Listed 2 March 2005 and re-listed 17 February 2007 and 3 November 2008

(Also known as: the al-Zarqawi network; al-Tawhid; Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad; Al-Tawhid and al-Jihad; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two rivers; Al-Qa’ida of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; Al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organisation of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; The Organisation Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; Tanzeem Qa’idat al-Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Kateab al-Tawhid; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; Brigades of Tawhid; Unity and Jihad Group; Unity and Holy Struggle; Unity and Holy War; AQI – Zarqawi; Islamic State in Iraq; and Mujahidin Shura Council.)

The following information is based on publicly available details about al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), formerly listed as Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR). AQI, under its various aliases, is listed in the United Nations 1267 Committee’s consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the US.

Current status of AQI

AQI is a Sunni Islamic extremist network established and originally led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, until his death on 7 June 2006. It has since been led by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, also known as Abu Ayyub al Masri.

The al-Zarqawi network emerged in 1999 as al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War), shortly after al-Zarqawi was released from prison, having served five years of a 15-year sentence for weapons possession. The group was mainly composed of Jordanian and Palestinian fighters who shared al-Zarqawi’s commitment to overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy. Over the next few years, al-Zarqawi focused on training Tawhid militants in Afghanistan and then Iran. He also planned and financed attacks in his homeland, including the assassination of US diplomat Laurence Foley in 2002, for which he was sentenced in absentia to death, and the disrupted plot to bomb the Raddison SAS Hotel in Amman along with several American, Israeli and Christian religious sites in Jordan, prior to New Year’s Day 2000. From May 2002, al-Zarqawi worked closely with Ansar al-Islam, until Ansar al-Islam and its members were scattered following intense military action in northern Iraq in 2003.

Al-Zarqawi’s group gained notoriety following attacks in 2003 on the UN headquarters in Baghdad (that killed 23 people, including the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello), and the kidnapping and televised beheading of US hostages Nicholas Berg, Jack Armstrong and Jack Hensley in 2004.

The name of al-Zarqawi’s network changed to Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR) on 17 October 2004, when al-Zarqawi publicly pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden via an internet posting. Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn literally translates as ‘The al-Qa’ida Organisation for Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers’. A statement by Usama bin Laden, broadcast on 27 December 2004, welcomed the union and exhorted mujahideen in Iraq to obey al-Zarqawi. As a result, the group is commonly referred to in Western parlance as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).

On 15 January 2006, it was announced that al-Zarqawi had brought together five jihadi groups in Iraq under one umbrella organisation, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC). Other members of the MSC included the Victorious Sect Army, Monotheism Supporters Brigades, Islamic Jihad Brigades, Foreigners Brigades and Fear Brigades. Though officially subsumed within the MSC, AQI still existed. As the dominant group within the MSC, AQI was responsible for attacks but carried them out in the Council’s name. On 15 October 2006, al-Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISoI), another umbrella organisation replete with a Cabinet and various ministries including War, Information and even Agriculture and Fisheries. As with the MSC, AQI is solely responsible for conducting the group’s various terrorist activities, but claims all attacks through the ISoI’s Ministry of Information.

AQI’s attempts to bring the Sunni insurgency under the religious strictures of the ISoI, together with the excessive brutality of its attacks on the civilian population, provided the catalyst for a widespread backlash from Sunni leaders. Many insurgent groups viewed AQI’s establishment of both the MSC and ISoI as thinly-veiled attempts to ‘Iraqify’ its image and thereby legitimise its claims as the sole authority in the Iraqi insurgency. The ISoI, with its stated objective of creating a trans-national caliphate in accordance with al-Qa’ida’s global Islamist ideology, was particularly disconcerting for nationalist elements within the Iraqi insurgency. AQI’s obsession with monopolising the movement was confirmed in late-2006, when Sunni tribal and nationalist leaders began challenging the group’s authority and the latter responded with a series of reprisals that involved the killing of thousands of tribal members and the assassination of high-profile insurgents such as 1920 Revolution Brigades leader, Harith Dhahir Khamis al-Dari.

In September 2006, angered by the killing of his father and two brothers by AQI, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha of the Albu Risha tribe, in Anbar, approached the US military with a view to combining forces against AQI. By March 2007, Abu Risha had brought together more than 40 tribes or sub-tribes under the auspices of the Anbar Awakening Council, and with US financial and military assistance AQI was driven out of Anbar province – once its core base of operations. Equally disenchanted with the increasing ruthlessness of AQI, Sunni tribal leaders who had previously fought alongside the insurgency followed Anbar’s example, and by December 2007, Awakening Councils had been established in a number of nearby provinces including Nineveh, Babil, Diyala, Salahuddin and Baghdad. As of April 2008, over 90,000 Iraqis had joined these Councils, variously referred to by the US military as ‘Concerned Local Citizens’ (CLCs) and ‘Sons of Iraq’.

These initiatives, along with continuing violent ructions within the insurgency itself and the US military’s willingness to provide financial backing to the Awakening Councils, have substantially eroded AQI’s capacity to conduct attacks in Iraq.

According to US statistics, the daily average of attacks by the Sunni insurgency has declined from 32 (about 960 a month) in early-2007, to 11 (about 330 a month) in the period between December 2007 and February 2008. Violence in several provinces and districts declined by as much as 90 per cent following the introduction of the Awakening Councils. According to the US military, 2,400 suspected members of AQI were killed and a further 8,800 captured during 2007. The number of foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria had reportedly plummeted from 110 a month in late summer to about 40 or 50 a month in February 2008. The number of AQI members across the country has plunged from about 12,000 in June 2007 to about 3,500 at the beginning of 2008. Nevertheless, AQI remains a lethal force in Iraq and was still responsible for 4,552 attacks in 2007 that killed 3,870 people and wounded 17,815.

The Awakening Councils have become a particular focus of insurgent activity, with AQI announcing on 14 September 2007 and again on 4 December 2007, its intent to target the growing number of Sons of Iraq cooperating with Coalition forces. Accordingly, attacks on Sons of Iraq leaders increased from 26 a month in October 2007 to 100 in January and February 2008. One of the first victims of this campaign was Abu Risha, the leader of the Anbar Awakening movement which had been largely responsible for driving AQI from Anbar province.

With the effective disruption of its activities in central Iraq, AQI has been pushed to a few key areas in northern Iraq – mainly Mosul, a large city in Nineveh, and the Za’ab triangle to the west of Kirkuk in the neighbouring province of Tammin. In Mosul, which is AQI’s strategic centre of gravity because of its proximity to the Syrian border, the increasing presence of insurgents has been especially conspicuous. From March to September 2007, there were about 7–9 attacks a day in Mosul and the surrounding area, but by the end of the year, as more and more insurgents moved north, this had increased to almost 15 attacks a day. By the middle of February 2008, attacks in Mosul were around 20 a day.

Though the bulk of its terrorist activities are now confined to northern Iraq, AQI is by no means a spent force. It has in recent months carried out some of its most lethal attacks, including a series of truck bombings in August 2007 on two Yazidi villages in northern Iraq that killed more than 500 people and injured a further 1,500. Other reports have stated the number of deaths at up to 700. It remains the single most deadly attack by insurgents since the US led invasion of 2003.

AQI, with its financial strength, long-term ideological appeal to young disaffected Iraqis and continuing strong capability, remains the most potent element in the Iraqi insurgency. Recognising this, the US military has commented that AQI is not a defeated force and is still capable of lethal attacks. AQI has also made statements indicating its intent to continue its activities and in this it has the full support of global al-Qa’ida.

Objectives

The objectives of AQI within Iraq are to overthrow the current Iraqi Government, expel the Multi-National Forces from the country, combat Shiite centres of power and establish an Islamic state under Sharia law. The continuing priority of these objectives is reflected in the group’s statements, which, as well as promoting the ISoI as the only legitimate Islamic authority in Iraq, almost invariably focus on tabulating AQI’s killing of ‘Crusaders’, Iraqi government and security forces, ‘spies and logistical support personnel’ – presumably referring to foreign contractors and Awakening Council members – and Shiite militia elements.

Beyond these immediate objectives, AQI seeks, through jihad, to liberate all Muslim territories from what it considers to be infidel regimes, an aspiration in which the eventual destruction of the ‘Zionist enemy’ figures prominently. It also promotes the long-term removal of governments of Muslim nations assessed by the network to be apostate.

Leadership and membership

AQI was established and continuously led by al-Zarqawi until his death on 7 June 2006. As of 13 June 2006 Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, an Egyptian formerly responsible for AQI’s intelligence operations and obtaining new recruits, has led the organisation. He adheres to an extreme interpretation of Islam, and, like Zarqawi, harbours a hatred of American ‘Crusaders’, Iraqi ‘impostors’ and ‘blasphemous’ Shiites. Closely aligned with fellow Egyptian al-Zawahiri, al-Muhajir in his first communiqué in June 2006 pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden.

The strength of the operational network in Iraq is not known. In 2005, AQI claimed to have 15 brigades, reportedly ranging from 100 to 300 operatives each, making a total of between 1,500 and 4,500 operatives. This figure is probably an underestimation, given the US military’s claim to have killed 2,400 suspected AQI operatives and captured a further 8,800 throughout 2007. Overall numbers may be as many as 10,000, while the organisation’s leadership is very small with an estimated 250 individuals comprising senior emirs, regional emirs and their staff.

In terms of AQI’s composition, Iraqis make up about 90 per cent of the organisation. AQI’s leadership, however, is predominantly foreign as are its suicide bombers. According to documents captured in Sinjar, a small town in northern Iraq situated approximately 15 kilometres from the Syrian border, a majority of foreign fighters joining AQI described their ‘work’ as suicide bombers. One recent study analysed 94 suicide bombers in Iraq and found that none were Iraqis – 44 were Saudi, seven Kuwaiti, seven European, six Syrian and the remainder came from across the Middle East and North Africa.

Targets, Methodology and Funding

AQI has been involved in thousands of terrorist attacks in Iraq against Multi-National Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, members of the Iraqi Government, foreigners, Iraqi civilians, especially Shiites but also tribal and fellow insurgent leaders in the Sunni community, and international facilities. Methods of attack are manifold and include small arms ambushes, mortar and artillery rocket attacks, person-borne suicide attacks, roadside bombings, kidnappings and executions. However, AQI is best known for its vehicle-borne suicide bombings. In this the organisation has proven capable, ensuring detonation by using auto-destruct triggers in front bumpers or by using suicide vests on drivers. To overcome suspicion, AQI has also perpetrated attacks using aid vehicles, including ambulances and fire trucks, and vehicles with children on board.

Recently, AQI has also made use of female suicide bombers who can easily conceal explosives beneath their abaya robes and who frequently escape the scrutiny of Iraqi security forces because of the lack of sufficient numbers of policewomen to conduct female searches. As a result, the number of female suicide attacks has risen sharply from eight in 2007 to 21 in the first six months of 2008. AQI used this tactic on 1 February 2008, when two mentally disabled women were used as suicide bombers in an attack on Baghdad pet bazaars that killed almost 100 people.

The network has also undertaken attacks outside of Iraq, especially in Jordan (suicide bomb attacks against hotels in Amman in November 2005 that killed 60 people). Al-Zarqawi also claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on the town of Kiryat Shimona in Israel in 2005. AQI undoubtedly maintains the intent, and possibly the capacity through its foreign fighter network and international links, to strike at Western interests outside Iraq.

Australia is seen as a target by AQI. This is demonstrated by its claim of responsibility for an attack against an Australian Defence Force convoy in Baghdad on 25 October 2004 and an attack near the Australian Embassy in Baghdad on 19 January 2005.

To fund its activities, AQI to some extent relies on regional supporters. These so-called ‘armchair jihadists’ are mainly concentrated in the Sunni Arab Diaspora, especially Saudi Arabia, but Jordan and Syria have also been identified as sources of funding for AQI. Mostly, however, AQI derives its money from criminal activities. As well as intimidating host communities for ‘tribute’, ransoming kidnap victims, car theft and commandeering rations, AQI has tapped into the lucrative fuel market to finance its activities. This generally involves AQI’s oil-stealing gangs hijacking fuel trucks and either diverting shipments to Jordan or Syria where prices are higher, or crossing the border into Iran, changing to Iranian license plates and then returning to Iraq under the guise of legitimacy to sell the fuel at higher prices.

AQI disseminates its ideological message through al-Qa’ida’s media outlet, the Global Islamic Media Group, while its Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production supports the production and distribution of videos showing attacks claimed by AQI. The matter contained in these communiqués is almost invariably violent in nature, praising its ‘martyrs’, calling upon the organisation’s followers to perpetrate attacks against the ‘Unholy Trinity’ of Christians, Jews and Shiites, and regularly providing a ‘harvest’ of enemy kills.

AQI’s engagement in terrorist activities

AQI, though destabilised by recent events, is still capable of conducting high-profile lethal attacks against a variety of sectarian, Sunni, Iraqi Government and Coalition targets. Significant recent attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by, or reliably attributed to AQI have included:

• 22 February 2006: Attack on the Shi’a al-Askariyah Golden Mosque in Samarra (the Golden Mosque in Samarra is one of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam and the bombing, which severely damaged the golden dome, sparked a wave of sectarian violence);
• 19 June 2006: Two US soldiers taken hostage on 16 June were found dead. Both bodies were mutilated and one was beheaded;
• 25 June 2006: Four Russian diplomats taken hostage on 3 June 2006 were executed. The executions were filmed showing one shot in the head and at least two being beheaded;
• 23 November 2006: A series of bombings in the predominantly Shiite section of Sadr City, in northern Baghdad, killed at least 200 people and injured a further 250;
• 28 January 2007: The first chlorine-boosted chemical truck bomb was detonated in Ramadi, capital of Anbar province, killing more than a dozen people;
• 10 May 2007: Nine Iraqi security officers were filmed being blindfolded and shot execution-style in the back of the head. A voice believed to be that of al-Muhajir said the men were ‘traitors and deserved to die’;
• 13 May 2007: Attack on Kurdistan Democratic Party headquarters in Makhmor, near Mosul, killing almost 50 people and wounding more than 120;
• 25 June 2007: A suicide bomber blew himself up at a gathering of tribal sheiks associated with the Anbar Awakening Council, killing 13 and wounding 21 others.
• August 2007: A series of car bombings targeting Yazidi villages in northern Iraq that killed as many as 700 people;
• February 2008: Two mentally disabled female suicide bombers blew themselves up in Baghdad markets mainly frequented by Shiites, killing almost 100 people and wounding hundreds of others;
• 15 April 2008: A wave of bombings in Baghdad and the provincial capitals of Baquba, Ramadi and Mosul killed 60 people and injured 100 others;
• 17 April 2008: A suicide bomber killed 50 mourners and wounded 60 when he detonated a bomb in a crowd of people attending a funeral for two cousins who had been fighting AQI insurgents in Diyala province, in northern Iraq;
• 10 May 2008: A suicide bomber killed 22 mourners and injured at least 40 others at a funeral in the village of Abu Munasir, in Anbar province, attended by Sunni tribesmen opposed to AQI;
• 22 June 2008: A female suicide bomber blew herself up outside a government complex in northern Baghdad, killing 15 people and wounding another 40;
• 26 June 2008: In Anbar province, a suicide bomber detonated a vest of explosives during a meeting of US troops and local tribal leaders, causing at least 20 deaths including three American Marines.