© Commonwealth of Australia 2017

With the exception of the Coat of Arms and where otherwise stated, all material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (www.creativecommons.org/licenses).

For the avoidance of doubt, this means this licence only applies to material as set out in this document.

The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website as is the full legal code for the CC BY 4.0 licence (www.creativecommons.org/licenses).

Use of the Coat of Arms

The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet website (www.dpmc.gov.au/government/commonwealth-coat-arms).
## Contents

**PREFACE** 1

**SECURITY CONTEXT** 1

**PURPOSE OF THE PLAN** 2

**NATIONAL COORDINATION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK** 2
- Commonwealth, State and Territory Responsibilities 2
- Coordination Bodies and Inter-governmental-agreements 2
- Legal Framework 9

**PREPAREDNESS** 10
- National Terrorism Threat Advisory System and Public Messaging 10
- National counter-terrorism capabilities and preparedness 10
- Exercising and Training 10
- Public Information (including media liaison) 11
- Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Arrangements 12
- Community/Private Sector Awareness and Partnerships 12
  - Protecting Crowded Places 12
- Science and Technology for National Security 13
- International Preparedness Arrangements 13

**PREVENTION** 14
- Disrupting Terrorist Activity within Australia 14
  - Intelligence 14
  - Investigation 14
  - Arrest and Prosecution 15
  - Legislative Measures 15
  - Counter-Terrorism Financing 15
  - Border Control 16
  - Returning Australians of Counter-Terrorism Interest 16
  - Dignitary and Foreign Mission Protection 16
  - Cyber Security 16
  - Hazardous Material Security 16
  - Transport Security (Aviation, Maritime, Surface) 17
  - Aviation 17
  - Maritime 17
  - Surface – Rail, Ferries, Bus 18
  - Countering Violent Extremism 18
  - National Intervention Program 18
  - Challenging terrorist propaganda 18
  - Building community resilience and social cohesion 19
- International arrangements for prevention 19
# RESPONSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Context</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Arrangements</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Governmental Coordination</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Government Role</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Terrorist Situation</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information (including media liaison)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous Material Incidents</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Arrangements for Response</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Government Coordination</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Head of Mission</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending Personnel Overseas</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intelligence Coordination</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police to Police and Law Enforcement Engagement</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Government Evacuations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States and Territories Assistance</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Partnerships</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information - International</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## RECOVERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hazards Crisis Management Arrangements</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Context</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Arrangements from Response to Relief and Recovery</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational and Coordination Arrangements</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Territory Role</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Role</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Messaging</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance and Economic Recovery</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Arrangements for Recovery</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim and Family Assistance</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification and Repatriation of Remains</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance Payments for Terrorist Events Overseas</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## GOVERNANCE AND REVIEW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## ANNEX A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency Roles</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States and Territories</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Government</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

1. The current terrorism threat to Australia and Australian interests is unprecedented in our history. The national terrorism threat level in Australia was raised in September 2014 and remains PROBABLE - credible intelligence, assessed by our security agencies indicates that individuals or groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. Terrorism is an enduring challenge for Australia; there is little prospect of significant improvement in the near future.

2. State, Territory and Commonwealth agencies work together to combat this threat with a focus on prevention as the first line of defence against terrorism. Their actions are informed by thorough analysis and assessment of intelligence on violent extremism here and abroad.

3. In response to the heightened threat, in July 2015 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) released Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (the Strategy). The Strategy sets out the framework for Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements and situates Australia’s current terrorism threat within the global context. It identifies five interconnected elements necessary to meet the enduring challenge:
   • Challenging violent extremist ideologies;
   • Stopping people from becoming terrorists;
   • Shaping the global environment to counter terrorism;
   • Disrupting terrorist activity within Australia; and
   • Having effective responses and recovery should an attack occur.

4. Agencies in State, Territory and Commonwealth governments – as well as the private sector and communities – are working both individually and collectively in support of these elements, with the over-arching objectives of protecting lives, upholding our values, and bringing terrorists to justice.

SECURITY CONTEXT

5. Terrorism poses a direct and ongoing threat to the safety and wellbeing of Australians both in Australia and abroad. The threat associated with violent extremist ideologies is of paramount concern. The ideological justifications for attacks are not limited to Islamist extremist ideologies but also include terrorism based on other ideological, political or religious beliefs – such as right or left wing extremists.

6. The terrorist threat can manifest across jurisdictional boundaries and it requires a coordinated, considered and comprehensive national response. Despite our best efforts there can be no guarantees that a terrorist attack will not occur.

7. International terrorist groups have proven adept at using their extremist ideology to motivate sympathisers and supporters to conduct terrorist attacks globally. Australians and Australian interests abroad can and have been impacted by terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks linked to the conflicts in the Middle East have been seen in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Of concern to Australia’s security interests and our region are the growing links between extremists in the Middle East and extremist groups in South East Asia.

8. Notwithstanding the significant time and effort put into legislation, resource allocation and capability development, Australian governments cannot provide the whole solution to the terrorist threat. The private sector and the community have critical roles to play in Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts.

9. Up to date threat information and details regarding Australia’s response to the terrorist threat can be found on the Australian National Security website at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au
PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

10. Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Plan (the Plan) outlines the arrangements, governance and operational responsibilities of Australian governments and agencies engaged in countering terrorism. The plan sets the framework for preventative activities, the response to, investigation of, and recovery from, terrorist acts and the preparations to support these activities.

11. It is underpinned by the prepare, prevent, respond and recover (PPRR) model. The PPRR model recognises that activities will be interconnected and will often occur concurrently.

12. The Plan sits below and complements Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which provides an overarching strategic framework for Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements.

13. The Plan is supported by detailed documentation, including the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook (the Handbook). The Handbook provides specific operational guidance for government agencies and accordingly is not publicly available.

14. The Plan supports and is guided by the principles outlined in the Strategy:
   i. Protecting lives is the absolute priority;
   ii. Governments and the community must face the challenge of terrorism together; and
   iii. Terrorist acts are crimes to be dealt with through the criminal justice system.

15. The Plan recognises that counter-terrorism is a shared responsibility of all sectors of society, including all levels of government, the private sector and the community. The Plan adopts the following approaches:
   i. Australian governments and agencies are committed to an intelligence-led approach to assessment and treatment of the terrorist threat;
   ii. Jurisdictions will adopt a cooperative national approach to counter-terrorism with a focus on interoperability; and
   iii. In the interest of public safety, early disruption of planned attacks will often be prioritised over waiting to gather further evidence for a successful prosecution.

NATIONAL COORDINATION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Commonwealth, State and Territory Responsibilities

16. Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements reflect Australia’s federal system of government. Tables 1 and 2 outline the respective roles and responsibilities the Commonwealth, States and Territories, local government, the private sector and the community have in preparing for, preventing, responding to and recovering from a terrorist act.

Coordination Bodies and Inter-governmental-agreements

17. The Commonwealth, State and Territory governments and their agencies work together to effectively align all aspects of Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy. Within the inter-governmental framework, the bodies outlined in Figures 1 to 4 have responsibilities for strategic-level coordination of counter-terrorism policy and related security response.
Table 1 – Commonwealth, State and Territory Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES AND TERRITORIES</th>
<th>COMMONWEALTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• maintain counter-terrorism related policies, legislation and plans within their jurisdictions with a view to national consistency and interoperability;</td>
<td>• maintain national counter-terrorism related policies, legislation and plans;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• contribute to national counter-terrorism related policies, legislation and plans, including the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook;</td>
<td>• determine and promulgate the national terrorism threat level and public narrative, in consultation with the States and Territories;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• develop and maintain core counter-terrorism capabilities in the agencies listed in Annex A;</td>
<td>• regulate aviation, maritime transport and offshore oil and gas sectors, administer relevant legislation and work with industry to ensure they meet their regulatory obligations and achieve security outcomes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• train and exercise counter-terrorism plans and capabilities to maintain readiness, assess and review capability and identify improvements;</td>
<td>• work with State and Territory governments to develop a consistent and coordinated approach to securing the surface transport sector;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• support and coordinate critical infrastructure resilience in their jurisdictions;</td>
<td>• support national coordination of critical infrastructure resilience;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• support local government and the private sector, including owners and operators of crowded places, to protect their sites;</td>
<td>• support national preparedness and response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• develop, implement and maintain emergency management plans to respond appropriately to chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) incidents;</td>
<td>• support national health measures that are relevant to counter-terrorism preparedness;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• develop, implement and maintain emergency management plans to support responses to nuclear incidents prior to the provision of Commonwealth and other specialist assistance when required;</td>
<td>• maintain Defence capabilities to assist with domestic terrorist incidents on request from States and Territories;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• support health measures that are relevant to counter-terrorism preparedness;</td>
<td>• train and exercise counter-terrorism plans and capabilities to maintain readiness, assess and review capability and identify improvements;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• develop and deliver CVE activities to prevent, divert or rehabilitate individuals from violent extremism and address the social impacts of violent extremism within their jurisdictions;</td>
<td>• provide Defence capabilities and effects including across the PPRR spectrum including intelligence, training, exercising, international engagement and capacity building;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• determine prevention strategies and operational responses through the JCTT arrangements;</td>
<td>• provide oversight and coordination of nationally significant CVE projects to prevent, divert or rehabilitate individuals from violent extremism and efforts to address the social impacts of violent extremism, including support for best practice in CVE across all levels of government and lead on Australia’s terrorist propaganda program;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• support the provision of protection to selected Australian high office holders, diplomats, foreign dignitaries and high profile visitors with the Commonwealth;</td>
<td>• determines Commonwealth Government prevention strategies and operational responses to threats and preventative CT investigations through the JCTTs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• have primary responsibility for the first response to a terrorist act in their jurisdiction;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STATE/TERRITORY

- in the event of terrorist act, consult and seek agreements with the Commonwealth on the need to declare a National Terrorist Situation; and
- lead recovery efforts in their jurisdictions; and
- maintain recovery coordination capabilities in the agencies listed in Annex A.

COMMONWEALTH

- lead the coordination and dissemination of relevant intelligence obtained by/from the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) and the AFP to State and Territory partner agencies in order to combat terrorist threats;
- coordinate the national response to maritime terrorist incidents;
- coordinate the provision of protection to selected Australian high office holders, diplomats, foreign dignitaries and high profile visitors with State and Territory jurisdictions;
- provide Commonwealth Government coordination of cyber security including in relation to cyber security policy and incident response;
- in a National Terrorist Situation, undertake activities to support collaboration and coordination in close consultation with affected States and Territories;
- support national coordination of public information in relation to terrorism;
- support the States and Territories in their first response to a terrorist act within their jurisdictions;
- provide financial and other support for recovery; and
- maintain counter-terrorism capabilities within the Commonwealth agencies listed in Annex A.

Figure 1- Intergovernmental Agreements and Coordination Bodies relating to Counter-Terrorism

INTER GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS THAT RELATE TO COUNTER TERRORISM:
- The Inter-governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements
- The Inter-governmental Agreement on Counter-Terrorism Laws
- The Inter-governmental Agreement on Surface Transport Security
- The Inter-governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Arrangements for the Management of Security Risks Associated with Chemicals

NATIONAL

Council of Australian Governments (COAG)
Australia-New Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC)
National Crisis Committee (NCC)
Police, Transport, Emergency Management, Health and Security Intelligence Coordination

COMMONWEALTH

National Security Committee of the Cabinet (NSC)
Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS)
Commonwealth Counter Terrorism Coordination
Joint Counter-Terrorism Board
Commonwealth Crisis Arrangements
Australian Government Crisis Committee (AGCC)
Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF)
Australian Government Disaster Recovery Committee (AGDRC)

STATE/TERRITORY

State/Territory Cabinet Committees
State/Territory security coordination bodies
State/Territory Crisis Centre (SCC/TCC)
Table 2 – Local Government, Private Sector and Community Roles

Local government, the private sector and the community, to varying levels, assist in Australia’s preparedness, prevention, response and recovery efforts by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL GOVERNMENT &amp; PRIVATE SECTOR ROLES</th>
<th>COMMUNITY ROLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• staying informed and be aware of the current terrorist threat environment and arrangements through publicly available information;</td>
<td>• staying informed and being aware of the current terrorist threat environment and arrangements through publicly available information;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• recognising that they have primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including the threat of terrorist attack;</td>
<td>• reporting any material found on the internet that is violent extremist in nature or could encourage radicalisation towards violence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• supporting the development and implementation of CVE activities and efforts to build community resilience to violent extremism;</td>
<td>• being aware of their surroundings and reporting suspicious or unusual behaviour to authorities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• raising awareness of possible security threats among their staff and patrons;</td>
<td>• monitoring public announcements during a terrorist act or threat to remain aware of what is required of them and what will assist in the management of the situation; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• undertaking risk assessments and/or vulnerability analysis of their sites;</td>
<td>• engaging with Government agencies in regard to recovery efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• implementing the appropriate mitigations, monitoring them for effectiveness (including through audits), and reviewing them at appropriate junctures;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• regularly testing security, emergency and contingency plans;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• participating in exercises to assist in harmonising prevention, response and recovery arrangements with relevant controlling agencies;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• sharing security information with State and Territory police and relevant government agencies;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• reporting any security incidents or suspicious activity to State and Territory police at the earliest opportunity;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• implementing and coordinating initial response activities in the event of a terrorist act; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• engaging with government agencies in regards to recovery efforts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2 – Standing Commonwealth, State and Territory Coordination Bodies

**COAG - Council of Australian Governments**
- **Chair**: Prime Minister
- **Australia’s peak inter-governmental forum**
- **Comprised of**: State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers and President of the Australian Local Government Association

**ANZCTC - Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee**
- **Chair**: Commonwealth Deputy Secretary with National Counter-Terrorism responsibilities and State/Territory or New Zealand Representative
- **National coordinating body for counter-terrorism; reports to COAG**
- **Comprised of**: Senior representatives from relevant Australian and New Zealand Government agencies, First Ministers’ departments and police from each jurisdiction
- **Role**: provide strategic and policy advice to government and ministers, coordinate an effective national counter-terrorism capability, maintain arrangements for sharing of intelligence & information, maintaining the Plan and associated documentation
- The ANZCTC itself has no operational role. However, Australian ANZCTC members have specific jurisdictional responsibilities and may be members of any National Crisis Committee (NCC) that is convened in relation to a terrorist incident

**Police, Transport, Emergency Managment, Health and Security Intelligence Coordination**
- **Police coordination occurs through consultation between all Commissioners of Police to determine the national police response to terrorism, including any resulting investigation**
- **Transport security is managed through the Transport Security Committee (TSC); the main forum for governments to develop a consistent and coordinated approach to Australia’s surface transport security. The Commonwealth provides a strategic leadership role through the Office of Transport Security (OTS)**
- **Emergency management coordination occurs through consultation between the affected jurisdiction(s) and Emergency Management Australia (EMA). EMA is responsible for coordinating Commonwealth response, recovery and consequence management support to the affected jurisdiction(s) and coordination between jurisdictions for the provision of operational assistance**
- **Health coordination occurs through the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) chaired by the Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer. The AHPPC coordinates the national response to a health disaster arising from either a natural event or from a terrorist incident**
- **Security intelligence coordination occurs through standing information sharing and investigation coordination arrangements including pre-existing intelligence dissemination channels within the Commonwealth and with State and Territory jurisdictions**

**NSC - National Security Committee of the Cabinet**
- **Chair**: Prime Minister
- **Role**: Focal point for discussions and decisions on major issues relevant to Australia’s national security interests. These may include international security issues of strategic relevance, Australian border security, national responses to domestic and international crises, terrorist incidents, military operations (including the deployment of Australian Defence Force) and the operation and activities of the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC)

**SCNS - Secretaries Committee on National Security**
- **Chair**: Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C)
- **Comprised of**: the heads of agencies engaged in national security issues
- **Role**: serves as the peak officials-level committee considering national security matters and supports the coordination of national security policy across government. The SCNS agenda is broadly influenced by the forward NSC work programme, and provides a forum for SCNS members to discuss broader strategic themes of national security significance

**Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordination**
- **Coordinator**: Commonwealth Deputy Secretary with National Counter-Terrorism responsibilities
- **Role**: Supports Australia’s strategic counter-terrorism agenda, through facilitative coordination of Commonwealth departments and agencies in their work to deliver effective counter-terrorism outcomes. Operational coordination is provided through facilitative engagement with Australian departments and agencies, including across jurisdictions and in conjunction with international partners
JCTB - Joint Counter-Terrorism Board

- **Chair**: Commonwealth Deputy Secretary with National Counter-Terrorism responsibilities
- Senior level committee that sets the strategic direction and priorities for the Commonwealth’s counter-terrorism efforts and oversees the effective implementation of new counter-terrorism measures endorsed by government
- **Role**: to provide strategic advice and support to improve strategic direction within the national security community and to support the coordination of policy development and crisis response

State and Territory security coordination bodies

- State and Territory security coordination bodies are comprised of senior officials and/or ministers who may determine whole of government policy and/or public information strategies in response to a terrorist incident
- State and Territory whole of government counter-terrorism policies and arrangements are determined by relevant bodies acting under State / Territory laws and arrangements

Figure 3 – Commonwealth, State and Territory Crisis Coordination Bodies

NCC - National Crisis Committee

- **Chair**: Relevant Commonwealth Deputy Secretary
- **Comprised of**: Representatives from First Ministers’ departments and relevant members of other Commonwealth and jurisdictional agencies
- **Role**: Senior level multi-jurisdictional committee established to exchange and coordinate information and the sourcing and delivery of support in the event of a terrorist act. May be convened at the request of an affected State or Territory or PM&C. In the event of a terrorist incident, the NCC will consider the factors that lead to an NTS determination and may make a recommendation for consideration by the Prime Minister and First Minister(s) of the affected jurisdiction(s)

AGCC - Australian Government Crisis Committee

- **Chair**: Relevant Commonwealth Deputy Secretary
- **Comprised of**: Senior officials from Commonwealth agencies
- **Role**: The AGCC is the Commonwealth’s senior crisis management mechanism that is primarily concerned with domestic events. The AGCC draws together capability and expertise from across government to provide comprehensive and coherent whole-of-government advice to the Prime Minister, the lead minister and other relevant ministers on the Australian Government’s response to a crisis. Where necessary, the AGCC coordinates with states and territories through the National Crisis Committee (NCC). The AGCC does not manage the deployment of resources or other activities of operational agencies

IDETF - Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force

- **Chair**: Representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). May be co-chaired by PM&C
- **Comprised of**: Representatives from DFAT, PM&C, the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), Defence, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), with other government agencies co-opted as necessary
- **Role**: responsible for coordinating the whole-of-government Commonwealth response to all overseas crises, including terrorist acts

AGDRC - Australian Government Disaster Recovery Committee

- **Chair**: Relevant Commonwealth Deputy Secretary
- **Comprised of**: senior officials from Commonwealth departments and agencies
- **Role**: responsible for coordinating whole-of-Australian-Government social and community recovery assistance following an onshore or offshore disaster of national significance

AGCCC - Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre

- **Role**: Dedicated all-hazards facility that operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The centre provides whole-of-government situational awareness to inform national decision-making during a crisis. This includes the coordination of physical assistance as well as briefing and support to executive decision-makers in the Australian Government, the State and Territory governments and non-government agencies. Operated by Emergency Management Australia (EMA) within the Attorney-General’s Department
GWO - Global Watch Office

- **Role:** Provide a single 24 hours a day, seven days a week point of contact for whole-of-government responses to international events and crises affecting Australians or Australian interests. The Global Watch Office is a facility in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) that operates alongside the Consular Emergency Centre. In the event of a crisis incident overseas, the Global Watch Office provides the first advice to government and affected Australians. DFAT can then quickly activate whole-of-government crisis responses, update travel advice, and provide around-the-clock advice. The Global Watch Office produces talking points and background material, and delivers a morning daily product to over 900 recipients with a snapshot of key international events that affected Australian interests.

SCC / TCC - State or Territory Crisis Centre

- **Role:** supports jurisdictional executive decision-makers and facilitates inter-jurisdictional strategic communication. The SCC/TCC will also coordinate public information messages with other States/Territories and the Commonwealth Government
- A State or Territory may elect to activate a Crisis Centre during a preventive activity; however, in most cases, a Crisis Centre would be activated to support the management of a response to a terrorist act

---

**Figure 4 - National Counter-Terrorism Crisis Management Arrangements**

Diagram showing the national counter-terrorism crisis management arrangements, including the First Minister, Prime Minister, Ministerial Committee, Ministerial Committee (National Security Committee), State & Territory security coordination committees, National Crisis Committee, Australian Government Crisis Committee, Crisis Coordination Centre, Australian Government agencies, State and Territory response and command arrangements, State and Territory Crisis Centre(s), State & Territory agencies, Locally based Australian Government, and Coordinated intelligence and investigations.
Legal Framework

18. Australia has a comprehensive, cooperative and nationally coherent counter-terrorism legislative framework that enables Australia’s law enforcement, intelligence and prosecution agencies to prevent terrorist acts occurring and to investigate and prosecute those who commit acts of terrorism or who seek to commit such acts.²

19. The Commonwealth and States and Territories are responsible for maintaining this framework and ensuring that it is effective in responding to the evolving threat of terrorism.

20. The Inter-governmental Agreement on Counter-Terrorism Laws provides for consultation to occur between the Commonwealth and State and Territory governments on amendments to federal terrorism offences and on the proscription of terrorist organisations. Where appropriate, the Commonwealth will consult with, and seek the approval of, States and Territories to change aspects of the legislative framework.

21. State and Territory legislation provides special powers to support law enforcement agencies’ response to terrorist acts and suspected acts, and to seek to prevent suspected imminent terrorist acts within their jurisdictions.

22. At the forefront of the framework are the terrorism offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which are targeted at individuals who engage in, train for, prepare, plan, finance or otherwise support terrorist activities. The Criminal Code also contains offences in relation to foreign incursions, which are particularly relevant to charging and prosecuting foreign fighters.

23. Many of Australia’s terrorism and foreign incursions offences target preparatory conduct, which allows law enforcement agencies to disrupt activities and arrest and charge persons at an earlier stage.

24. The framework contains appropriate safeguards and review processes to ensure there is a balance between national security requirements, personal privacy and the public interest.

PREPAREDNESS

25. Preparedness refers to the process of understanding the terrorist threat and communicating, planning, resourcing and exercising to ensure governments, agencies, the private sector and the community are best able to prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorist act. Preparedness measures include the development, testing and review of counter-terrorism arrangements.

26. A key aspect of preparedness is the development and maintenance of the capabilities required by agencies and personnel. This includes the development of specialist skills through training, exercising and the acquisition of equipment.

27. Interoperability between agencies and jurisdictions is vitally important. Key to this is the development of complementary and coordinated plans and consistent capability development.

28. The private sector, the community and local organisations have critical roles in achieving appropriate levels of preparedness and Australian governments and their responsible agencies will keep them informed and ensure they are effectively engaged.

National Terrorism Threat Advisory System and Public Messaging

29. The National Terrorism Threat Advisory System (NTTAS) comprises: the National Terrorism Threat Level – a five tier scale (see figure 5); and an accompanying public statement (or narrative) which provides further information such as the nature of the terrorist threat facing Australia and our interests.

30. The Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) sets the National Terrorism Threat Level on the basis of intelligence. The threat level is regularly reviewed and updated in-line with the security environment.

31. Details regarding the NTTAS and the current National Terrorism Threat level are available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

National counter-terrorism capabilities and preparedness

32. Agencies at Commonwealth, State and Territory levels maintain a variety of capabilities for use to counter terrorism.

33. The Inter-governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements aims to enhance Australia’s counter-terrorism capability through a cooperative partnership between all jurisdictions.

34. The effectiveness of capabilities is tested through training and exercise programs, assessment of utility in operations, and by drawing on international experience and benchmarks.

35. The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) provides strategic guidance, policy coordination and invests in nationally consistent approaches to capability development with an emphasis on interoperability.

36. Interoperability activities include shared exercising and doctrine, consistent training, effective information sharing and procurement of specialised equipment and technology that may be otherwise unavailable to jurisdictional members.
Exercising and Training

37. Exercise activities are a key element of capability development and support continuous improvement through the maintenance, development and evaluation of counter-terrorism capabilities.

38. Agencies and jurisdictions undertake training activities designed to ensure that they have the capabilities required for preventative, response and recovery activities including the investigation of terrorist acts. A key outcome of exercising and training is to ensure interoperability and cohesion across capabilities and jurisdictions.

39. Exercising provides the opportunity for multi-agency, cross sector engagement including:
   • testing current plans and arrangements to identify capability gaps;
   • validating and confirming levels of capability achievement;
   • validating training and informing training requirements;
   • developing and maintaining interoperability;
   • informing the review and development of security legislation, policy, plans, arrangements and processes; and
   • maintaining consistency in the application of the national counter-terrorism arrangements.

40. Jurisdictions are responsible for the training and accreditation (where appropriate) of first responders and specialist policing capabilities according to their requirements.

41. Training in relation to specialist police capabilities is undertaken in line with ANZCTC guidelines and jurisdictional requirements. All training programs and operational procedures are regularly reviewed and evaluated based on the best available evidence and feedback from relevant situations.

Public Information (including media liaison)

42. Commonwealth and State and Territory governments ensure that public information and media liaison activities work to:
   • improve the public’s understanding of the terrorism threat and Australia’s arrangements to counter that threat;
   • generate confidence in Australia’s ability to respond to any terrorist act, threat or activity;
   • ensure consistent and coordinated messages are delivered in a timely manner; and
   • ensure public information promotes community harmony and discourages all forms of hatred, vilification and violent extremism.

43. States and Territories are responsible, within their jurisdictions, for public messaging in the event of a terrorist act or a change in the national terrorism threat level.

44. The national approach to the sharing of public information, facilitated by the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), assists in providing consistent and coordinated public messaging across all facets of Australia’s counter-terrorism effort.

45. In the event of a terrorist act or a change in the national terrorism threat level, AGD Media have overall responsibility for coordinating all Commonwealth public information and media activity. The AGD Media team will act as the coordination point between Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies, including through co-location of Media Liaison Officers within the relevant State or Territory media unit as required.
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Arrangements

46. The Commonwealth, State and Territory governments have complementary critical infrastructure programs designed to support both the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorism, and its resilience against a range of threats and hazards.

47. Commonwealth, State and Territory governments work together with the private sector to maximise information sharing, increase the awareness of threats and hazards, and develop solutions to common security and resilience challenges.

48. State and Territory police are responsible for disseminating relevant intelligence and threat information to appropriate sectors and owner and operators.

49. Owners and operators of critical infrastructure are ultimately responsible for determining and discharging their own legal obligations and managing risks to their operations that might have a material, financial, legal or reputational impact on the organisation, or harm staff, customers or other parties.

50. The AGD manages the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) which provides a secure environment in which critical infrastructure owners and operators meet regularly to share information on security issues relevant to the protection of critical infrastructure. Coordination and strategic guidance for the TISN is provided by the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC).

51. The Guidelines for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism are available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

Community/Private Sector Awareness and Partnerships

52. The private sector and the community can assist in Australia’s preparedness, prevention, response and recovery efforts through staying informed and being aware of the national counter-terrorism arrangements through publicly available information such as in this Plan and on the national security website www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

53. The National Security Hotline (1800 123 400) allows the private sector and the community to report possible terrorist activities to the appropriate authorities 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Protecting Crowded Places

54. Australia’s Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism (the Crowded Places Strategy) provides owners and operators and other stakeholders, across both the public and private sectors, with contemporary and consistent national guidance to help build and maintain the capacity to protect crowded places from terrorism.

55. The Crowded Places Strategy provides a structure for building a consistent national approach to protecting crowded places that can be applied flexibly throughout Australia.

56. The Crowded Places Advisory Group (CPAG) is a body that reports to and advises the ANZCTC on protecting crowded places from terrorism.

57. The CPAG works with, and is advised by, the Business Advisory Group (BAG). The BAG’s membership consists of representatives of crowded places with a national presence. It operates a national forum through which crowded place owners and operators, peak industry bodies, government representatives, and international partners share information and advice. The BAG also enables drills and training for its members.
58. Information and guidance developed by the CPAG is shared, where appropriate, with owners and operators in all jurisdictions through the BAG and State and Territory Crowded Places Forums.

59. ASIO hosts a Business and Government Liaison Unit (BGLU) website that contains intelligence-backed unclassified reporting on the domestic and international security environment. To complement the website, the BGLU engages directly with government and business stakeholders to build a common understanding and strong mutually beneficial relationships.

60. Additional information and supplementary guidelines associated with the Crowded Places Strategy can be found at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au)

**Science and Technology for National Security**

61. The Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group’s National Security Science and Technology Centre (NSSTC) coordinates’ whole-of-government science and technology for national security in order to prioritise requirements, reduce duplication and improve impact. To achieve this, the NSSTC fosters academic, industry and international partnerships to leverage state of the art capabilities for Australia.

62. In addition, the NSSTC manages the DST Group national security science and technology program to maximise dual use applications of DST Group capabilities.

**International Preparedness Arrangements**

63. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is responsible for international engagement for the Commonwealth supported by other Commonwealth agencies who maintain an international presence or international links to facilitate cooperative activities including intelligence sharing, collaboration and liaison.

64. DFAT promotes Australia’s counter-terrorism interests through effective international advocacy, cooperation and capacity building. DFAT in cooperation with all Commonwealth agencies identifies and prioritises opportunities for strengthening Australia’s international counter-terrorism engagement. It also works with agencies on thematic or country specific issues.

65. The Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) and AFP have well established international networks and partnerships which are used to support domestic counter-terrorism arrangements.

66. Defence undertakes an extensive program of counter terrorism engagement and capacity-building activities with international partners.

67. The Commonwealth Government has structures in place to make information available to Australians on security threats overseas. DFAT’s country travel advisories assist Australians travelling overseas to make well-informed and responsible travel decisions. The travel advisories contain information about safety and security issues, and other useful, practical tips on health, local laws, local customs and entry/exit requirements. In addition, the Government maintains contingency plans, which it may activate in response to an international incident affecting Australians overseas, including terrorist acts.
PREVENTION

68. The Plan approaches Prevention from two perspectives: by preventing people or diverting people from becoming terrorists and by preventing terrorist attacks through intelligence-led disruption.

69. Prevention is undertaken through:
   • the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence;
   • investigating the planning of, support for and facilitation of terrorist activity;
   • employing measures to protect the community and assets;
   • countering violent extremism activities, including challenging terrorist propaganda (including online), building the resilience of communities to resist or reject violent extremist influences and developing tailored intervention programs; and
   • influencing the international environment.

Disrupting Terrorist Activity within Australia

Intelligence

70. Australia’s approach to counter-terrorism relies upon a strong intelligence-led framework.

71. Intelligence is collected and developed in many forms by agencies across the Australian national security community including the agencies of the AIC, AFP and State and Territory police. Relevant agencies use this intelligence to identify emerging threats and determine operational or policy responses.

72. The National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC), located within ASIO, prepares assessments of the likelihood and probable nature of terrorism and protest violence, including against Australia, Australians and Australian interests here and abroad, special events and international interests in Australia. NTAC threat assessments support jurisdictions and agencies to make risk management decisions to determine how best to respond to the threat and mitigate risk.

73. State and Territory police and the AFP manage ongoing threat information at the tactical and operational level. Intelligence assessments are produced by State and Territory police and the AFP to support and guide operational decision making.

Investigation

74. State and Territory police and the AFP maintain investigative capabilities to detect and prevent terrorism related activity and to collect evidence that may be used in prosecutions for terrorism and terrorism-related offences.

75. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation and the Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams (JCTT) provide and establish a nationally consistent governance framework for the strategic management of counter-terrorism investigations in jurisdiction(s).

76. JCTTs are established in each State and Territory and comprise AFP, State and Territory law enforcement, ASIO and other government agencies as per each jurisdiction’s arrangements. The JCTTs provide a coordinated and consistent approach to combating terrorism.
77. JCTTs conduct threat based preventative investigations with a view to utilising a variety of measures to minimise threat and risk and/or bring criminal prosecutions for breaches of terrorism legislation. Comprehensive governance arrangements for the operation of JCTTs are in place to ensure there is a coordinated response to terrorist within and across jurisdictions in accordance with the Plan.

78. The AFP led National Disruption Group (NDG) supports operational priorities through the coordination of joint Commonwealth agency capabilities to prevent, disrupt and prosecute the terrorism threat. The NDG national security partner agencies include State and Territory police, Australian intelligence agencies, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC), Australian Border Force (ABF), the Australian Taxation Office, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) and the Department of Human Services.

79. The NDG provides an additional specialist capability in support of counter-terrorism investigations by providing a link into these non-traditional partner agencies. Options at the NDG’s disposal to mitigate the ongoing domestic threat include preventing international travel through passport and visa cancellations and ACIC examinations.

Arrest and Prosecution

80. A number of preparatory terrorism and foreign incursions offences exist in the Commonwealth Criminal Code that allow persons to be arrested and prosecuted prior to committing terrorist acts in Australia or overseas. For more information on these offences, refer to https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/WhatAustraliaisdoing/Pages/Laws-to-combat-terrorism.aspx

81. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) is responsible for prosecuting a person for a terrorism or foreign incursions offence. Arrangements exist between the CDPP and each of the State and Territory Director of Public Prosecutions to determine which Director should have carriage of matters when the matters involve offences against the laws of the Commonwealth and/or a State or Territory.

Legislative Measures

82. Australia’s counter-terrorist framework contains a number of legislative measures that seek to prevent terrorist acts occurring. These include a control order regime, a preventative detention order regime, and a continuing detention order regime. For more information on these measures, refer to Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) https://www.legislation.gov.au/Series/C2004A04868

Counter-Terrorism Financing

83. AUSTRAC contributes financial intelligence to law enforcement counter-terrorism investigations and has regulatory and enforcement powers that contribute to counter-terrorism disruption strategies.

84. Through AUSTRAC, the Commonwealth Government contributes to international efforts to combat terrorism financing. AUSTRAC shares financial intelligence with a large international network of partner Financial Intelligence Units, and contributes to global policy and standards in relation to counter-terrorism financing.

85. Commonwealth Government agencies work to reduce the risks presented by Australian-based individuals in supporting terrorist activities through the illicit movement of currency out of Australia.

86. The AFP maintains a Terrorism Financing Investigation Unit which works in support of the JCTT’s.
Border Control

87. The Commonwealth is responsible for Australia’s customs and border protection activities that support national counter-terrorism prevention measures. The ABF is the primary Commonwealth agency operating at the border and performs the immigration function at air and sea ports.

88. In performing its role, the agency works closely with other government and international agencies to monitor, assess, detect and prevent the illegal movement of people and goods across Australia’s border.

89. The ABF also monitors the entry and exit of vessels, aircraft, goods and people in support of counter-terrorism activities.

Returning Australians of Counter-Terrorism Interest

90. Australians fighting or engaged with terrorist groups overseas or their families, including children, who want to return to Australia, are carefully managed by law enforcement and security agencies on a case-by-case basis.

91. Agencies assess each potential returnee — this includes consideration of the threat they may pose, the potential criminality of their activities overseas, and the level of their engagement with violent extremist groups. Additional considerations are taken into account in relation to returning children who have been exposed to violent extremism.

92. Depending on the circumstances, these persons could:
   • be excluded from returning;
   • be prosecuted for criminal offences (including for providing material support to or associating with terrorist groups);
   • be subject to control orders or ongoing monitoring; and/or
   • participate in diversion programs or require other services to support reintegration, as appropriate.

Dignitary and Foreign Mission Protection

93. The multi-agency Security Coordination Group, chaired by the Australian Federal Police coordinates the protection of Australian high office holders, foreign diplomatic and consular staff and premises, internationally protected persons and other international dignitaries. The AFP, in consultation with relevant agencies, determines a risk management strategy based on the threat assessment, the capabilities of protection providers and the interests of affected parties.

94. The AFP and State and Territory police share operational responsibility for the security of Australian high office holders, diplomatic and consular officials, visiting dignitaries, internationally protected persons and other individuals assessed to be at risk.

Cyber Security

95. The Commonwealth, State and Territory governments work cooperatively with international partners, and with owners and operators of critical communications infrastructure, other operational systems and key data holdings to ensure Australia is well placed to respond to cyber security threats. Integral to this approach are two supporting Commonwealth bodies: Australia’s national Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT Australia) and the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC).

Hazardous Material Security

96. The regulation of hazardous materials to prevent their use for terrorism purposes is a joint responsibility of the Commonwealth and States and Territories. There are specific CBRN security arrangements and frameworks across jurisdictions informing and implementing these regulations.
Transport Security
(Aviation, Maritime, Surface)

97. The Office of Transport Security (OTS) is the security regulator for the aviation and maritime transport industries and the offshore oil and gas sectors. Legislation relevant to regulation includes the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth) (ATSA) and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 (MTOFSA) (Cth). The OTS works with industry to ensure they meet their regulatory obligations and achieve security outcomes.

98. The OTS also works with State and Territory governments to develop a consistent and coordinated approach to securing the surface transport sector.

Aviation

99. The ATSA establishes a regulatory framework to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference with aviation, in respect of Australian registered aircraft in Australian airspace and airports. The ATSA also establishes a regulatory framework for industry participants who may handle, prepare or transport air cargo at locations on airports or remotely from airports.

100. Security at Australian airports is the responsibility of the airport operator. For those airports declared to be security controlled airports under the ATSA, the operator is required to prepare a Transport Security Program (TSP). These declared airports must comply with their approved TSP and the Aviation Transport Security Act and Regulations (ATSA). The ATSA makes provision for the issue of specific security directions by the responsible Commonwealth Secretary (or their delegate) to address special circumstances or aviation security incidents.

101. The AFP provides first response capability at designated airports, pending State or Territory police attendance. The AFP also operates the Air Security Officer program, which provides a policing response and containment capability on board Australian registered aircraft to prevent acts of violence and provide specialist in-flight security services as required by key stakeholders.

Maritime

102. The Commonwealth Government has responsibility for offshore maritime counter-terrorism preparedness, prevention, response and recovery (that is seaward of the Territorial Sea Baseline). State and Territory governments have responsibility for on-shore maritime counter-terrorism preparedness, prevention, response and recovery (that is landward of the Territorial Sea Baseline) in their jurisdictions. State and Territory governments are also responsible for terrorism response in ports and terminals.

103. Maritime Border Command (MBC) is the lead operational authority for coordinating Australia’s whole-of-government response to and recovery from terrorist acts in the offshore maritime environment to the outer boundary of Australia’s Security Forces Authority Area.

104. Responsibility for counter-terrorism prevention and response in relation to areas or facilities of national security significance that are landward of the Territorial Sea Baseline, with the exception of ports, may be subject to formal agreements between the Commonwealth Government and the relevant jurisdiction.

105. The MTOFSA establishes a regulatory framework to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference in the maritime sector. The OTS regulates the security arrangements of Australian ports, port facilities, ships and offshore oil and gas facilities through the MTOFSA.
Surface – Rail, Ferries, Bus

106. Surface transport security cooperation, particularly in prevention and preparedness, is guided by an IGA on Surface Transport Security under which the States and Territories have primary carriage of surface transport security issues. The agreement provides that States and Territories are to determine security identified surface transport operations. This action includes security risk assessment and security planning that takes into account the NTTAS.

Countering Violent Extremism

107. CVE aims to reduce the risk of individuals becoming or remaining violent extremists and to address the social impacts of violent extremism. CVE activities are distinct from, but complement counter-terrorism activities such as investigations and operational responses.

108. Commonwealth, State and Territory governments are all engaged in practical efforts to strengthen social cohesion, challenge violent extremist ideologies and stop people becoming terrorists. Australia’s CVE efforts have the following objectives:

i. Build the resilience of communities to violent extremism;

ii. Support the diversion of individuals at risk of becoming violent extremists when possible; and

iii. Rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremists when possible.

109. In support of these efforts, governments engage with communities, civil society organisations, international partners and with academia to ensure best practice approaches are identified and, where appropriate, implemented.

110. Commonwealth, State and Territory governments work together to develop training and awareness-raising materials to educate and empower communities, families, youth, organisations and frontline professionals to more effectively recognise and respond to signs of radicalisation.

111. Commonwealth, State and Territory governments also work together to develop and implement programs to rehabilitate people imprisoned for terrorism related offences, as well as to prevent the radicalisation of other prisoners.

National Intervention Program

112. The National Intervention Program has been established across Australia to support locally delivered intervention programs while building national consistency through the development of national training, risk and needs assessment tools and case management and sharing best practice.

113. Across Australia State and Territory-led intervention activities seek to divert and disengage individuals at risk of becoming violent extremists. The Commonwealth Government supports these activities through coordination, support and funding.

114. The intervention program relies on a network of government and community partners to implement individualised, early intervention and violence disengagement strategies. Their purpose is to bring together the necessary support so that people can disengage from violence and reconnect with their family and community before they harm themselves or others.

Challenging terrorist propaganda

115. The Commonwealth Government addresses online radicalisation and challenges terrorist propaganda by seeking to limit its appeal, reducing access to extremist material online and empowering community voices to combat extremist narratives.
116. Other initiatives to counter violent extremism in online communication include working with social media companies on take-downs of violent extremist material, including through the Report Online Extremism tool for the public and increasing community capacity to undermine the appeal of violent extremism.

Building community resilience and social cohesion

117. Building and sustaining social cohesion at the local level helps create a sense of shared purpose and belonging for all Australians.

118. Commonwealth, State and Territory governments, in partnership with communities, civil society organisations, business and other sectors of society, are all engaged in practical efforts to strengthen social cohesion.

119. Australian governments’ activities include funding and conducting social policy programs that support community harmony and address barriers to social and economic participation. While these programs are not funded for security purposes they may indirectly contribute to security by developing protective factors in individuals and groups that can act as buffers against violent extremist influences.

120. Effective partnership with communities, civil society organisations and other sectors of society, such as business, play a crucial role in the delivery and success of these initiatives.

International arrangements for prevention

121. DFAT’s Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism’s work focuses on South-East Asia and areas where terrorist activity may harm Australians and their interests. This involves leading Australian delegations in counter-terrorism officials’ talks and close consultation with donor partners, ensuring that our international counter-terrorism capacity-building activities complement and are coordinated with those of our allies. At a regional level, Australia engages in counter-terrorism activities with neighbouring countries through a range of fora.

122. DFAT and AGD engage internationally on CVE to:
   - shape regional and global approaches to CVE through targeted engagement in priority multilateral and regional fora;
   - build capacity of partner governments and communities to strengthen resilience to violent extremism;
   - undermine the appeal of extremist thinking and messages; and
   - learn from international experience to inform Australia’s domestic CVE approaches.

123. To achieve these objectives DFAT and AGD collaborates with a range of international counterparts, both bilaterally and through multilateral fora such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Five Eyes CVE Working Group.

124. Violent extremism disproportionately affects developing countries and undermines basic development goals. Australia’s development assistance is partly guided by the Development Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism: Policy Framework and Guidance Note. The framework recognises that the drivers of violent extremism vary across contexts and works to make CVE investments based on robust analysis, locally appropriate methods and measures to ensure they do no harm.

125. The AIC and the AFP maintain overseas liaison channels to gather intelligence and to pursue investigations. ASIO and the AFP also maintain a 24 hour monitoring and alert unit. Relevant Commonwealth agencies provide the interface with overseas security, intelligence and police agencies as part of international counter-terrorism efforts.

126. Defence contributes to the prevention of terrorism through its overseas operations by disrupting a primary source of, and inspiration for, terrorist activities worldwide.
RESPONSE

127. Response refers to actions taken immediately to prevent or minimise loss of life, injury, damage to property and damage or disruption to infrastructure; facilitate investigations into the terrorist act, including the prosecution of offenders; and ensure that people affected by the threat or act are given immediate relief and support.

128. The ramifications of any terrorist act will necessitate high level decision-making within the government. The scale or complexity of the act may also dictate special cooperative responses.

Domestic Context

Operational Arrangements

129. State and Territory police and emergency response agencies have operational responsibility for first response to a terrorist act, consistent with their statutory responsibilities and in accordance with arrangements established under the Handbook and State and Territory police plans. The Commonwealth Government supports the affected State or Territory as appropriate.

130. Australia’s policy is, wherever possible and appropriate, to resolve terrorist situations through negotiation to minimise the risk to life. Australia will not make concessions in response to terrorist demands. Additional guidance in relation to negotiation policy is outlined in the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook.

131. Whilst the preferred principle response strategy for the resolution of any high risk situation is to contain and negotiate, the nature of active armed offender and terrorist attacks may require consideration of an alternate response strategy to resolve these situations with the objective to prevent serious injury and/or death of person(s), including the rescue of hostages, by implementing appropriate resolution action as soon as practicable. Details regarding response strategies are provided in the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook.

132. In a counter-terrorism response, police are responsible for resolving and investigating the circumstances of the act in accordance with arrangements established under the Handbook and State and Territory police plans.

133. The Commonwealth Government may also provide other operational support from other relevant agencies. Defence maintains capabilities to respond to domestic and international terrorist threats and attacks in support of Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies.

134. All relevant information and evidence acquired in the course of the investigation is managed in accordance with agreed investigative arrangements. Other agencies involved maintain detailed records of events, decisions, plans and arrangements and provide these to police upon request.

Inter-Governmental Coordination

135. Each State and Territory government activates coordination arrangements in response to a terrorist act based on an assessment of the risk to that jurisdiction. This may include activating a SCC/TCC. The SCC/TCC provides support to its relevant Executive Government members and will be the primary communications link between the police command, the State and/or Territory Government and the Commonwealth Government.
136. Affected jurisdictions, including the Commonwealth, may seek assistance from other jurisdictions and the Commonwealth as specific responses require.

**Commonwealth Government Role**

137. After the Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre (AGCCC) is notified of a terrorist act it advises other Commonwealth Government and State and Territory agencies and activates Commonwealth Government crisis coordination arrangements, which may include convening the NCC.

138. ASIO and the AFP establish appropriate mechanisms involving relevant agencies to assess and disseminate intelligence and information relevant to the terrorist act.

139. In the first instance, management of needs and resources is coordinated between AGD and State and Territory authorities according to existing plans. AGD coordinates Commonwealth Government assistance.

140. In the event of an offshore maritime terrorist act, the MBC is responsible for coordinating Australia’s whole-of-government response to, and recovery from, the incident.

**National Terrorist Situation**

141. In the event of a terrorist incident, the Commonwealth and the directly affected State (States) and/or Territory (Territories) may agree the incident constitutes a National Terrorist Situation, reflecting a shared understanding of the benefits of national coordination.

142. An NTS could be considered when a terrorist incident(s) impacts Commonwealth interests or has national implications and requires broad policy and strategy coordination by the Commonwealth.

143. Following consultation with the First Minister(s) of the directly affected jurisdiction(s), the Prime Minister and the First Minister(s) may agree the terrorist incident constitutes an NTS.

144. The public may be advised of the agreement between the Prime Minister and the First Minister(s) of the directly affected jurisdiction(s) that a terrorist incident is an NTS. However, this would be a matter for consideration by the Commonwealth and the affected jurisdiction(s).

145. In the event of a terrorist incident, crisis management arrangements will be activated. Under such arrangements, the NCC will consider if the scale, nature and duration of the incident warrants an NTS, and may make a recommendation for consideration by the Prime Minister and First Minister(s) of the directly affected jurisdiction(s).

146. This process does not preclude the Prime Minister and the directly affected First Minister(s) agreeing a terrorist incident constitutes an NTS outside of these arrangements. This agreement will be formally documented.

147. Factors that could constitute an NTS include:
   - planned attacks or attacks on Commonwealth targets or where there are national implications;
   - involvement of multiple jurisdictions;
   - impact of a threat involving civil aviation, telecommunications, maritime interest or cargo security;
   - scale and nature of the incident, including the use or intended use of CBRN materials;
   - involvement of nationally vital infrastructure;
   - significance of the threat; and/or
   - involvement of foreign or international interests.
148. In an NTS, the Commonwealth may provide leadership in areas such as:
- National leadership on strategic issues;
- Policy settings beyond the authority or scope of the affected jurisdiction (e.g. aviation security settings at designated airports);
- Public information (e.g. national security public information coordination);
- Commonwealth agency support; and/or
- Communication (e.g. international engagement/liaison).

149. In circumstances where an NTS determination has not been made, the Commonwealth may still provide support to States and Territories in these areas.

150. Additional NTS guidance is outlined in the National Counter-Terrorism Handbook.

Public Information (including media liaison)

151. The first responding agency (usually State and Territory police) leads public messaging on the operational response to a terrorist act.

152. AGD Media acts as a central hub for sharing public information with States and Territories and other relevant Commonwealth agencies during a terrorist act or a period of heightened terrorist threat.

153. AGD Media is not responsible for clearing agency/jurisdiction information, but ensuring the information is shared with States and Territories and disseminated through established communication channels.

154. In a declared NTS AGD Media also coordinates national security public information and media responses at a Commonwealth level, where a coordinated whole-of-Commonwealth Government approach is required.

155. Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies are responsible for maintaining effective communication channels within their jurisdiction to enable prompt distribution of key messages and material, including to maintain community harmony.

156. The police are responsible for liaising with the media according to their standing arrangements, in consultation with the affected agencies or organisations. Once an SCC/TCC is operating, media comment will be coordinated between the police, the SCC/TCC and the Commonwealth Government via AGD Media.

157. All public information and media liaison activities are conducted in line with the National Security Public Information Guidelines (NSPIG), which provides specific advice for government agencies and accordingly is not publicly available.

Hazardous Material Incidents

158. The State and Territory governments have responsibility for the development, implementation and maintenance of disaster/emergency management plans that include capabilities to prevent, respond and recover from CBR incidents and conduct subsequent investigations.

159. State and Territory Governments have the responsibility to develop, implement and maintain emergency management plans to support responses to nuclear incidents, prior to the provision of Commonwealth and other specialist assistance when required.

160. The response to a terrorist incident involving CBRN will be supplemented by specialist expertise from State, Territory and Commonwealth agencies.

161. Defence, including the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Special Operations Engineer Regiment (SOER), may be deployed to assess and respond to CBRN incidents when requested.
International Arrangements for Response

Australian Government Coordination

162. Following a terrorist act overseas affecting Australians or Australian interests, the Head of Mission (HoM), or delegated authority, of the relevant Australian Embassy, High Commission or Consulate-General (the post) will advise the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of DFAT of the terrorist act. In many cases this will trigger the convening of the Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) that will coordinate the government’s response to the act.

163. The DFAT Crisis Centre will be activated in the event of a major international terrorist act. The DFAT Crisis Centre manages a crisis from policy, security, consular, humanitarian, public information and other operational perspectives. It coordinates and manages a whole-of-government response to an international crisis. The DFAT Crisis Centre accommodates liaison officers from other agencies, including the AFP, Defence, Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) and intelligence agencies that can provide a direct response to the IDETF on agency-specific information. For lower scale incidents involving Australians, these functions will be carried out by the Global Watch Office (GWO).

The Head of Mission

164. The HoM, or delegated authority, will lead the Commonwealth government response in a country of accreditation and provide updates to support IDETF decision making.

165. Other Australian agencies which have direct links to the host government input any information gained through their liaison efforts to the post’s situation report or to the IDETF.

166. The AFP’s international network will engage with its international law enforcement partners, in support of the HoM, and provide information into the post’s situation report.

Sending Personnel Overseas

167. The dispatch overseas of a Crisis Response Team (CRT) and the deployment of ADF, medical, police or other personnel will generally be considered by the IDETF, prior to any approval being granted.

168. The legal basis for sending any team overseas is assessed, negotiated and approved on a case by case basis. DFAT (in consultation with the AGD where appropriate), will consider the legal basis for their deployment, as well as the composition of each team. Australia’s response to a terrorist act overseas will take into account Australia’s obligations under international law.

International Intelligence Coordination

169. During an incident overseas involving Australians or Australian interests, existing intelligence arrangements will continue to operate as normal.

170. In the event of an overseas terrorist act, ASIO will coordinate a whole-of-government intelligence response through regular reporting by NTAC.

Police to Police and Law Enforcement Engagement

171. During an act overseas involving Australians or Australian interests, AFP will liaise with law enforcement partners to maintain police-to-police cooperation as normal, and in support of the HoM or delegated authority. Consideration will be given to providing police-to-police support if requested.
172. In the event of an overseas terrorist act, AFP would engage directly with host foreign law enforcement counterparts to offer police-to-police assistance if required and within the interests of Australia.

**Australian Government Evacuations**

173. If the safety of Australian citizens overseas is threatened as a result of a terrorist act, the Commonwealth Government may decide to conduct an evacuation.

174. The methods used for evacuation will necessarily vary according to the situation, and the resources at the Commonwealth Government’s disposal on the ground, and be subject to advice by the HoM.

**States and Territories Assistance**

175. In the event of an international terrorist act or critical incident overseas, States and Territories may be involved in reception arrangements including the provision of medical or other assistance to affected individuals.

176. An overseas terrorist act or critical incident may require States and Territories to assist through the provision of specialist assistance including medical, police and/or forensic assistance. The AFP would lead any policing response to an international incident with support as required from State and Territory police.

177. The dispatch of State or Territory assistance overseas would be part of a whole-of-government response on the recommendation of the IDETF. Emergency Management Australia (EMA) has primary carriage for requesting and coordinating such input from the States and Territories on behalf of DFAT.

**International Partnerships**

178. In the event of a deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radiological material that affects health, the World Health Organisation (WHO) global alert and response framework, together with the technical resources of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) would form part of effective international containment efforts. Australia is an active participant in GOARN.

**Public Information - International**

179. The IDETF has overall responsibility for media management following a major overseas incident. The IDETF will direct the DFAT Crisis Centre’s schedule for the production of updates and the dissemination of talking points for use by all relevant agencies, posts and ministers. DFAT may provide a media representative to coordinate other agencies’ media representatives and to work in close consultation with State and Territory media agencies. For lower scale incidents involving Australians, the GWO and DFAT’s Media Liaison Section will coordinate media responses.

180. In response to any international incident involving Australians, DFAT would activate the Crisis Hub, a consolidated digital information portal which combines details on consular and humanitarian crisis response. The Crisis Hub enables an integrated approach to consular and humanitarian crisis management and provides key crisis-related information to the Australian public.

181. Specific and credible threat information held by the Government is conveyed to the Australian public via DFAT’s Smartraveller travel advisories.
RECOVERY

182. Recovery is the coordinated process of supporting affected communities in reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of psychological, social, economic, environmental and physical wellbeing in the aftermath of a terrorist act.

183. All State, Territory and local government undertake recovery activities in keeping with their State and Territory emergency management legislation and the National Principles for Disaster Recovery and the Community Recovery Handbook available at https://www.aidr.org.au

184. Governments will work collaboratively with affected individuals, groups, communities and the private sector to re-establish essential services, and restore public confidence and community wellbeing. As with all emergencies, the size and scale of the event will dictate the level of government involvement.

All Hazards Crisis Management Arrangements

185. State and Territory emergency management arrangements generally cover all hazards, including terrorism. These arrangements include the roles and responsibilities of agencies that support recovery.

Domestic Context

Transitional Arrangements from Response to Relief and Recovery

186. State and Territory governments are responsible for coordinating recovery from a terrorist act affecting their jurisdiction. Relief and recovery activities will begin alongside the initial response to a terrorist act.

187. As the response to the terrorist act winds down transitional arrangements are put in place to ensure that arrangements commenced during response are gradually devolved and integrated into the recovery phase.

This includes media arrangements, information management, impact and needs assessment, case management, rehabilitation of built and natural environments, and restoring social networks and public confidence. The Commonwealth Government supports the States and Territories to fulfil this role.

Operational and Coordination Arrangements

State and Territory Role

188. Existing State and Territory government arrangements for emergency relief and recovery coordination may be activated following a terrorist act.

189. State and Territory arrangements specify which agencies are responsible for recovery services and incorporate local, regional and state level coordination.

190. The generic role of State/Territory committees includes:
   • coordinating and facilitating the whole of government recovery process;
   • developing policy on recovery management planning and operations;
   • developing the recovery strategy;
   • overseeing the implementation of the recovery strategy;
   • providing advice to government; and
   • regularly reviewing recovery plans and arrangements.

191. Regional/district/local committees are necessary where recovery services are administered and delivered on a regional, district or local basis. The generic role of regional, district or local recovery committees include:
   • coordinating and facilitating a whole of agency recovery process;
   • implementing regional/district/local aspects of the recovery strategy;
   • developing and implementing regional/district/local policy on recovery management planning and operations;
   • providing advice to government;
• coordinating post disaster recovery reports; and
• regularly reviewing recovery plans.

192. A variety of non-government organisations also provide recovery services which may be coordinated through local authorities and State and Territory committees.

Commonwealth Role

193. The Commonwealth Government supports the States and Territories to fulfil their role in coordinating recovery. The Commonwealth Government, in close consultation with all States and Territories, may consider the initial recovery strategy and Commonwealth resources that could support its implementation.

194. AGD oversees the Commonwealth Government disaster recovery through the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework which outline the understandings, roles and responsibilities through which the Commonwealth Government coordinates recovery assistance.

195. The Australian Government Disaster Recovery Committee (AGDRC), chaired by AGD, is responsible for the planning and coordination of Commonwealth Government support for disaster recovery activities following an onshore or offshore disaster of national significance.

196. The AGDRC recommends to the Commonwealth Government the provision of tailored recovery assistance in response to disasters of national significance, and in the coordination of assistance to Australians in the event of an off-shore disaster or critical incident.

Public Messaging

197. The affected State or Territory leads public messaging on the recovery efforts following a terrorist act. Information will include details about the situation, what agencies are doing and what recovery services are available. The national approach to the sharing of public information, facilitated by AGD, also applies to the recovery phase.

198. Media and public information issues in the recovery phase will continue to be coordinated in accordance with the NSPIG.

199. State and Territory police are responsible for providing information to the public about those killed, injured or missing following a terrorist act. They may be supported by a database of information about victims that is maintained by the Australian Red Cross. Jurisdictions may also have additional systems that will be used in conjunction with this register.

Financial Assistance and Economic Recovery

200. All States and Territories can provide emergency grants and personal hardship payments, which are generally focused on covering short-term expenses such as essential personal items and emergency accommodation. These payments are generally enacted at the discretion of a designated Minister in each jurisdiction and may be provided as a grant or in kind.

201. The Commonwealth Government can provide financial assistance to States and Territories and individuals (including sole traders and primary producers) following a terrorist act.

202. The Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment (DRP) and the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Allowance (DRA) allows for the provision of financial assistance to individuals that have been impacted by a disaster.

203. DRP is activated when the impact of a disaster on individuals and families requires Commonwealth Government assistance, in addition to that provided under standard recovery assistance.

204. The DRA is a short-term income support payment to assist individuals who can demonstrate their income has been affected as a direct result of a disaster. When available, DRA assists employees, small business persons and farmers who experience a loss of income as a direct result of a disaster event.
205. The Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) provide financial assistance to State and Territories where a disaster results in large-scale expenditure. Under these arrangements, assistance is provided for immediate personal hardship and distress payments and longer-term recovery grants and concessional loans for needy individuals to alleviate the financial burden on states and territories. It also supports the provision of urgent financial assistance to disaster affected communities.

206. Under these arrangements, the State or Territory government determines which areas receive NDRRA assistance and what assistance is available to individuals and communities. The NDRRA can be made available following an onshore terrorist act.


208. The Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation (ARPC) is a corporate Commonwealth entity established by the Terrorism Insurance Act 2003 (TI Act) to administer the terrorism reinsurance scheme. The scheme provides primary insurers with reinsurance for commercial property and associated business interruption losses arising from a declared terrorist act. A declared terrorism act under the TI Act requires insurers of eligible commercial property to cover terrorism losses for property damage, business interruption and public liability within their commercial insurance policies.

International Arrangements for Recovery

Victim and Family Assistance

210. In support of the AFP counter-terrorism offshore capability, the AFP has a Family Investigative Liaison Officer (FILO) capability which allows the AFP to engage effectively with Australian victims of overseas terrorist acts and their families in times of crisis.

211. DFAT provides consular assistance to Australians impacted by an overseas crisis and their family members in Australia in line with the Charter of Consular Services.

Identification and Repatriation of Remains

212. The AFP has responsibility to lead and coordinate the identification of Australian victims of overseas mass casualty incidents under frameworks enabled under the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA) Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Committee. This is subject to an offer to assist which is made to the country concerned.

213. DFAT provides guidance on the methods for repatriation of remains of Australians during, and in the aftermath of, an incident abroad. The repatriation of remains from other countries may vary as DVI processes differ from country to country.

214. Where a foreign national is killed as a result of an incident occurring in Australia, the authority which is registering the death, whether it be police, a coroner or other authority, should inform the relevant foreign consulate of the death without delay.

Financial Assistance Payments for Terrorist Events Overseas

215. The Australian Government Victims of Terrorism Overseas Payment (AVTOP) scheme allows for the provision of financial assistance to victims of a declared terrorist act overseas who were Australian citizens and residents at the time of the terrorist act. Australians harmed and the close family members of an Australian person who dies as a direct result of a declared terrorist act overseas can claim payments up to a designated amount.

216. The Australian Government DRP may also be made available for terrorist incidents overseas.
GOVERNANCE AND REVIEW

217. Australia’s national counter-terrorism coordinating body, the ANZCTC, meets regularly to monitor and assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism arrangements. The ANZCTC reports to COAG annually.

218. This Plan will be reviewed on a regular basis by the ANZCTC to ensure it reflects current governance and operational responsibilities in: preparing for, preventing, responding to, and recovering from terrorist acts in Australia and its territories.

219. The ANZCTC will be responsible for approving updated versions of the Plan as required.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Australian Border Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACIC</td>
<td>Australian Crime Intelligence Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSC</td>
<td>Australian Cyber Security Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGCC</td>
<td>Australian Government Crisis Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGCCC</td>
<td>Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGD</td>
<td>Commonwealth Government Attorney-General's Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGDRC</td>
<td>Australian Government Disaster Recovery Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Australian Intelligence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZCTC</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZPAA</td>
<td>Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Australian Signals Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIO</td>
<td>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASNO</td>
<td>Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSA</td>
<td>Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Cth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRAC</td>
<td>Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVTOP</td>
<td>Australian Government Victims of Terrorism Overseas Payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAG</td>
<td>Business Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGLU</td>
<td>Business and Government Liaison Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTC</td>
<td>Centre for Counter-Terrorism Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDPP</td>
<td>Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERT</td>
<td>Computer Emergency Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Critical infrastructure: that which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, will impact on social or economic well-being or affect national security or defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAC</td>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COAG</td>
<td>Council of Australian Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAG</td>
<td>Crowded Places Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Crisis Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIO</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIBP</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoIRd</td>
<td>Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>Australian Government Disaster Recovery Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DST Group</td>
<td>Defence Science and Technology Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVI</td>
<td>Disaster Victim Identification Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Emergency Management Australia (a Division of AGD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FILO</td>
<td>Family Investigative Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCTF</td>
<td>Global Counter-Terrorism Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOARN</td>
<td>Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWO</td>
<td>Global Watch Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDETF</td>
<td>Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCTT</td>
<td>Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIG</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>Maritime Border Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Crisis Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTP</td>
<td>National Counter-Terrorism Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDG</td>
<td>National Disruption Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRAAA</td>
<td>Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Coordination Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Committee of Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPIG</td>
<td>National Security Public Information Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSTC</td>
<td>National Security Science and Technology Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTAC</td>
<td>National Threat Assessment Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>National Terrorist Situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTS</td>
<td>Office of Transport Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM&amp;C</td>
<td>The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPRR</td>
<td>Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>State Crisis Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCNS</td>
<td>Secretaries Committee on National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOER</td>
<td>Special Operations Engineer Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Territory Crisis Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TISN</td>
<td>Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>Transport Security Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex A

Agency Roles

States and Territories

Community Services and Justice departments and agencies assist individual and community recovery through the coordinated provision of emergency and ongoing assistance.

Dangerous goods and work cover agencies maintain standards for the security and transport of dangerous substances.

Emergency services provide consequence management in the event of a terrorist act, consistent with State and Territory plans and structures.

Engineering services/public works departments assist the recovery of physical infrastructure.

First ministers’ departments coordinate whole-of-government preparedness and response.

Health departments participate in the development and maintenance of biological hazard plans; provide hospital treatment and on-going care for victims.

Police have operational responsibility for preparing for, preventing and responding to terrorism and will investigate possible terrorist activity.

Transport departments are responsible for coordinating surface transport operations and ensuring the implementation of security arrangements for those operations that are security identified.

Commonwealth Government

Airservices Australia provides air traffic management, air navigation infrastructure services and aviation rescue and firefighting.

Attorney-General’s Department provides legislative advice, and policy coordination of critical infrastructure protection, countering violent extremism and cyber security, which includes technical response for the private sector through CERT Australia. EMA (and its embedded CCC) is a division of the Department. AGD is a division of the Commonwealth level and the activities of the Countering violent extremism Sub-Committee (CVESC). CVESC was established under the ANZCTC to ensure there is national coordination of CVE activities including the sharing of information and the development of initiatives that are locally appropriate.

AGD coordinates CVE policy at the Commonwealth level and the activities of the Countering violent extremism Sub-Committee (CVESC). CVESC was established under the ANZCTC to ensure there is national coordination of CVE activities including the sharing of information and the development of initiatives that are locally appropriate.

AGD’s CVE Centre continues to lead and support a variety of innovative initiatives to counter violent extremism in online communication, including working with social media companies on take-downs of violent extremist material, developing a cyber awareness program for parents, and increasing community capacity to undermine the appeal of violent extremism.

The CVE Centre reports content directly to digital industry where it violates their terms of service, with a particular focus on material that:

- provides instructions to commit an offence associated with terrorism
- is extremely graphic in nature
- expressly promotes or advocates violence against Australian individuals or organisations.
The CVE Centre also works to undermine the appeal of violent extremist propaganda by partnering with communities and other influential individuals to discredit or trigger doubt in violent extremists, and to promote positive messages that build trust with and within key Australian communities.

**AUSTRAC** assists Commonwealth, State/ Territory and International partners to better understand, identify, investigate and disrupt terrorism financing. This includes monitoring the financial activity of persons of national security interest, contributing financial intelligence to law enforcement investigations and discovering previously unknown terrorism financing threats. AUSTRAC also makes targeted use of its regulatory and enforcement powers as part of counter-terrorism investigation strategies.

AUSTRAC shares financial intelligence with a large network of partner Financial Intelligence Units around the world and contributes to multilateral efforts to combat terrorism financing under the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

AUSTRAC also works with the private sector through the Fintel Alliance to identify, target, disrupt and deter money laundering and terrorism financing. This partnership brings together the collective knowledge and resources of Government and industry to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

AUSTRAC also contributes to global policy and standards in relation to counter-terrorism financing under the Financial Action Taskforce and coordinates Australia’s whole-of-government engagement with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

**Australian Border Force**, the operational arm of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, facilitates and monitors the movement of people and goods across the border in a manner that protects the community, intercepts prohibited and restricted items, identifies illegal movement of people and maintains compliance with Australian law.

**Australian Federal Police** enforces Commonwealth criminal law and protects Commonwealth and national interests from crime in Australia and overseas. The AFP is the Commonwealth Government’s primary law enforcement body and provides services to assist in the prevention and investigation of crime in relation to Australian interests both in Australia and overseas.

The AFP’s International Network conducts enquiries on behalf of all Australian State, Territory and Federal law enforcement agencies including on terrorism matters. The AFP broker’s collaboration with international law enforcement agencies to drive investigations and support cooperation, gathers and exchanges criminal intelligence, and enhancing the capacity and the capability of international law enforcement agencies to combat transnational crime.

In disrupting terrorist activity, the AFP host Joint Counter Terrorism Teams (JCTTs) involving state and territory police and law enforcement partners which conduct preventative investigations to minimise threat and risk and/or bring criminal prosecutions for breaches of terrorism legislation.

The AFP also leads the National Disruption Group (NDG) in coordinating joint Commonwealth agency capabilities to prevent, disrupt and prosecute the terrorism threat. This provides an additional specialist capability in support of CT investigations by providing a link into some of these non-traditional partner agencies.
The AFP also maintains a Terrorism Financing Investigation Unit (TFIU) which works in support of the JCTT’s. The TFIU is a multidisciplinary unit which works closely with various law enforcement agencies, intelligence partners and other government departments. The establishment of the TFIU reflects the central role that financing plays in all counter terrorism investigations and demonstrates the collegiate approach to countering terrorism financing adopted in Australia.

In addition the AFP has responsibility for providing policing services in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in accordance with the Policing Arrangement between the Commonwealth and ACT governments. In this context, the AFP has the primary responsibility for preventative investigations in the ACT, and operates joint Diversion Teams in ACT and NSW with relevant agencies. The Diversion Team is one part of the nationwide effort, combining law enforcement, state and commonwealth government, and communities, to address all forms of radicalisation to violent extremism.

**Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency** is the IAEA designated National Competent Authority for Emergency Preparedness and Response involving radiological materials can provide specialist technical operational support teams to the Australian Government and the State and Territory jurisdictions upon request.

ARPANSA teams are capable of locating, identifying and characterising radiological material, including being able to assess the geographic and health implications due to an event or incident.

**Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office** (ASNO), within DFAT, regulates nuclear safeguards within Australia to ensure that Australia meets non-proliferation and security treaty commitments and implements the Chemical Weapons Convention and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. ASNO is also involved in the development of domestic verification arrangements for the Biological Weapons Convention.

**Australian Security Intelligence Organisation** protects the nation and its interests from threats to security through intelligence collection, assessment, and advice for Government, government agencies, and businesses.

**Defence Science and Technology** (DST) Group has a mandated whole of government responsibility for coordinating national security science and technology through the National Security Science and Technology Centre (NSSTC). This role spans government, industry and academia to harness available science and technology expertise and resources for the application of national security agencies, including for any counter terrorism role or responsibility they may perform. DST Group is responsible for:

- leading and coordinating the development and implementation of national security science and technology policy,
- fostering of international national security research collaborations,
- strategic analysis of national security priorities and resourcing, and
- integration of counter-terrorism technologies to benefit Defence and civilian agencies.

**Department of Defence** (including ADF, ASD, AGO, DIO and DST Group) contributes directly to Australia’s domestic and international counter terrorism efforts in support of the Commonwealth Governments comprehensive whole of government approach to counter terrorism – prepare, prevent, response and recovery.
Defence supports domestic counter-terrorism efforts by assisting civil authorities assuming an ‘all hazards’ approach including but not limited to providing specialist ADF capabilities to assist in the resolution of terrorist act; intelligence support to decision makers; participating in exercises and training and undertaking scientific research. Defence may assist civil authorities in emergencies under Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) arrangements and Defence Force Aid to Civilian Authorities (DFACA) (Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903). DACC and DFACA may apply when a specific emergency is beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities to resolve. DACC applies where the use of force is not envisaged; DFACA, where force may be required.

Defence supports the Commonwealth Government’s international counter-terrorism efforts through a range of contributions, including but not limited to participating in overseas operations providing intelligence support to decision makers; and engaging and cooperating with international partners.

**Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade** conducts international liaison designed to enhance international counter-terrorism arrangements and provides advice in relation to the protection of visiting foreign dignitaries. It also manages any “reverse consular” obligations that may arise if there were a terrorist act in Australia. It leads the International Engagement Mission to promote Australia’s counter-terrorism interests through effective international advocacy, cooperation and capacity-building. The Department, through the IDETF, also coordinates the Australian Government’s response to overseas terrorist acts, including when involving Australians or Australian interests.

**Department of Health** coordinates the health response to national incidents. The Department of Health maintains the National Medical Stockpile – a strategic reserve of pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment, and develops and manages health sector response plans for communicable diseases, CBRN and mass casualty incidents.

**Department of Immigration and Border Protection**, including through its operational arm the Australian Border Force (ABF), protects Australia’s border and manages the movement of people and goods across it. The Department manages the conferral of Australia’s citizenship, implements Australia’s migration programme, administers Australia’s visa regime, intercepts prohibited and restricted items at the border, identifies illegal movement of people into and out of Australia, and maintains compliance with Australian law.

**Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development** (DoIRD or Infrastructure) through the Office of Transport Security (OTS), provides a key safeguard against unlawful interference with aviation and maritime transport and offshore oil and gas facilities. OTS is the security regulator for these industries and provides advice to the Australian Government on transport security policy and practice. OTS works with the intelligence community, government partners and industry to review threats and risks, and assesses how these could be prevented or deterred through regulatory and compliance activities.

**Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism** has particular policy responsibility for offshore petroleum infrastructure and installations and a strong coordinating role with respect to onshore energy infrastructure.

**Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet** advises the Prime Minister on matters relating to counter-terrorism, coordinates Commonwealth policy responses to terrorism, and provides the secretariat for Cabinet Committees and SCNS.
Emergency Management Australia coordinates emergency and consequence management assistance to States and Territories.

Office of National Assessments provides intelligence assessments on terrorist activities outside Australia.

Office of Transport Security provides a key safeguard against unlawful interference with aviation and maritime transport and offshore oil and gas facilities. OTS is the security regulator for these industries and provides advice to the Australian Government on transport security policy and practice. OTS works with the intelligence community, government partners and industry to review threats and risks, and assesses how these could be prevented or deterred through regulatory and compliance activities.

Maritime Border Command is a multi-agency task force within the Australian Border Force that utilises assets assigned by the ABF and the Australian Defence Force to conduct Australia’s civil maritime security operations. It is the lead operational authority for coordinating Australia’s whole-of-government response to and recovery from terrorist act in the offshore maritime environment to the outer boundary of Australia’s Security Forces Authority Area.

National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) provides assessments of the likelihood and probable nature of terrorism and protest violence, including against Australia, Australians and Australian interests here and abroad, special events and international interests in Australia. NTAC threat assessments support jurisdictions and agencies to make risk management decisions to determine how best to respond to the threat and mitigate risk.

Non-Government Organisations assist community recovery through the provision of emergency and ongoing welfare assistance.