AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING CROWDED PLACES FROM TERRORISM

2017
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**Summary**

Crowded places such as stadiums, shopping centres, pedestrian malls, and major events will continue to be attractive targets for terrorists. The current National Terrorism Threat Level in Australia is PROBABLE (Figure 1), as outlined on www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.

This reflects the advice of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that individuals and groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. The elevated terrorist threat is likely to persist for the foreseeable future and it is not confined to any one city or metropolitan area.

Attacks on crowded places overseas, including London Bridge and Borough Market in June 2017, Manchester Arena in May 2017, the Berlin Christmas market in December 2016, and the Bastille Day parade in Nice in July 2016, demonstrate how basic weapons—including vehicles, knives, and firearms—can be used by terrorists to devastating effect.

Australia is not immune. Terrorists have plotted similar attacks here, including on crowded places, and we expect more will occur.

In July 2017, police and intelligence officials disrupted a plot to conduct a terrorist attack using an improvised explosive device against the aviation sector, and a plot to develop an improvised chemical dispersion device for use in a terrorist attack on Australian soil.

Australian governments work with the private sector to protect crowded places. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to detect and disrupt plots, and they have a strong history of stopping terrorist attacks.

But the reality is it will not always be possible to prevent all terrorist attacks from occurring, so we need to strengthen our national arrangements in order to help owners and operators better protect crowded places from terrorism.

Owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including terrorism.

The objective of this Strategy is to protect the lives of people working in, using, and visiting crowded places by making these places more resilient (Figure 2).

The approach taken to protect crowded places should be nationally consistent, proportionate and, to every extent possible, preserve the public’s use and enjoyment of these places. It is not possible to protect everything, so owners and operators must prioritise the highest risk areas of a crowded place.

This Strategy also ensures there is a clear and consistent understanding of what constitutes a crowded place, the roles and responsibilities of all those involved in protecting these places, and the threat environment in which they operate.

The success of this Strategy rests on strong and sustainable partnerships across Australia between governments and the private sector to better protect crowded places. This Partnership provides a consistent approach in each state and territory for trusted engagement between all levels of government, state and territory police, and owners and operators across the country.

Membership of the Crowded Places Partnership gives owners and operators access to better threat and protective security information. This comes from a variety of sources, including Commonwealth law enforcement and intelligence agencies, state and territory police, other owners and operators, and international partners. In each state and territory, police have in place, or will be introducing, ‘Crowded Places Forums’, through which they can share information and advice with owners and operators.

By accessing this information, owners and operators will be in a better position to protect their crowded places against terrorism. Protective security measures can be used to deter, detect, delay, respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack. Implementing them can be a complex process which, if done incorrectly, can be costly and ineffective. This Strategy includes a suite of supplementary materials that will assist owners and operators to understand and implement protective security measures. These materials also contain modules on specific weapons and tactics used by terrorists.

These supplementary materials can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces and include:

- Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool;
- Crowded Places Security Audit;
- Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines;
- Chemical Weapon Guidelines;
- Active Armed Offender Guidelines; and
- Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines.

The Guidelines are designed to increase understanding of the threat posed by particular weapons and tactics (e.g., vehicles, improvised explosive devices) to crowded places. The Guidelines also provide guidance on the issues and options that owners and operators may consider during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities.

Even the most robust and thorough protective security plan may not stop a terrorist attack on a crowded place from occurring or succeeding. But what well-considered and tested protective security does is reduce both the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and the consequences of such an attack.
Crowded places are a preferred terrorist target (Box 1). This is not a new phenomenon—attacks such as the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2005 London transport system attacks demonstrated the catastrophic impact of this tactic. These attacks, along with more recent ones—such as those on Finsbury Park in June 2017, London Bridge and Borough Market in June 2017, Manchester Arena in May 2017, the Berlin Christmas market in December 2016, and the Bastille Day parade in Nice in July 2016—have been, and will continue to be glorified in terrorist propaganda and viewed as worthy of emulation. While the capability to do so may vary, the intent is likely to persist.

A range of factors can shape terrorist target selection. In most cases, the location itself is not the target—it is the high volume and concentration of people that makes a crowded place attractive to attack. While some crowded places have other attractive features, any location that concentrates large crowds could be an attractive target.

Box 1: Why do terrorists attack crowded places?

- Large crowds—especially when highly concentrated—provide the potential for mass casualties.
- The often indiscriminate nature of an attack on a crowded place can have a strong psychological effect, particularly among those who regularly visit similar types of crowded places.
- Crowded places are commonly open and accessible, sometimes reducing the need for complex attack planning.
- Some crowded places may have high symbolic value, such as an iconic representation of a country, government or culture.
- An attack against a crowded place will probably cause broader disruption to surrounding businesses and infrastructure (such as transport networks), increasing the prospect for significant longer-term economic damage.
- Large crowds offer more witnesses, increasing an attack’s resonance. Social media can quickly spread first-hand accounts of an attack, including through images and footage.
- An attack against a widely used crowded place is likely to resonate with large numbers of people who regularly visit or transit that location.
- An attack against a crowded place will probably attract significant global media coverage.

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The circumstances of would-be attackers—including specific grievances, the weapons and equipment they can access, and their location—are likely to influence any potential attack planning, including target selection.

According to ASIO, terrorist attack planning in Australia will probably continue to involve weapons and tactics that are low-cost and low-capability. This methodology has been used by terrorists for attacks on crowded places overseas to devastating effect. Basic weapons (including knives and vehicles), firearms, and explosives could all be used in any attack.

That said, the possibility of more complex attacks cannot be ruled out.

Many factors influence the selection of weapons and tactics by terrorists, such as resource availability, skills, knowledge, opportunities, motivation, group makeup, as well as strategic, ideological, and tactical objectives. The interplay of these factors shapes the size, style, sophistication and location of an attack, as well the likelihood of success.

Individuals preparing for, planning to undertake, or in the process of committing a terrorist attack, tend to display certain behaviours. These can be specific behaviours they may exhibit in order to make and execute their plans (for example, conducting reconnaissance) or more general behaviours of intent or support for terrorist activity (such as repeatedly expressing ideologically extreme sentiments).

A number of terrorists worldwide have been detected by bystanders who acted on their initial suspicion that something was ‘not quite right’ about an individual’s activity by reporting this to authorities. Employees working in crowded places and members of the public are often best placed to detect suspicious behaviour. It is important that owners and operators of crowded places do everything they can to raise awareness of possible suspicious behaviour among those using their sites. For further information, please see ‘Implementing Effective Protective Security’ (page 14).

Who Has a Role in Protecting Crowded Places?

Owners and Operators of Crowded Places

Owners and operators of crowded places can include businesses, major event organisers, sporting clubs, charties, community groups, religious groups, and local, state and territory and Commonwealth governments.

All owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including the threat of terrorist attack.

Owners and operators have a responsibility to undertake a risk assessment and/or vulnerability analysis of their crowded place. They may need to do so by engaging a private security provider. Once this assessment is completed, owners and operators have a responsibility to implement the appropriate mitigations, monitor them for effectiveness (including through audits), and review them at appropriate junctures. Personal liability can attach to some of these obligations if breached.

Developing, implementing, and regularly testing a comprehensive security plan is a matter of good business and a corporate responsibility. The plan should prioritise saving lives and minimising harm while aiming to protect physical assets, information, reputation and other elements that could affect business continuity.

Owners and operators have a responsibility to understand what the current terrorist threat environment means for the security of their site. This includes how security arrangements and plans may need to change if the national threat level is raised or lowered, and how long it would take to implement these changes. This should be achieved by accessing information and guidance provided by governments, both online and through state and territory networks. Owners and operators also have a responsibility to raise awareness of possible security threats among their staff and patrons.

Owners and operators should understand the main factors that influence terrorist target selection. The Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces offers information and guidance on how to assess such factors for a crowded place.

Depending on the outcome of this assessment, owners and operators may need to take further action including, but not limited to, engaging directly with state and territory police, undertaking a formal risk assessment of their site, engaging with private security contractors, and, based on expert advice, implementing effective and proportionate protective security measures.

Owners and operators are also expected to report any security incidents or suspicious activity to law enforcement at the earliest opportunity.

In life threatening situations, everyone should phone 000. Suspicious or unusual behaviour should be reported to local police by phoning 131 444 (in Victoria call 1800 333 000) or by contacting the National Security Hotline on 1800 123 400, if the information is not time-critical (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Local Governments

Local governments have already evolved beyond a narrow focus on administering and maintaining local services and infrastructure. They play a key role in the safety and wellbeing of Australian communities, including by helping to protect crowded places from terrorism. As a member of the Crowded Places Advisory Group (CPAG), the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) acts as a direct conduit from the ANZCTC to the 537 local councils around the country which ALGA represents.

Local governments are often responsible for, among other things, managing civic spaces, public activities, celebrations, agricultural shows, and community days. This means they have the same role and responsibilities as other owners and operators of crowded places, including a duty of care to develop, implement, and regularly test protective security measures.

Local governments also play an important role in designing and approving public spaces—including a unique opportunity to consider and creatively apply protective security during the early stages of crowded place design. Doing so helps to minimise the disruptive effect of protective security on the public’s enjoyment of public spaces.

State and Territory Governments

State and territory governments have the primary responsibility for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks in their jurisdiction.

The protection and resilience of crowded places—particularly those at an elevated security risk—is a key focus of state and territory governments. While the owners and operators of crowded places remain responsible for implementing protective security measures, state and territory governments acknowledge that responsibility for building and sustaining resilience to terrorism is shared between government, owners and operators, and communities.
State and territory police are responsible for providing threat information to owners and operators of crowded places. This includes material developed by the states and territories, Commonwealth agencies, and overseas partners. Police provide specific information on the local threat context to help owners and operators develop protective security measures. State and territory police may also provide protective security guidance in some instances.

State and territory police are also responsible for running and administering Crowded Places Forums (see page 11). These Forums are the primary means of collective engagement between police and local owners and operators of crowded places, including businesses and local councils. Members of the Crowded Places Forum can share information, guidance, and lessons learned relevant to their local circumstances. These Forums also provide an opportunity for Commonwealth agencies, particularly ASIO and the AFP, to brief owners and operators in each state and territory as a collective.

The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee
The ANZCTC coordinates an effective counter-terrorism capability across Australia and maintains arrangements for intelligence and information sharing between all jurisdictions and relevant agencies. The ANZCTC reports to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). The ANZCTC also provides information and advice on counter-terrorism issues to heads of government and relevant ministers.

All jurisdictions and New Zealand are members of the ANZCTC. Each Australian jurisdiction has its own comprehensive counter-terrorism governance arrangements.

Crowded Places Advisory Group and the Business Advisory Group
The CPAG is the body that reports to and advises the ANZCTC on protecting crowded places from terrorism. It is also a forum through which all jurisdictions can identify and share best practice, develop capabilities, and oversee activities related to protecting crowded places. The CPAG is responsible for developing and maintaining a nationally consistent crowded places protective security capability across state and territory police forces.

CPAG membership has been expanded and now consists of senior representatives from state and territory police services, the chair of the Business Advisory Group (BAG), the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), ASIO, and ALGA.

The CPAG works with, and is advised by, the BAG. The BAG’s membership consists of representatives of crowded places with a national presence. It operates a national forum through which crowded place owners and operators, peak industry bodies, government representatives, and international partners share information and advice. The outcome of this engagement directly informs the work of the CPAG. The BAG also facilitates exercises and training for its members.

Information and guidance developed by the CPAG is shared, where appropriate, with owners and operators in all jurisdictions through the BAG and state and territory Crowded Places Forums.

Commonwealth Government
The Commonwealth has a number of key responsibilities related to protecting crowded places from terrorism. It maintains national counter-terrorism related policies, legislation, and plans; maintains a broad range of counter-terrorism intelligence, investigative and operational capabilities within Commonwealth agencies; and supports intelligence and information sharing between the jurisdictions.

Commonwealth agencies also directly support the states and territories to prevent, investigate, disrupt, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents across the country. This is done primarily through ASIO and AFP involvement in each jurisdiction’s Joint Counter-Terrorism Team.

ASIO is the authoritative source of security threat information in Australia and is responsible for determining the National Terrorism Threat Level. ASIO assesses security intelligence and provides protective security advice to governments, the police, and other agencies. ASIO also provides threat information and protective security guidance to owners and operators of crowded places through various means. For further information see ‘Enabling Better Information Sharing and Guidance’ (page 12).

Private Security Providers
Private security providers and professionals play a central role in protecting crowded places. In many cases, private security personnel—including security contractors, risk analysis experts, and private security officers—are directly responsible for strengthening the security of crowded places. They are often the first responders to a terrorist incident. Consequently, they must be well-trained and professional.

Governments have a role in supporting the private security sector to achieve this, including by maintaining a robust regulatory regime around employment, training, and registration.

The Community
All communities and individuals have a responsibility to help detect and prevent possible terrorist attacks in crowded places. Everyone working in or using a crowded place should be aware of their surroundings and report suspicious or unusual behaviour to authorities.

In life threatening situations, everyone should phone 000. Suspicious or unusual behaviour should be reported to local police by phoning 131 444 (in Victoria call 1800 333 000) or by contacting the National Security Hotline on 1800 123 400, if the information is not time-critical.

Australia’s Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism
Australia’s Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism is based on strong, trusted partnerships between all levels of government and those responsible for crowded places. It aims to make crowded places as resilient as possible to terrorist attacks while preserving our use and enjoyment of these places. A nationally consistent approach will help achieve this objective in an effective and efficient manner.

The Strategy involves four core elements which provide a structure for building a consistent national approach to protecting crowded places that can be applied flexibly throughout Australia (Figure 2, page 2).

Improving the resilience of crowded places relies on all stakeholders taking action to apply this Strategy. Owners and operators, and governments at all levels, will need to use this Strategy to make decisions and implement protective security measures in accordance with the existing arrangements in each jurisdiction.
Building Stronger Partnerships

Protecting crowded places from terrorism is not just a job for governments; it is a responsibility shared by the private sector and the community. The success of this Strategy rests on sustainable and strong partnerships across Australia between all governments and owners and operators of crowded places, including businesses and local governments.

In Australia, the national framework for cooperation is known as the ‘Crowded Places Partnership’ (Figure 4). The Partnership supports a nationally consistent and coordinated approach for trusted engagement between police, owners and operators of crowded places, and Commonwealth agencies in every state and territory.

Trusted relationships between governments and owners and operators of crowded places are fundamental to the effective implementation of this Strategy. The Crowded Places Partnership sets out a range of mechanisms to support this engagement, but none of these replace the ability for all police and intelligence agencies to engage directly with owners and operators when required.

Figure 4

The primary vehicle for police to engage collectively with owners and operators of crowded places in each jurisdiction is known as ‘Crowded Places Forums’ (Box 2). These Forums already exist in some jurisdictions and will be introduced in all others. Their membership comprises owners and operators (including business and local councils), state or territory officials, and police protective security officers. The state and territory Crowded Places Forums are a vehicle for fostering local networks and partnerships to ensure all stakeholders are as well connected as possible. The Forums are also responsible for reporting to the CPAG on a regular basis, to ensure local information is considered and captured at a national level.

The Commonwealth and many states and territories already have broad networks of international contacts through which they exchange expertise on protecting crowded places. These efforts require robust coordination to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and to ensure outcomes are shared across the country with those who would benefit from them.

The CPAG plays a role in strengthening these arrangements. With members from the Commonwealth, state and territories, local government, and the business community, the CPAG acts as a central repository for documenting and coordinating our international engagement on protecting crowded places, including advice, lessons learned, information about equipment and technology, and training we receive from our overseas partners.

Enabling Better Information Sharing and Guidance

Protecting crowded places from terrorism in an evolving threat environment requires trusted and routine information sharing and guidance across Australia between all governments, industry sectors, business, and communities. The strong partnerships developed and sustained through the Crowded Places Partnership will help to achieve this goal (Figure 5).

We have much to learn from our international counterparts. Having the right mechanisms in place to build and sustain the trusted exchange of ideas and advice with international partners allows us to identify, refine, and share the most effective measures for protecting crowded places. International engagement must continue to inform and guide Australia’s approach to protecting crowded places from terrorism. This engagement should occur at all levels of government, between owners and operators of crowded places, and should include regular consultation with private sector experts.

We recommend that the CPAG acts as a central repository for capturing and documenting international advice, lessons learned, information about equipment and technology, and training we receive from our overseas partners.
ASIO is responsible for the National Terrorism Threat Advisory System found on www.nationalsecurity.gov.au. It provides public advice on a scale of five levels about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia. If the threat level changes, the Commonwealth provides advice on what the threat level means, where the threat is coming from, potential targets, and the most likely weapons and tactics used by terrorists.

ASIO also issues threat assessments to inform the actions of police and other agencies responsible for protecting Australians from terrorism. Police in all jurisdictions consider this intelligence and translate it into threat information and guidance that is relevant to local circumstances. This information and guidance is shared with owners and operators both directly and through state and territory Crowded Places Forums.

In circumstances where credible intelligence points to a specific and immediate threat to a crowded place, ASIO works proactively with local police and impacted parties to share threat information so an appropriate response can be developed and deployed. This engagement is initiated by ASIO as required.

ASIO’s Business and Government Liaison Unit (BGLU) is the principal interface between ASIO and industry. The BGLU provides information to business and government via a subscription-based website, ASIO-hosted briefings, face-to-face engagement, and participation in forums such as the BAG Forum and the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) led by the Attorney-General’s Department. All of these mechanisms are aimed at providing risk management decision makers with the most current security intelligence and protective security advice to assist them in their duties.

The BGLU secure website hosts intelligence-backed reporting drawn from the full range of ASIO’s information holdings and expertise, including from the National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) and ASIO’s protective security area—T4. The website also hosts reports and products from other Commonwealth departments such as the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC). The BGLU has a dedicated page for grouping together reporting relevant to owners and operators of crowded places. Owners and operators of crowded places can apply for access to the BGLU at www.bglu.asio.gov.au.

ASIO T4 is a source of protective security advice to Government and, through the BGLU, provides guidance to the private sector. T4 produces a range of Security Managers Guides available through the BGLU website that constitute a valuable resource to help security managers address protective security requirements.

The flow of information between governments and those responsible for crowded places is not one-way. Owners and operators should be willing to share information, advice, and lessons they have learned with governments and their peers. Building a strong and inclusive security culture is a responsibility shared by all.

In addition, everyone has a responsibility to report suspicious behaviour to the authorities. In life-threatening situations everyone should call 000. To report a crime or possible criminal activity, police can be contacted on 131 444 (in Victoria call 1800 333 000).

Box 3: How Should I Assess Security Consultants?

The following are factors that owners and operators of crowded places should consider when selecting a security consultant:

- Security licence;
- Education, qualifications, skills, and experience;
- Referee reports;
- Security clearance (where required);
- Professional association and affiliations;
- Previous experience conducting security reviews;
- Ability to effectively undertake the security review (subject matter knowledge);
- Impartiality of advice (consider any commercial affiliations); and
- Published professional work.

Implementing Effective Protective Security

Implementing protective security measures can be a complex process which, if done incorrectly, can be costly and ineffective. Owners and operators have a responsibility to undertake a risk assessment and/or vulnerability analysis of their crowded place, implement the appropriate mitigations, monitor them for effectiveness (including through audits), and review them at appropriate junctures.

This section is designed to provide owners and operators of crowded places with a baseline of knowledge to improve their understanding of protective security.

The tools and information provided with this Strategy are a starting point. In many cases, owners and operators will be required to seek further advice from private security professionals. Professional and qualified security consultants play an important role in undertaking full security risk assessments of crowded places and recommending appropriate protective security measures (Box 3).
Guidance
Before owners and operators make decisions about protective security measures they must first understand how attractive their location may be for a terrorist to attack. To determine this, all owners and operators should complete the Crowded Places Security Audit found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces. Based on the outcome of the Security Audit, the document provides guidance on what owners and operators should do next. This could include:
• Refer to information on the general threat environment and specific terrorist weapons and tactics found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces;
• Complete the Crowded Places Security Audit found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces;
• Contact the relevant area within your state or territory police for further information, including about joining a Crowded Place Forum (Box 2 on page 12).

Crowded places encompass a significant range of different locations, venues and businesses. They differ substantially in size and have different levels of risk to manage. For example, the security requirements for a large shopping centre will be different from those of a small street market or a large music concert.

For this reason, the Crowded Places Security Audit does not provide a definitive list of all security matters that must be addressed for a particular location. Instead, it provides a checklist of the most common security considerations faced by crowded places in order to highlight gaps in security. It is important to remember that protective security measures should be proportionate to the level and type of threat. The Audit should only be consulted after the Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool has been completed.

Layered Security
Layered security describes the practice of securing a site by applying multiple layers of complementary protective security measures (Figure 6). The goal of layered security is to reduce the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack on a crowded place by building multiple layers of redundancy into a site’s security architecture. If implemented correctly, layered security ensures that the failure of any single layer—which may consist of different security measures—will not significantly compromise the overall security of the place being protected. This concept is also known as ‘security in depth’.

Figure 6: Layered Security

Applying the model better equips those responsible for, working in, and using a crowded place to deter, detect, delay, and respond to a terrorist attack.

The actual measures owners and operators can use within each of these layers will differ from location to location. Decisions about protective security will be informed by a variety of factors, including:
• The prevailing threat advice;
• The type of purpose of the site, including the presence of high-profile individuals;
• The history of security incidents at the site;
• The presence of high-risk facilities in close proximity to the site;
• Existing security measures that are in place.

The following represents some examples of protective security measures that can be used within each layer. Some security measure can strengthen multiple layers. For example, the effective use of security officers can help to delay, detect, deter, respond to, and recover from an attack.

Deterring a potential terrorist attack can involve the presence of obvious physical and electronic target hardening measures, including:
• Fencing indicating demarcation;
• perimeter security lighting;
• Warning signs and notices;
• High visibility security patrols;
• CCTV cameras;
• Perimeter vehicle security barriers.

Detecting a potential terrorist attack can occur through visual detection and alert systems, including:
• CCTV cameras;
• Electronic intruder detection systems;
• Reporting of suspicious behaviour by security officers, staff, or members of the public;
• Vehicle screening and searching;
• Canine explosive trace detection;
• Screening—x-ray machines, metal detectors, explosive trace detection, and bag inspections.

Delays a potential terrorist attack can occur through physical counter-measures and other approaches including:
• Security fences;
• Environmental barriers including water features, natural topography, and vegetation;
• Vehicle security barriers and measures to slow the speed of vehicles;
• Pedestrian and vehicle access control points;
• Trained staff interventions;
• Rapid security officer response.

Responding to a potential terrorist attack requires a timely and coordinated security response throughout a crowded place’s area of control. Important elements of response include:
• Security staff who can respond quickly and possess the requisite training, competence and equipment to deal with or limit the impact of threats to the location;
• Reliable emergency communication systems throughout the location;
• Comprehensive security plans that are understood by all staff and security personnel, regularly exercised, and compatible with local emergency services plans.

Cost and Proportionality
Security measures can be resource intensive, costly and, if not correctly managed and communicated, can alienate staff and the public and significantly disrupt the day-to-day operations of a crowded place. This is why expert specialist advice is essential and why careful consideration and planning is required before implementing any protective security measures. The following principles should underpin all decision-making:
• It is not possible to protect everything, so owners and operators must prioritise the highest risk areas of a crowded place;
A robust business continuity plan will be designed so it can be activated during any major disruption. It should not just cover terrorist attacks and must be designed to return to normal as quickly as possible after an incident. The plan requires owners and operators of crowded places to re-establish essential services and restore public confidence as quickly as possible. Insurance can be a useful tool to manage losses or damage caused by an act of terrorism. The Australian Government ensures that insurers cannot exclude liability for major acts of terrorism from eligible insurance contracts through the Terrorism Insurance Act 2003.

**Increasing Resilience**

Even the most robust and thorough protective security plan may not stop a terrorist attack on a crowded place from occurring or succeeding. But what well-considered and tested protective security does is reduce both the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and the consequences of such an attack. Resilient crowded places can do more to prevent a terrorist attack, can reduce the damage caused by an attack, and can recover more quickly after an attack has occurred. Building a strong security culture is central to developing resilience to terrorism and other types of criminal activity.

**Other elements of building an effective security culture can include:**
- Ensuring that security is a permanent feature of executive decision making and agendas;
- Requiring senior management to demonstrate personal commitment to compliance with security values and standards;
- Understanding commercial, reputational and legal risk that could result from inappropriate protective security measures being in place to prevent or mitigate a terrorist attack;
- Providing staff with clear, succinct and jargon-free guidance about security standards and procedures;
- Promoting good security practice to both staff and visitors by making use of internal communication systems, posters, message boards and newsletters;
- Adopting effective and lawful staff screening processes during recruitment;
- Providing staff training in security practices;
- Exercising all staff in security scenarios;
- Self-initiated security penetration and breach testing;
- Sharing information with staff about security breaches;
- Encouraging and rewarding staff for identifying and reporting security vulnerabilities and incidents.

Communication runs through the full length and breadth of every organisation and requires a mechanism for counter-terrorism security to be different. It protects a crowded place from terrorism rests on building and sustaining a culture of security from management level through to staff on the ground. Those responsible for managing the security of a crowded place should regularly meet with staff to discuss security issues and encourage staff to raise their concerns about security.

Security managers should also consider a communication strategy for raising awareness among staff and others who need to know about a security plan and its operation.

A resilient crowded place has trusted relationships with government, other crowded places, and the public. It has access to accurate, contemporary threat information and has a means of translating this threat information into effective, proportionate protective security measures commensurate with the level of risk they face. While resilience is difficult to measure in the absence of an attack—you cannot evaluate what has not occurred—it can be assessed through regular testing and evaluation of policies and procedures, exercising security arrangements and responses, and regular and ongoing training of staff.

It is natural that owners and operators of crowded places will examine terrorist attacks that occur elsewhere and seek to understand what it means for them. The more comprehensive they have been at addressing activities around prevention, preparedness and response, the more confident the owners and operators can be that their level of resilience will reduce, as far as possible, the impact of a terrorist attack. This will include the ability of owners and operators to resume business-as-usual activities as soon as possible.

**Governance and Accountability**

Countering terrorism is a responsibility shared by all Australian governments, the community, and the private sector.

Australia’s national counter-terrorism coordinating body, the ANZCTC, meets regularly to coordinate and maintain effective counter-terrorism arrangements across Australia. The ANZCTC reports to COAG annually.

This Strategy will be reviewed on a regular basis by the CPAG and the ANZCTC.