



**ACTIVE ARMED
OFFENDER
GUIDELINES FOR
CROWDED
PLACES**

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Introduction

Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism states that all owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including the threat of terrorism.

Crowded places are a preferred terrorist target because of the high volume and concentration of people making them attractive to attack. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for protecting the location.

Globally, active armed offender attacks have occurred, and continue to occur, in crowded places such as shopping centres, sporting stadiums, transport hubs and entertainment venues.

It is the responsibility of both government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of terrorism.

This guidance material has been developed by the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). It should be read in conjunction with the ANZCTC's '*National Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism*' and associated guidelines.

Purpose

The *Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places* are intended to help owners or operators of crowded places to be more aware of the threat posed by Active Armed Offenders (AAO). They also provide guidance on considerations during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities.

Considerations for owners and operators are presented across the areas of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (PPRR).

What is the Threat?

An Active Armed Offender is defined as an armed offender who is actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people, and who demonstrated their intention to continue to do so while having access to additional potential victims.

Active armed offender attacks continue to be one of the most common tactics adopted by terrorists and other criminals around the world. This is, in part, due to the relative ease of access to weapons, including edged weapons and firearms – although the availability of weapons such as firearms varies between countries.

In Australia, a terrorist attack is likely to be low-cost, using readily available weapons and simple tactics. Weapons such as knives, vehicles and firearms used in combination with simple tactics, can maximise casualties.

Australia and New Zealand are not immune to active armed offender attacks. Several attacks targeting places like shopping centres, universities and public spaces have been disrupted. Active armed offender attacks in Australia remain a real threat to the community.

A violent extremist ideology (both religious and issue based) can give rise to this tactic although some offenders may not be motivated by ideology at all. The deadliest mass casualty shooting in Australia – the 1996 Port Arthur massacre – was perpetrated by an individual with no links to a violent extremist ideology.

Recent counter-terrorism arrests and prosecutions in Australia demonstrate the potential threat of terrorism onshore. Some Australian counter-terrorism arrests include

charges related to plots involving readily available weapons.

National Terrorism Threat Level

The National Terrorism Threat Advisory System informs Australians about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia to help guide national preparation and planning. When the threat level is raised, additional precautions may be required. State and territory police can provide information on how the National Terrorism Threat Advisory System relates to the local security context.

Further Advice

Updated threat advice and the current National Terrorism Threat Level is publicly available on the **National Security website** (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au).

State and territory police can also provide information on how the National Terrorism Threat Level relates to the local security context.

(www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places/state-territory-police-contacts)

The ASIO Outreach secure website also hosts reporting drawn from ASIO intelligence holdings, and owners and operators of crowded places can apply for access at the ASIO Outreach website (www.asio.gov.au/outreach).

Owners and operators should consider this advice in the context of their own crowded place. Completing the **Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool** (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places) may also assist in better understanding the factors that make your site attractive as a target, and to ensure responses are proportionate to the threat context.

Characteristics of Active Armed Offender Incidents

An active armed offender attempting to kill and injure as many people as possible within the shortest period of time will generally target places with the greatest number of people in close proximity, i.e. crowded places.

The form of an active armed offender attack may vary from a simplistic opportunist attack utilising rudimentary weapons to a more sophisticated mixed mode attack involving considerable preplanning and hostile reconnaissance. Attack characteristics may include:

- Lone attacker, multiple attackers, multiple groups of attackers;
- Arrival on a location on foot in a vehicle or an attack perpetrated by insiders; and/or,
- Entering in without using force, or forcing entry for example using an explosive device, a vehicle, coercion of someone with access or a combination there of.

Whilst an active armed offender incident may not generally include a hostage situation, it has potential transition to one, particularly once the police response has commenced.

The sudden, unpredictable, and rapid development of active armed offender incidents often means the first responders to these incidents may include uniformed and/or plain clothes police, protective service officers or security guards.

General features

Common elements of active armed offender incidents include:

- Incidents often occur in crowded places where the offender has access to a large number of potential victims;
- Most incidents will evolve rapidly and are often reach resolution quickly;
- Many active armed offenders will continue to attempt to harm victims until confronted by law enforcement personnel or some other type of intervention occurs; and,
- Most incidents will not be effectively resolved through negotiation or peaceful means.

Individual reactions

An individual's initial reaction to an attack may vary depending on a variety of factors including, their situational awareness, the reactions of those around them and whether they have rehearsed their response. Stress and fear will cause different reactions in individuals and may diminish their ability to process information and make decisions. Individuals may:

- Freeze, temporarily being unable to process information or make decisions;
- Flight, typically leaving using familiar rather than optimal routes or following a crowd;
- Fight, even when their chances of stopping an attack are low; and/or,
- Film, taking action that puts themselves or others in danger.

Visitors and members of the public are likely to be less able to recognise an attack as well as being less familiar with an organisations site layout, environment and procedures. It is unrealistic to expect these people to be prepared for an attack and their actions may put themselves or others in danger. In the event of attack knowledgeable personnel should guide these people on what to do utilising the **Escape Hide Tell** methodology detailed next.

Active Armed Offender attack – initial action advice for individuals

Refer to Appendix C for further details.

Escape: The priority is to remove victims from close proximity to the offender.

Occupants of crowded places should consider evacuating the site if it is safe to do so. People should leave behind most belongings and determine the safest escape route before beginning to move. Maintaining situational awareness and making good use of available concealment or cover while moving is also important.

Hide: If unable to safely evacuate, shelter in place ensuring people take advantage of available concealment or cover from offender.

If safely evacuating the venue is not possible, occupants of crowded places should attempt to hide in a secure area where they can lock the door, blockade the entrance with heavy furniture, cover windows, turn off lights and remain silent. Mobile phones or other personal electronic devices should also be turned to silent. Avoid congregating in the open.

If the option of hiding is adopted, individuals should continually re-assess the situation and their opportunities to safely evacuate or better secure themselves within the premises. They may also need to consider options to incapacitate the active armed offender in the event they are located. This can include using or throwing available objects or using aggressive force when confronted. Such action should only be taken as a last resort and in order to protect life.

Tell: The more information people can pass on to the police or owners and operators the better, but NEVER at the expense of an individual's own safety or the safety of others.

If it is safe to do so information should be provided immediately to the police via 000.

People passing on information to law enforcement may be asked to remain on the line and provide any other information or updates that the operator requests.

Consideration should always be given to providing information and advice to others who may be unfamiliar with the site, the nature and extent of the threat, or what they should do to remain safe.

Further Advice

Escape Hide Tell – Training guides and posters for business can be located at; [What to do in an attack \(nationalsecurity.gov.au\)](https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-to-do-in-an-attack).

Weapons

Firearms

Firearm ownership restrictions have reduced the accessibility of firearms in Australia. However, firearms acquired through legitimate or illicit means will continue to pose a threat to the public. Domestic and international experience emphasises that attacks using firearms remain an enduring threat.

Prohibited Weapons

Laws have been changed to make our community safer by reducing the number of items in the community that are easily concealed, easily carried, and are designed to kill or injure people. These laws make it an offence for a person to have prohibited weapons, unless exempted in special and limited circumstances.

Although illegal, many prohibited weapons can still be purchased or manufactured without a license and exist in significant numbers in the community. An active armed offender could have easy access to these weapons, including edged weapons such as large knives, machetes and swords.

Improvised Weapons

Improvised weapons are commonly used by attackers when they are unable to obtain

conventional weapons such as firearms and/or prohibited weapons.

Everyday items can be a weapon if it is carried with the intention of hurting someone or if it is being carried in a threatening way. Common or everyday items such as a knife, bottle, screwdriver, baseball bat, or even a motor vehicle can be an improvised weapon.

A motivated individual can easily use such items to kill or inflict serious injury. Improvised weapons are only limited by an individual's imagination. It should be noted they could also be used to defend against an active armed offender as a last resort.

Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery (PPRR)

In most incidents, active armed offenders need freedom of movement and ready access to victims in order to achieve their objective. Therefore, minimising the offender's access to potential victims should be the primary objective of any plans or strategies. This is most likely to be achieved through the following activities:

- Initiating immediate response arrangements;
- Minimising the duration of the incident;
- Restricting the offender's movements;
- Moving people away from danger;
- Preventing people from entering the scene; and,
- Helping police to locate and isolate the active armed offender.

Time + Freedom of Movement = Increased Casualties

Australia's *National Counter-Terrorism Plan* recognises the need to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover (PPRR) from terrorist acts. The Plan can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au. The PPRR concept does not represent a consecutive set of activities and many elements of PPRR will often occur concurrently. Event organisers and owners and operators of crowded places are strongly encouraged to ensure their own prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements align with those of emergency service agencies, and in that regard, the following information provides useful guidance on how PPRR activities might best be developed, particularly in terms of active armed offender situations.

Prevention

Not all risks or emergencies can be prevented, therefore the concept of prevention should encompass activities that may reduce the vulnerability of a site, and the severity or impact of an incident.

For most types of active armed offender attacks, prevention activities should aim to:

- Assess the threat and risk to address vulnerabilities;
- Develop a proactive protective security posture;
- Deter a would-be attacker – by providing obvious physical and electronic security measures, coupled with good risk management practices;
- Detect an intrusion – by providing alert and visual detection systems; and,
- Delay or limit the intrusion for a sufficient period to allow a response force to attend – by putting in place measures that will potentially limit the movement of the offender and reduce access to further victims.

For active armed offender attacks, prevention-related activities specifically aimed at mitigating

or reducing the severity of the incident should also be considered. The main focus of those activities should be on restricting the movement of the offender/s while reducing their access to further victims. How to best achieve this will depend on many variables, such as the physical design and security features of the crowded place, the movement of the offender/s and the opportunities for victims to escape or shelter in place.

Not all crowded places will share the same risk profile or have similar vulnerabilities, so the principle of proportionality should generally be applied to any prevention-related activities. This means that protective security measures not only need to be proportionate to the level of assessed risk, they should also strike a reasonable balance between protecting the public and, where possible, preserving the public's use and enjoyment of these places. When measuring proportionality it should be recognised that prevention and mitigation activities related to terrorism may also provide broader crime prevention and public safety benefits.

Preparedness

Preparedness incorporates emergency planning, resourcing, capability development and testing of preparedness arrangements. Some key activities include regularly reviewing the national and local threat environment and how it impacts your business, promoting a strong security culture, regular review and testing of policies and procedures, and having plans and procedures to identify and assess suspicious behaviours or activity, including hostile reconnaissance.

Security culture

Security culture is a set of values shared by everyone in an organisation that determines how people think about and approach security. Improving security culture helps staff be more security vigilant and consider security in their day-to-day business.

Building a strong security culture is central to developing resilience to terrorism and other types of criminal activity.

Elements of building an effective security culture can include:

- Ensuring that security is a permanent feature of executive decision making and agendas;
- Requiring senior management to demonstrate personal commitment to and compliance with security values and standards;
- Providing staff with clear, succinct, and jargon-free guidance about security standards and procedures;
- Promoting good security practice to both staff and visitors by making use of internal communication systems, posters, message boards and newsletters; and,
- Encouraging and rewarding staff for identifying and reporting security vulnerabilities and incidents.

Vigilant personnel who are confident in recognising and reporting suspicious behaviour may not only provide early warning of an attack but may even deter an attack which is still being planned.

Develop, review and test of security plans, policies and procedures

Developing, implementing, and regularly testing a comprehensive security plan is a matter of good business and a corporate responsibility. Well-considered, regularly reviewed, and tested security plans, policies and procedures reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and the consequences of such an attack.

When conducting a review of security, emergency and evacuation plans, owners and operators of crowded places may consider:

- Training security and staff to be aware of indicators of an AAO attack, and their role and responsibilities in the building security response plans;

- Training security and staff in reporting procedures for suspicious items or activity;
- Requirements for suitably trained first aid officers with appropriate equipment and supplies;
- Pre-planning evacuation routes, including procedures for clearing and securing assembly areas;
- How evacuation routes will be communicated to people onsite during an incident;
- Implementation of a rehearsed lockdown procedure;
- Planning and exercising the security response to assist delivering a timely and proportionate response;
- Where possible, engaging local police and emergency services to ensure responses align; and/or,
- Contingency plans for a heightened threat environment which may include increasing baggage screening and security patrols or minimising public access.

Further Advice

Further information on dynamic lockdown is available to approved ASIO Outreach subscribers on the [Reports](#) page of the Outreach website. You will need to log in to the website to view reports.

Disrupting hostile reconnaissance

People at your site—whether security, staff, patrons, or visitors—are best placed to detect suspicious behaviour. However, they will be more likely to report the behaviour if it's convenient and they are confident about how to do so.

The most effective method of detecting and disrupting suspicious activity is ensuring staff, security, and visitors:

- Know what to report and where to report;

- Know it is easy to report information; and,
- Know that reports will be taken seriously.

Indicators of hostile reconnaissance should be reported immediately to the appropriate person, which may be your manager or security personnel.

In life threatening situations, everyone should phone **000**.

Suspicious or unusual behaviour that is not time critical, should be reported to Crime Stoppers on **1800 333 000** or the National Security Hotline on **1800 1234 00**.



Further Advice

Further advice on identifying and responding to suspicious behaviour can be found in the ANZCTC Disrupting Hostile Reconnaissance Guidelines for Crowded Places (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au).

Response

Initial response

The dynamic and unpredictable nature of active armed offender incidents means there is no single best practice that crowded place owners

and operators can build into their plans, arrangements and training activities. Your organisation must determine its response priorities and ascertain what is realistic through planning and testing. This should include preparing and empowering security and frontline personnel to make decisions to counter an active armed offender attack that may prevent unnecessary delays coordinating a response. The primary objective of any initial response planning should be to minimise the offender's access to victims. Owners and operators should develop and practise strategies aimed at evacuating people and isolating the offender.

Guidance for initial response considerations for crowded places is contained at **Appendix B**, and is summarised in the following table.¹

Suggested priorities for response tasks to be completed by security and front-line personnel.

PRIMARY ACTIVITY	<p>Detect the attack and make a rapid initial assessment</p> <p>Call, update and facilitate police & emergency services</p> <p>Alert personnel and members of the public</p> <p>Decide whether to instigate lockdown and use any active delay systems</p> <p>Advise senior management</p>
SECONDARY ACTIVITY	<p>Alert neighbours</p> <p>Keep personnel and members of the public updated</p> <p>Make a detailed assessment</p> <p>Direct front-line personnel</p> <p>Record events, decisions and actions</p>

¹ Adapted from CPNI. (2022, June 2). *Marauding Terrorist Attacks*. Retrieved from <https://www.cpni.gov.uk/marauding-terrorist-attacks-0>.

Transition considerations

Responsibility for implementing and coordinating initial response activities will, in most instances, be assumed by the management or security staff of the crowded place pending the arrival of police and other first responders. A critical aspect of managing the initial response and transitioning responsibility to police will be the ability to gain 'situational awareness'.

Police need an accurate picture of a situation and how it has developed. To enable this, owners and operators need to establish quick, effective, and continuous lines of communication from the incident site to police. Understanding the requirements of police first responders will also enable a faster transition of incident management from owners and operators to police. Planning and staff capability/training activities should include:

- Developing strategies that allow designated staff to safely maintain situational awareness of the incident and relay any new information to responding police; and,
- Training staff and occupants on how to react when police arrive on scene.

Guidance for initial response considerations for affected staff and occupants is contained at **Appendix B**.

Police response

All Australian law enforcement agencies, have robust systems and inter-agency arrangements in place that guide their response to a range of natural and manmade emergencies. Whilst these procedures are designed to reflect the specific needs, capacity and capabilities of each jurisdiction's operating environment, common amongst them are requirements for police to employ:

- Operational response strategies that are designed to defeat, or at least mitigate, a range of specific threats; and,

- A use of force model supported by operational principles, skills, tactics and training.

There are a number of differences in emergency management arrangements, processes and terminology across the states and territories. It is therefore critical that the owners and operators of crowded place and major event stakeholders develop a firm understanding of the emergency service arrangements that apply to the jurisdiction in which they are operating. Due to the often unpredictable and dynamic nature of active armed offender incidents, highly trained police tactical group operators may be unable to respond to a scene immediately. As such, police first responders will generally provide the initial response to most active armed offender situations and may potentially manage them to their conclusion. It is expected that the following objectives will guide initial response actions in all jurisdictions:

- ***Saving lives and minimising risk of serious injury***: This will generally be achieved through a rapid deployment strategy, the purpose of which is to defeat or mitigate the threat posed by the active armed offender as quickly as possible.
- ***Locate and isolate***: The focus of police first responders will be to locate the offender(s) with a view to reducing their area of operation and access to further victims.
- ***Resolve***: When responding to an active armed offender incident, police first responders are trained to move toward the threat at a sustained pace to defeat or disarm the offender. In doing so, they may initially need to keep moving past panicked and injured people. Their primary goal is to prevent the offender killing or causing serious injury to further victims.

Recovery

To ensure a smooth transition from response to recovery, gradually devolve and integrate response arrangements. This includes media and information management, impact assessment, rehabilitation of the built environment and restoring community and staff confidence. While many recovery-related matters will be similar for most emergency events, significant or traumatic events such as terrorist acts or AAO incidents may add extra complexity to normal recovery procedures.

Key recovery considerations following an AAO incident may include:

- Public information and community confidence;
- Crime scene and investigation;
- Business continuity challenges; and,
- Ongoing welfare and support.

In the immediate aftermath of an AAO incident, demands will be placed on your organisation by personnel, members of the public, emergency services and the media. Your organisation may need to continue to meet customers' needs without access to the site that has been attacked and with many staff dead, injured or otherwise unable to work.

Immediate aftermath – What to expect

Police may designate the site and or surrounding area a crime scene, establishing cordons to restrict access to police officers and staff. This means that the area will not be accessible to personnel or members of the public. Police may want to take statements from personnel and members of the public. The ambulance service will seek to treat people's injuries.

Public information and community confidence

Handling the media

Local, national, and international media will be searching for information to report and people to interview. Many news crews will arrive at the scene. Plans for handling the media should include a designated spokesperson, coordinating statements with the police, a means for providing continuous updates, and prepared responses to likely questions.

Media or public information activities must support operational policies and actions. To achieve this, develop public messaging in coordination with senior operational personnel and experienced media managers. This is particularly important in situations where an offender has been taken into custody or charged with offences relating to the incident, as information released may interfere with pending legal proceedings.

Provide information regularly to keep the public informed and only restrict it in the interests of safety or operational security. Clearly separate information relating to consequence management, such as aiding victims, from the actual incident or security issue. As a general rule:

- An organisation must only release information for which it has responsibility; and,
- A log of all public information activities and decisions should be maintained.

Medical treatment

People may require medical treatment for physical injuries as well as mental distress. Some people may have incurred a physical injury that has been masked by adrenaline during the attack, and effects may not be immediately apparent. Working with the ambulance service, ensure that all personnel and members of the public are checked, recorded, and given medical treatment where needed.

Support for families and friends

Families and friends of those present will be seeking information and many may arrive at the scene of the attack. Plan to establish mechanisms through which information can be issued such as a dedicated telephone number, website, or social media feed. Consider setting aside an area where people may be reunited with family and friends.

Arranging vigils

Consider designating a place where people may leave tokens of remembrance. Organising a vigil provides an opportunity to allow people to begin to grieve and to offer support to those in need.

Crime scene and investigation activities

A major investigation will always follow a police response to an incident involving an active armed offender. This could involve criminal and forensic investigations in relation to potential criminal offences (including acts of terrorism), as well as inquires conducted on behalf of the coroner. These investigative processes will need to be extremely thorough and may often be protracted, particularly where death or serious injury has occurred, the incident has taken place over a broad geographical area, or involves significant forensic challenges.

During the investigation phase the police may also seek assistance from owners and operators of crowded places to help identify potential sources of evidence or witnesses. This could include requesting CCTV footage depicting any hostile reconnaissance, site access and the offense, radio, telephone, or decision-making logs. Recovery or business continuity plans should identify a suitable liaison officer, at an appropriately senior level within the organisation, who can work with the police to help facilitate these types of requests.

Business continuity

Since the attacked site and surrounding area will be designated as a crime scene, they will be inaccessible. Business continuity plans should be implemented and include moving functions to an

alternate location and covering the duties of personnel at the affected site.

The ability of owners and operators of crowded places to return to business-as-usual following a terrorist attack, or other disaster, depends on how effectively they can devise and implement their business continuity arrangements.

Through their contact with investigating police, the nominated liaison officer will generally be in a position to obtain information about the likely duration of the crime scene examination, allowing the venue to start implementing their business continuity arrangements. While the actual process may not change significantly, the amount of time it takes often will.

Useful links

Australian national security:
www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

ASIO Outreach: www.asio.gov.au/outreach

Contacts

National contact information

In the event of an emergency (police, ambulance, fire) **000**.

Crime Stoppers **1800 333 000**.

To report possible signs of terrorism National Security Hotline **1800 123 400** for TTY users: **1800 234 889**.

Email: hotline@nationalsecurity.gov.au

State and Territory Contacts

Details for police in each state and territory can be found at:

<https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/states-territories>

Version control

This document is endorsed by the Australia- New Zealand National Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) and maintained by the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs). Home Affairs is responsible for the version control of this document. To preserve the integrity and currency of this document:

- major amendments must be endorsed by the ANZCTC; and
- minor amendments, for example to correct spelling or grammar, should be documented and forwarded to Crowded Places Advisory Group (CPAG) to be

implemented and to be endorsed before it is distributed.

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Active Armed Offender: An armed offender who is actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people, and who demonstrated their intention to continue to do so while having access to additional potential victims.

Concealment: Prevents a person from being seen or observed, but does not provide protection from physical harm.

Cover: Concealment that provides physical protection from harm.

Crowded Places: Crowded places are locations or environments which are easily accessible by large numbers of people on a predictable basis. Crowded places include, but are not limited to, sports stadia, transport hubs, shopping centres, pubs, clubs, places of worship, tourist attractions, movie theatres, and civic spaces. Crowded places do not have to be buildings and can include open spaces such as parks and pedestrian malls.

A crowded place will not necessarily be crowded at all times: crowd densities may vary between day and night, by season, and may be temporary, as in the case of sporting events, open air festivals, or one-off events.

Emergency Management: The plans, structures and arrangements that are established to bring together government agencies, voluntary groups and private organisations in a coordinated way to deal with emergency needs, including prevention, response and recovery.

Evacuation: The process of relocating people from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas to safer areas. The purpose of an evacuation is to use distance to separate people from the danger created by the emergency.

Police First Responder: A police officer who provides the initial policing response to a call for police assistance.

Improvised weapon: An object that is not designed to be a weapon, but can be used as a means to kill or inflict serious injury.

Mitigation: Measures taken before, during, or after an event to decrease or eliminate its impact on people, property or a location.

Prohibited weapon: A weapon that is prohibited or restricted by law in relation to its manufacture, dealing, possession, or use.

Rapid deployment: The swift and immediate deployment of police and other emergency services personnel to an ongoing situation where delayed deployment could result in death or serious injury.

Situational awareness: The ability to quickly recognise and interpret an event, make sound decisions based on those interpretations, and establish early, effective and continuous lines of communication between the incident site and the controlling agency in order to provide ongoing accurate information about the situation to responders.

Terrorist act: An act or threat committed with the intention of advancing a political, ideological or religious cause, and which is intended to coerce or intimidate an Australian government, a foreign government, or sections of the public, which causes serious physical harm or death to a person, endangers a person's life, causes serious damage to property, creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public, or seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system².

² Commonwealth Criminal Code Act No.12 of 1995

Appendix B: Active Armed Offender Attack – Advice for Owners and Operators of Crowded Places

Response priorities: During an Active Armed Offender incident the primary response objectives and the potential actions for achieving them may include:

Saving and protecting life

- a. Implement pre-arranged incident management protocols.
 1. Activate lockdown procedures (if available).
 2. Initiate and establish communications with police agency through '000' or other means.
 3. Communicate appropriate escape or hide options to those present.
- b. Restrict further vehicle access to the site (bollards, gates, road closures, etc).
- c. Identify and establish a safe medical triage/first aid location.

Facilitating the evacuation of those at risk

- d. Notify key staff of the incident through prearranged messages/codes and methods.
- e. Appoint an evacuation manager and ensure they have situational awareness
- f. Provide guidance on safe routes (considering cover & concealment) for those who are self-evacuating.
- g. Assess the suitability and potential safety of normal evacuation routes.
- h. Evaluate the safety of standing evacuation muster points and change if necessary.

- i. Identify potential safe places or strong holds for those unable to evacuate.

Containing the incident or threat

- j. Consider electronic/ mechanical isolation systems to constrain the movement of the offender/s or restrict access to potential victims.
- k. Identify and establish a suitable perimeter for securing the location.
- l. Use the existing built environment to best advantage for safety and containment action.
- m. Consider restricting escape options for the offender/s if these may endanger others.

Supporting emergency response and investigation activities

- n. Identify and communicate safe access routes/form up points for emergency services.
- o. Consider using CCTV and other remote methods where possible to enable situational awareness.
- p. Commence incident and decision-making logs.
- q. Nominate a suitable emergency services liaison officer to meet/brief the police.
- r. Ensure access for police to site plans and CCTV footage (where possible).
- s. Clearly identify when incident management has transitioned to the police.
- t. Provide ongoing support to the emergency response action as requested.

It is important to regularly practise these and any additional initial response activities so that key managers and staff clearly understand the priority actions and are able to perform these actions in a high-stress and dynamic environment.

Appendix C: Active Armed Offender Attack – Initial Action Advice for Individuals

When attacks involving firearms and other weapons occur it is important to be prepared to react quickly. Considering your potential options and actions in advance will help you to make more informed decisions quickly in a stressful and chaotic environment. The following advice may help with pre-planning your response options.

ESCAPE

Your priority action should be to remove yourself and others from close proximity to the offender/s, or areas that they might reasonably access. The following actions may influence the decisions you make in safely assessing your available options:

Under immediate attack - Take cover initially, but attempt to leave the area as soon as it is safe to do so.

- Leave most of your belongings behind (except for mobile phone);
- Do not congregate in open areas or wait at evacuation points;
- Provide guidance to people that might be unfamiliar with the area;
- Make good use of available cover and concealment opportunities; and,
- Consider (only as a last resort) options for arming yourself with improvised weapons to defend yourself in the event that you are located by the offender.

Nearby attack - Leave the area immediately and move quickly from where the attack is located, but only if it is safe to do so.

Cover from gunfire

- Brickwork or concrete walls;
- Vehicles (engine block area);
- Large trees & fixed objects; and,
- Earth banks/hills/mounds.

Concealment from view (in addition to above options)

- Building walls and partitions (internal and external);
- Vehicles;
- Fences and other large structures; and,
- Blinds/curtains.

HIDE

If you don't believe you can safely evacuate, then you may need to consider sheltering in place. Constantly re-assess the situation and your options based on the best available information.

- Avoid congregating in open areas, such as corridors and foyers;
- Consider locking or barricading yourself and others in a room or secure area;
- Secure your immediate environment and other vulnerable areas;
- Move away from the door, remain quiet and stay there until told otherwise by appropriate authorities, or you need to move for safety reasons;
- Silence mobile phones and other devices that may identify your presence;
- Try to contact police (000) or others to advise of your location and situation;
- Assess and re-assess better options for sheltering in place either within your current location or at an alternative location;
- Choose a location which may enable access to a more secure area; and
- Consider (only as a last resort) options for arming yourself with improvised weapons to defend

yourself in the event that you are located by the offender.

TELL

The more information you can pass on to the police or owners and operators the better, but NEVER at the risk of your own safety or the safety of others.

If it is safe to do so, think about obtaining the following information:

- Exact location of the incident;
- Description of the offender/s and whether they are moving in any particular direction;
- Details of any weapons being used;
- Number of people in the area and any that have been injured; and
- The motive or intent of the offender/s (if known or apparent).

Provide this information immediately to the police via 000 if this can be achieved safely. You may be asked to remain on the line and provide further that the operator requests or if the situation changes.

Consider providing information and advice to others that may be in your area that may be unsure of the current location of the threat and what they should do. Whether you are able to safely do this, and the communication methods available to you, will be determined by the circumstances and your own assessment of the situation.

Police Response

In an Active Armed Offender scenario a police officer's priority is to protect lives. One of their priority actions to achieve this will be to locate the offender and effectively manage that threat as quickly as possible, which could mean initially moving past people who need help.

As more police resources become involved they will attempt to quickly provide support and guidance to persons affected by the incident.

At some stage they will conduct a 'clearance' search of the location to ensure that all persons involved or impacted by the incident are located, and to make the scene safe.

Please remember:

- Upon arriving at the scene, it is possible police officers may initially not be able to distinguish you from the offender(s);
- Police officers will be armed and could point guns in your direction;
- Avoid quick movements or shouting and keep your hands in view;
- They may initially move past you in search of the offender/s;
- Be aware that police may enter your location at some stage to secure the building and locate people that have hidden from the threat; and,
- Promptly follow any instructions given by emergency responders.

Information and advice

- In life-threatening situations or in the case of an emergency, **dial 000**.
- Suspicious or unusual behaviour should be reported to local police by phoning **131 444** or by contacting the National Security Hotline on **1800 1234 00**, if the information is not time-critical.
- For all other inquiries, contact police in your jurisdiction. Contact details can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces.

