




# AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING CROWDED PLACES FROM TERRORISM

AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND **COUNTER-TERRORISM** COMMITTEE





# AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING CROWDED PLACES FROM TERRORISM

2023

ISBN: 978-1-925593-95-2 (Online)

© Commonwealth of Australia 2023.

With the exception of the Coat of Arms and where otherwise stated, all material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence ([www.creativecommons.org/licenses](http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses)).

For the avoidance of doubt, this means this licence only applies to material as set out in this document.



The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website as is the full legal code for the CC BY 4.0 licence ([www.creativecommons.org/licenses](http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses)).

#### **Use of the Coat of Arms**

The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet website.

# Table of Contents

Summary	2
What is a Crowded Place?	4
Crowded Places and Terrorism	4
Who Has a Role in Protecting Crowded Places?	7
Owners and Operators of Crowded Places	7
Local Governments	8
State and Territory Governments	8
The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee	9
Crowded Places Sub Committee and the Business Advisory Group	9
Commonwealth Government	9
Private Security Providers	9
The Community	10
Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism	10
Building Stronger Partnerships	10
Enabling Better Information Sharing and Guidance	12
Implementing Effective Protective Security	14
Guidance	15
Layered Security	15
Cost and Proportionality	16
Reputation	16
Recovery	16
Increasing Resilience	17
Governance and Accountability	18



## Summary

Crowded places such as stadiums, shopping centres, pedestrian malls, and major events will continue to be attractive targets for terrorists. The current National Terrorism Threat Level is outlined at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au), with the levels depicted below in Figure 1.

The current environment reflects advice of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that individuals and groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia.

Australia is not immune to the threat of terrorism and contemporary information regarding the current environment is detailed at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au). Australian governments work with the private sector to protect crowded places. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to detect and disrupt plots, and they have a strong history of stopping terrorist attacks.

But the reality is it will not always be possible to prevent all terrorist attacks from occurring, so we need to strengthen our national arrangements in order to help owners and operators better protect crowded places from terrorism.

Owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including terrorism.

The objective of this Strategy is to protect the lives of people working in, using, and visiting crowded places by making these places more resilient (Figure 2).

The approach taken to protect crowded places should be nationally consistent, proportionate and, to every extent possible, preserve the public's use and enjoyment of these places. It is not possible to protect everything, so owners and operators must prioritise the highest risk areas of a crowded place.

Figure 1 – National Terrorism Threat Level




This Strategy also ensures there is a clear and consistent understanding of what constitutes a crowded place, the roles and responsibilities of all those involved in protecting these places, and the threat environment in which they operate.

The success of this Strategy rests on strong and sustainable partnerships across Australia between governments and the private sector to better protect crowded places. To this end, the Strategy sets out a national framework, known as the 'Crowded Places Partnership.' This Partnership provides a consistent approach in each state and territory for trusted engagement between all levels of government, state and territory police, and owners and operators across the country.

Membership of the Crowded Places Partnership gives owners and operators access to better threat and protective security information. This comes from a variety of sources, including Commonwealth law enforcement and intelligence agencies, state and territory police, other owners and operators, and international partners. In each state and territory, police have 'Crowded Places Forums', through which they can share information and advice with owners and operators.

Figure 2 – Framework for protecting crowded places from terrorism



By accessing this information, owners and operators will be in a better position to protect their crowded places against terrorism. Protective security measures can be used to deter, detect, delay, respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack. Implementing them can be a complex process which, if done incorrectly, can be costly and ineffective. This Strategy includes a suite of supplementary materials that will assist owners and operators to understand and implement protective security measures. These materials also contain modules on specific weapons and tactics used by terrorists.

These supplementary materials can be found at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au) and include:

- *Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool;*
- *Crowded Places Security Audit;*
- *Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines;*
- *Chemical Weapon Guidelines;*
- *Active Armed Offender Guidelines;*
- *Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines;*
- and
- *Disrupting Hostile Reconnaissance Guidelines.*

The *Guidelines* are designed to increase understanding of the threat posed by particular weapons and tactics (e.g. vehicles, improvised explosive devices) to crowded places. The *Guidelines*, and complementary publications such as 'escape, hide tell,' also provide guidance on the issues and options that owners and operators may consider during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities.

Even the most robust and thorough protective security plan may not stop a terrorist attack on a crowded place from occurring or succeeding. But what well-considered and tested protective security does is reduce both the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and the consequences of such an attack.



The reputation of owners and operators of crowded places is prone to serious and permanent damage if a less than robust, responsible, and professional priority is given to protecting people against attack. Reputational damage can have a significant impact on a business' finances. Being security minded and better prepared could not only deter an attack, it can reassure customers and staff that those responsible for crowded places are taking security seriously.

The tools and information provided within this Strategy are intended to give readers a general understanding. In many cases, owners and operators will be required to seek further specific advice from private security professionals. The Strategy contains guidance on how to select a private security consultant.

Hardening and improving the resilience of crowded places relies on all stakeholders taking action to apply this Strategy. Owners and operators, and governments at all levels, will need to use the guidance in this Strategy to make decisions and implement protective security measures in accordance with the existing conditions and arrangements in each jurisdiction.

This Strategy will be reviewed on a regular basis by the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), the national body responsible for coordinating an effective counter-terrorism capability across Australia and maintaining arrangements for intelligence and information sharing between all jurisdictions and relevant agencies.

## What is a Crowded Place?

Crowded places are locations which are easily accessible by large numbers of people on a predictable basis.

Crowded places include, but are not limited to, sports stadia, transport infrastructure, shopping centres, pubs, clubs, hotels, places of worship, tourist attractions, movie theatres, and civic spaces. Crowded places do not have to be buildings and can include open spaces such as parks and pedestrian malls.

A crowded place will not necessarily be crowded at all times: crowd densities may vary between day and night, by season, and may be temporary, as in the case of sporting events, festivals, or one-off events.

## Crowded Places and Terrorism

Australia's current National Terrorism Threat Level is outlined at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au).

It is important for owners and operators of crowded places to understand the current National Terrorism Threat Level and accompanying information on the national security context.

A range of factors can shape terrorist target selection. In most cases, the location itself is not the target—it is the high volume and concentration of people that makes a crowded place attractive to attack. While some crowded places have other attractive features, any location that concentrates large crowds could be an attractive target.

The circumstances of would-be attackers—including specific grievances, the weapons and equipment they can access, and their location—are likely to influence any potential attack planning, including target selection.

According to ASIO, terrorist attack planning in Australia will probably continue to involve weapons and tactics that are low-cost and low-capability. This methodology has been used by terrorists for attacks on crowded places overseas to devastating effect. Basic weapons (including knives and vehicles), firearms, and explosives could all be used in any attack. That said, the possibility of more complex attacks cannot be ruled out.

Many factors influence the selection of weapons and tactics by terrorists, such as resource availability, skills, knowledge, opportunities, motivation, group makeup, as well as strategic, ideological, and tactical objectives. The interplay of these factors shapes the size, style, sophistication and location of an attack, as well as the likelihood of success.

## Box 1: Why do terrorists attack crowded places?



Individuals preparing for, planning to undertake, or in the process of committing a terrorist attack, tend to display certain behaviours. These can be specific behaviours they may exhibit in order to make and execute their plans (for example, conducting reconnaissance) or more general behaviours of intent or support for terrorist activity (such as repeatedly expressing ideologically extreme sentiments).

A number of terrorists worldwide have been detected by bystanders who acted on their initial suspicion that something was 'not quite right' about an individual's activity by reporting this to authorities. Employees working in crowded places and members of the public are often best placed to detect suspicious behaviour. It is important that owners and operators of crowded places do everything they can to raise awareness of possible suspicious behaviour among those using their sites. For further information, please see 'Implementing Effective Protective Security' (page 14).

## Who Has a Role in Protecting Crowded Places?

### Owners and Operators of Crowded Places

Owners and operators of crowded places can include businesses, major event organisers, sporting clubs, charities, community groups, religious groups, and local, state and territory and Commonwealth governments.

All owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including the threat of terrorist attack.

Owners and operators have a responsibility to understand what the current terrorist threat environment means for the security of their site. This includes understanding the main factors that influence terrorist target selection. The Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool found at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au) offers information and guidance on how to assess such factors for a crowded place. Advice on the threat environment can be found on the national security website, the ASIO Outreach subscription website, or through local police contacts.

The Self-Assessment Tool itself should not be considered a risk or vulnerability assessment. Rather, it helps owner/operator understand the relative attractiveness of their site which can then inform these assessments and help guide further security planning. Depending on the outcome of this assessment, owners and operators may need to take further action including, but not limited to, engaging directly with state and territory police, undertaking a formal risk assessment of their site, engaging with private security contractors, and, based on expert advice, implementing effective and proportionate protective security measures.

Owners and operators have a responsibility to undertake a risk assessment and/or vulnerability analysis of their crowded place. They may need to do so by engaging a private security provider. Once this assessment is completed, owners and operators have a responsibility to implement the appropriate

mitigations, monitor them for effectiveness (including through audits), and review them at appropriate junctures. Personal liability can attach to some of these obligations if breached.

Developing, implementing, and regularly testing a comprehensive security plan is a matter of good business and corporate responsibility. The plan should prioritise saving lives and minimising harm while aiming to protect physical assets, information, reputation and other elements that could affect business continuity.

Owners and operators have a responsibility to consider how security arrangements and plans may need to change if the national threat level is raised or lowered, and how long it would take to implement these changes. This should be achieved by accessing information and guidance provided by governments, both online and through state and territory networks. It helps owners/operators also have a responsibility to raise awareness of possible security threats among their staff and patrons.

### Box 2: Responsibilities of Owners and Operators of Crowded Places

- Primary responsibility for protecting their sites;
- Understand the threat of terrorism;
- Undertake risk assessment and/or vulnerability analysis;
- Develop, implement and regularly test security plans;
- Raise awareness of security threats with staff and patrons
- Timely reporting of security incidents and suspicious behaviours.

Owners and operators are also expected to report any security incidents or suspicious activity to law enforcement at the earliest opportunity.

In life threatening situations, everyone should phone 000. Suspicious or unusual behaviour, that is not time critical, should be reported to Crime Stoppers on 1800 333 000 or the National Security Hotline on 1800 123 400.

Figure 3 – Who To Contact



## Local Governments

Local governments are often responsible for, among other things, managing civic spaces, public activities, celebrations, agricultural shows, and community days. This means they have the same role and responsibilities as other owners and operators of crowded places, including a duty of care to develop, implement, and regularly test protective security measures.

Local governments also play an important role in designing and approving public spaces—including a unique opportunity to consider and creatively apply protective security during the early stages of crowded place design. Doing so helps to minimise the disruptive effect of protective security on the public's enjoyment of public spaces.

## State and Territory Governments

State and territory governments have the primary responsibility for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks in their jurisdiction.

While the owners and operators of crowded places remain responsible for implementing protective security measures, state and territory governments acknowledge that responsibility for building and sustaining resilience to terrorism is shared between government, owners and operators, and communities.

State and territory police are responsible for providing threat information to owners and operators of crowded places. This includes material developed by the states and territories, Commonwealth agencies, and overseas partners. Police provide specific information on the local threat context to help owners and operators develop protective security measures. State and territory police may also provide protective security guidance in some instances.

Crowded Places Forums are a shared responsibility between government and industry stakeholders. These Forums are the primary means of collective engagement between police and local owners and operators of crowded places, including businesses and local councils. Members of the Crowded Places Forum can share information, guidance, and lessons learned relevant to their local circumstances. These Forums also provide an opportunity for Commonwealth agencies, particularly ASIO and the AFP, to brief owners and operators in each state and territory as a collective.

## **The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee**

The ANZCTC is comprised of representatives from the Australian government, Australian state and territory governments and the New Zealand Government. The ANZCTC coordinates an effective counter-terrorism capability across Australia and maintains arrangements for intelligence and information sharing between all jurisdictions and relevant agencies. The ANZCTC also provides strategic and policy advice to heads of government and other relevant ministers.

All jurisdictions and New Zealand are members of the ANZCTC. Each Australian jurisdiction has its own comprehensive counter-terrorism governance arrangements.

## **Crowded Places Sub Committee and the Business Advisory Group**

The CPSC is the body that reports to and advises the ANZCTC on protecting crowded places from terrorism. It is also a forum through which all jurisdictions can identify and share best practice, develop capabilities, and oversee activities related to protecting crowded places.

The CPSC is responsible for developing and maintaining a nationally consistent crowded places protective security capability across state and territory police forces.

CPSC membership has been expanded and now consists of senior representatives from state and territory police services, the chair of the Business Advisory Group (BAG), the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and ASIO.

The CPSC works with, and is advised by, the BAG. The BAG's membership consists of representatives of crowded places with a national presence. It operates a national forum through which crowded place owners and operators, peak industry bodies, government representatives, and international partners share information and advice. The outcome of this engagement directly informs the work of the CPSC. The BAG also facilitates exercises and training for its members.

Information and guidance developed by the CPSC is shared, where appropriate, with owners and operators in all jurisdictions through the BAG and state and territory Crowded Places Forums.

## **Commonwealth Government**

The Commonwealth has a number of key responsibilities related to protecting crowded places from terrorism. It maintains national counter-terrorism related policies, legislation, and plans; maintains a broad range of counter-terrorism intelligence, investigative and operational capabilities within Commonwealth agencies; and supports intelligence and information sharing between the jurisdictions.

Commonwealth agencies also directly support the states and territories to prevent, investigate, disrupt, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents across the country. This is done primarily through ASIO and AFP involvement in each jurisdiction's Joint Counter-Terrorism Team.

ASIO is the authoritative source of security threat information in Australia and is responsible for determining the National Terrorism Threat Level. ASIO assesses security intelligence and provides protective security advice to governments, the police, and other agencies. ASIO also provides threat information and protective security guidance to owners and operators of crowded places through various means. For further information see 'Enabling Better Information Sharing and Guidance' (page 12).

## **Private Security Providers**

Private security providers and professionals play a central role in protecting crowded places. In many cases, private security personnel—including security contractors, risk analysis experts, and private security officers—are directly responsible for strengthening the security of crowded places. Security guard force or frontline officers are often the first responders to a terrorist incident. Consequently, they must be well-trained and professional. Governments have a role in supporting the private security sector to achieve this, including by maintaining a robust regulatory regime around employment, training, and registration.

## The Community

All communities and individuals have a responsibility to help detect and prevent possible terrorist attacks in crowded places. Everyone working in or using a crowded place should be aware of their surroundings and report suspicious or unusual behaviour to authorities.

In life threatening situations, everyone should phone 000. Suspicious or unusual behaviour, that is not time critical, should be reported to Crime Stoppers on 1800 333 000 or the National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00

**Figure 3 – Who To Contact**



## Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism

*Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism* is based on strong, trusted partnerships between all levels of government and those responsible for crowded places. It aims to make crowded places as resilient as possible to terrorist attacks while preserving our

use and enjoyment of these places. A nationally consistent approach will help achieve this objective in an effective and efficient manner.

The Strategy involves four core elements which provide a structure for building a consistent national approach to protecting crowded places that can be applied flexibly throughout Australia (Figure 2, page 3).

Improving the resilience of crowded places relies on all stakeholders taking action to apply this Strategy. Owners and operators, and governments at all levels, will need to use this Strategy to make decisions and implement protective security measures in accordance with the existing arrangements in each jurisdiction.


### Building Stronger Partnerships

Protecting crowded places from terrorism is not just a job for governments, it is a responsibility shared by the private sector and the community. The success of this Strategy rests on sustainable and strong partnerships across Australia between all governments and owners and operators of crowded places, including businesses and local governments.

In Australia, the national framework for cooperation is known as the 'Crowded Places Partnership' (Figure 4). The Partnership supports a nationally consistent and coordinated approach for trusted engagement between police, owners and operators of crowded places, and Commonwealth agencies in every state and territory.

Trusted relationships between governments and owners and operators of crowded places are fundamental to the effective implementation of this Strategy. The Crowded Places Partnership sets out a range of mechanisms to support this engagement, but none of these replace the ability for all police and intelligence agencies to engage directly with owners and operators when required.

Figure 4 – Crowded Places Partnership



The primary vehicle for police to engage collectively with owners and operators of crowded places in each jurisdiction is known as 'Crowded Places Forums' (Box 3). The Forums comprise owners and operators (including business and local councils), state or territory officials, and police. The state and territory Crowded Places Forums are a vehicle for fostering local networks and partnerships to ensure all stakeholders are as well connected as possible. The Forums are also responsible for reporting to the CPSC on a regular basis, to ensure local information is considered and

### Box 3: Crowded Places Forums

For further information on Crowded Places Forum in your state or territory, please visit the Crowded Places Page at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places).

captured at a national level.

We have much to learn from our international counterparts. Having the right mechanisms in place to build and sustain the trusted exchange of ideas and advice with international partners allows us to identify, refine, and share the most effective measures for protecting crowded places. International engagement must continue to inform and guide Australia's approach to protecting crowded places from terrorism. This engagement should occur at all levels of government, between owners and operators of crowded places, and should include regular consultation with private sector experts.

The Commonwealth and many states and territories already have broad networks of international contacts through which they exchange expertise on protecting crowded places. These efforts require robust coordination to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and to ensure outcomes are shared across the country with those who would benefit from them.

The CPSC plays a role in strengthening these arrangements. With members from the Commonwealth, state and territories, local government, and the business community, the CPSC acts as a central repository for documenting and coordinating our international engagement on protecting crowded places, including advice, lessons learned, information about equipment and technology, and training we receive from our overseas partners.

### **Enabling Better Information Sharing and Guidance**

Protecting crowded places from terrorism in an evolving threat environment requires trusted and routine information sharing and guidance across Australia between all governments, industry sectors, business, and communities. The strong partnerships developed and sustained through the Crowded Places Partnership will help to achieve this goal (Figure 5).

It is a key responsibility of government to ensure those who own and operate crowded places have access to high quality threat information. This information, intelligence, and guidance is generated by ASIO and police across the country, and shared, primarily, through the Crowded Places Partnership and Crowded Places

Forums.

ASIO is the authoritative source of security threat information in Australia. The threat information and intelligence it generates is provided to owners and operators of crowded places through a range of different mechanisms.


ASIO is responsible for the National Terrorism Threat Advisory System found on [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au). It provides public advice on a scale of five levels about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia. If the threat level changes, the Commonwealth provides advice on what the threat level means, where the threat is coming from, potential targets, and the most likely weapons and tactics used by terrorists.

ASIO also issues threat assessments to inform the actions of police and other agencies responsible for protecting Australians from terrorism. Police in all jurisdictions consider this intelligence and translate it into threat information and guidance that is relevant to local circumstances. This information and guidance is shared with owners and operators both directly and through state and territory Crowded Places Forums.

In circumstances where credible intelligence points to a specific and immediate threat to a crowded place, ASIO works proactively with local police and impacted parties to share threat information so an appropriate response can be developed and deployed. This engagement is initiated by ASIO as required.

ASIO Outreach is the principal interface between ASIO and industry. The ASIO Outreach provides information to business and government via a subscription-based website, ASIO-hosted briefings, face-to-face engagement, and participation in forums such as the BAG Forum and the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) led by the Department of Home Affairs. The Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) is the Australian Government's primary industry engagement mechanism to enhance the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. The TISN brings together in partnership critical infrastructure owners and operators, supply chain entities, peak bodies, and all levels of government. Several crowded place owners and operators are TISN members. The TISN is supported by the Department of

Figure 5 – Information Sharing



Home Affairs together with the Australian Government and state and territory agencies. All these mechanisms are aimed at providing risk management decision makers with the most current security intelligence and protective security advice to assist them in their duties.

The ASIO Outreach secure website hosts intelligence-backed reporting drawn from the full range of ASIO's information holdings and expertise. ASIO Outreach has a dedicated page for grouping together reporting and Security Guides relevant to Owners and operators of crowded places. Eligible owners and operators of crowded places can subscribe to the ASIO outreach at [www.outreach.asio.gov.au](http://www.outreach.asio.gov.au), a website that constitutes a valuable resource to help security managers address protective security requirements.

The flow of information between governments and those responsible for crowded places is not one-way. Owners and operators should be willing to share information, advice, and lessons they have learned with governments and their peers. Building a strong and inclusive security culture is a responsibility shared by all.

In addition, everyone has a responsibility to report suspicious behaviour to the authorities. In life threatening situations, everyone should phone 000. Suspicious or unusual behaviour, that is not time critical, should be reported to Crime Stoppers on 1800 333 000 or the National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00

**Figure 3 – Who To Contact**



## Implementing Effective Protective Security

Implementing protective security measures can be a complex process which, if done incorrectly, can be costly and ineffective. Owners and operators have a responsibility to undertake a risk assessment and/or vulnerability analysis of their crowded place, implement the appropriate mitigations, monitor them for effectiveness (including through audits), and review them at appropriate junctures.

This section is designed to provide owners and operators of crowded places with a baseline of knowledge to improve their understanding of protective security.

The tools and information provided with this Strategy are a starting point. In many cases, owners and operators will be required to seek further advice from private security professionals. Professional and qualified security consultants play an important role in undertaking full security risk assessments of crowded places and recommending appropriate protective security measures.

### Box 4: How Should I Assess Security Consultants?

The following are factors that owners and operators of crowded places should consider when selecting a security consultant:

- Security licence;
- Education, qualifications, skills, and experience;
- Referee reports;
- Security clearance (where required);
- Professional association and affiliations;
- Previous experience conducting security reviews;
- Ability to effectively undertake the security review (subject matter knowledge);
- Impartiality of advice (consider any commercial affiliations); and
- Published professional work.

## Guidance

Before owners and operators make decisions about protective security measures they must first understand how attractive their location may be for a terrorist to attack. To determine this, all owners and operators should complete the *Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool* found at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/CrowdedPlaces). Based on the outcome of the Self-Assessment, the document provides guidance on what owners and operators should do next. This could include:

- Refer to information on the general threat environment and specific terrorist weapons and tactics found at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au)
- Complete the *Crowded Places Security Audit* found at [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au)
- Contact the relevant area within your state or territory police for further information, including about joining a Crowded Place Forum.

Crowded places encompass a significant range of different locations, venues and businesses. They differ substantially in size and have different levels of risk to manage. For example, the security requirements for a large shopping centre will be different from those of a small street market or a large music concert.


For this reason, the *Crowded Places Security Audit* does not provide a definitive list of all security matters that must be addressed for a particular location. Instead, it provides a checklist of the most common security considerations faced by crowded places in order to highlight gaps in security. It is important to remember that protective security measures should be proportionate to the level and type of threat. The Audit should only be consulted after the Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool has been completed.

## Layered Security

Layered security describes the practice of securing a site by applying multiple layers of complementary protective security measures (Figure 6). The goal of layered security is to reduce the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack on a crowded place by building multiple layers of redundancy into a site's security architecture. If implemented correctly, layered security ensures that the failure of any single layer—which may consist of different security measures (people, information, and physical assets) - will not significantly compromise the overall security of the place being protected. This concept is also known as 'security in depth'.

Applying the model better equips those responsible for, working in, and using a crowded place to deter, detect, delay, and respond to a terrorist attack.

Figure 6 – Layered Security



The actual measures owners and operators can use within each of these layers will differ from location to location. Decisions about protective security will be informed by a variety of factors, including:

- The prevailing threat advice;
- The type of purpose of the site (people, information and physical assets), including the presence of high-profile individuals;
- The history of security incidents at the site;
- The presence of high-risk facilities in close proximity to the site;
- Existing security measures that are in place.

### Cost and Proportionality

Security measures can be resource intensive, costly and, if not correctly managed and communicated, can alienate staff and the public and significantly disrupt the day-to-day operations of a crowded place. This is why expert specialist advice is essential and why careful consideration and planning is required before implementing any protective security measures. The following principles should underpin all decision-making:

- All protective security measures should be proportionate to the level and type of threat;
- It may not be possible to protect everything, so owners and operators must prioritise the highest risk areas of a crowded place;
- Physical security is more cost effective when incorporated into the design phase of a crowded place.

### Reputation

The success of governments and businesses rests on building and maintaining a good professional reputation. Reputation is prone to serious and permanent damage if owners and operators of crowded places give a less than robust, responsible professional priority to protecting people against attack. Being security minded and better prepared could not only deter an attack, it reassures customers and staff that those responsible for crowded places are taking security issues seriously.

### Recovery

Recovery from a terrorist attack is the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating affected individuals, communities, and physical assets. This process usually begins once an incident has been resolved, continues until disruptions have been rectified, demands on services have returned to normal levels, and the needs of those affected have been met.

A business continuity plan is central to the recovery process. This plan is activated during the 'response' phase of an incident and is designed to return a business, activity, or location to normal as quickly as possible after an incident. The plan requires owners and operators to make important decisions about which assets or activities are most important and the timeframes within which certain operations must be resumed. A business continuity plan should not just cover terrorist attacks and must be designed so it can be activated during any major disruption.

A robust business continuity plan will often include:

- Cross training of skills among the paid and volunteer workforce;
- Documented procedures to allow staff to quickly perform unfamiliar tasks;
- Agreed relocation operations both within and outside the location;
- Remote access to IT systems in nominated backup locations;
- Alternative sources of essential equipment;
- Secure offsite storage of data backups and valuable documentation;
- Agreed methods for out-of-hours contact for staff, clients, and other critical personnel.

It is important to note that, in the event of a terrorist attack, arrangements outlined in a business continuity plan may be overridden by police or a coroner, who may control a location for a significant period of time, preventing the resumption of normal business operations. This may be necessary to secure a site and facilitate forensic examination. Police will attempt to minimise the duration of this period to the extent possible.

Governments will work with affected owners and operators of crowded places to re-establish essential services and restore public confidence as quickly as possible.

Insurance can be a useful tool to manage losses or damage caused by an act of terrorism. The Australian Government ensures that insurers cannot exclude liability for major acts of terrorism from eligible insurance contracts through the Terrorism Insurance Act 2003.

## Increasing Resilience

Even the most robust and thorough protective security plan may not stop a terrorist attack on a crowded place from occurring or succeeding. But what well-considered and tested protective security does is reduce both the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and the consequences of such an attack.

Resilient crowded places can do more to prevent a terrorist attack, can reduce the damage caused by an attack, and can recover more quickly after an attack has occurred. Building a strong security culture is central to developing resilience to terrorism and other types of criminal activity.

Other elements of building an effective security culture can include:

- Ensuring that security is a permanent feature of executive decision making and agendas;
- Requiring senior management to demonstrate personal commitment to and compliance with security values and standards;
- Understanding commercial, reputational and legal risk that could result from inadequate protective security measures being in place to prevent or mitigate a terrorist attack;
- Providing staff with clear, succinct and jargon-free guidance about security standards and procedures;
- Promoting good security practice to both staff and visitors by making use of internal communication systems, posters, message boards and newsletters;
- Adopting effective and lawful staff screening processes during recruitment;
- Providing staff training in security practices;
- Exercising all staff in security scenarios;
- Self-initiated security penetration and breach testing;
- Sharing information with staff about security breaches;
- Encouraging and rewarding staff for identifying and reporting security vulnerabilities and incidents.

Communication runs through the full length and breadth of every organisation and communication regarding counter-terrorism security should be no different. Protecting a crowded place from terrorism rests on building and sustaining a culture of security from management level through to staff on the ground. Those responsible for managing the security of a crowded place should regularly meet with staff to discuss security issues and encourage staff to raise their concerns about security.

Security managers should also consider a communication strategy for raising awareness among staff and others who need to know about a security plan and its operation.

A resilient crowded place has trusted relationships with government, other crowded places, and the public. It has access to accurate, contemporary threat information and has a means of translating this threat information into effective, proportionate protective security measures commensurate with the level of risk they face.

While resilience is difficult to measure in the absence of an attack—you cannot evaluate what has not occurred—it can be assessed through regular testing and evaluation of policies and procedures, exercising security arrangements and responses, and regular and ongoing training of staff.

It is natural that owners and operators of crowded places will examine terrorist attacks that occur elsewhere and seek to understand what it means for them. The more comprehensive they have been at addressing activities around prevention, preparedness and response, the more confident the owners and operators can be that their level of resilience will reduce, as far as possible, the impact of a terrorist attack.

This will include the ability of owners and operators to resume business-as-usual activities as soon as possible.

## Governance and Accountability

Countering terrorism is a responsibility shared by all Australian governments, the community, and the private sector.

Australia's national counter-terrorism coordinating body, the ANZCTC, meets regularly to coordinate and maintain effective counter-terrorism arrangements across Australia. This Strategy will be reviewed on a regular basis by the CPSC and the ANZCTC.

