CHEMICAL WEAPON GUIDELINES FOR CROWDED PLACES

AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND **COUNTER-TERRORISM** COMMITTEE

OFFICIAL

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Table of Contents

Introduction 2
Purpose 2
What is the threat? 2
National Terrorism Threat Level 2
Characteristics of chemical weapon incidents 3
Indicators of a chemical weapon attack 3
Health effects 4
Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery (PPRR) 4
Prevention 4
Building 4
Procedural controls 4
Preparedness 5
Security culture 5
Review and testing of security plans, policies, and procedures 5
Disrupting hostile reconnaissance 6
Good housekeeping 6
White level inspections 7
Response 7
Communicated threats 8
Responding to a chemical weapons attack 9
Evacuating those at risk 9
Containing the incident or threat 10
Supporting emergency response and investigation activities 10
Recovery 11
Public information and community confidence 11
Crime scene and investigation 12
Business continuity challenges 12
Ongoing welfare and support 12
Contacts 13
Useful links 13
Appendix A: Telephoned threat checklist 14
Appendix B: Chemical weapon attack— response priorities for management 16
Appendix C: Chemical weapon attack— 17

Introduction

Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism states that all owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including the threat of terrorism.

Crowded places are a preferred terrorist target because of the high volume and concentration of people making them attractive to attack. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for protecting the location.

Globally, violent extremists have previously shown a willingness and capability to use chemical weapons. Such weapons could be used to target crowded places such as public transport, sporting arenas, entertainment precincts, and shopping malls.

It is the responsibility of both government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of terrorism.

Purpose

The *Chemical Weapon Guidelines for Crowded Places* is intended to help owners or operators of crowded places to be more aware of the threat posed by chemical weapons. They also provide guidance on considerations during risk mitigation, security planning, and contingency planning activities.

Considerations for owners and operators are presented across the areas of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (PPRR).

This guideline highlights security planning considerations for the mitigation of risks from chemical weapons, however these are also likely to improve planning and resilience from biological and radiological weapons against crowded places. Biological and radiological weapons are likely to have similar target considerations and can be delivered via similar methods.

What is the threat?

Globally, terrorists continue to promote propaganda calling for attacks featuring chemical weapons. Historically, terrorists have shown a willingness and the capability to acquire, make and use these weapons.

Terrorist methodologies continue to evolve, and new and innovative weapons and tactics emerge. They may seek to use chemical weapons against crowded places due to their potential to provoke fear and panic, cause casualties and/or significant economic damage.

National Terrorism Threat Level

The National Terrorism Threat Advisory System informs Australians about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia to help guide national preparation and planning. When the threat level is raised, additional precautions are required. State and territory police can provide information on how the National Terrorism Threat Advisory System relates to the local security context.

Further Threat Advice

Updated threat advice and the current National Terrorism Threat Level is publicly available on the **National Security website** (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au).

State and territory police can also provide information on how the National Terrorism Threat Level relates to the local security context. (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places/state-territory-police-contacts)

The ASIO Outreach secure website also hosts reporting drawn from ASIO intelligence holdings, and owners and operators of crowded places can apply for access at the **ASIO Outreach website** (www.asio.gov.au/outreach)

Owners and operators should consider this advice in the context of their own crowded place. Completing the **Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool** (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places) may also assist in better understanding the factors that make your site attractive as a target, and to ensure responses are proportionate to the threat context.

Characteristics of chemical weapon incidents

Chemical weapons are diverse. They can include, but are not limited to, crude mixtures of chemicals, toxins, toxic industrial chemicals, and their precursors. These can be made, stolen, or acquired for use in an attack. Chemical weapons can be concealed in containers of different shapes and sizes, and can be used in a number of different ways to cause harm.

Possible delivery methods for chemical weapons that could expose people in enclosed or crowded spaces include:

- heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems of a building;
- misting, aerosolising devices, sprayers, or improvised chemical dispersal devices;
- passive release, such as an open container;
- chemically enhanced improvised explosive devices intended to disperse a chemical agent;
- introduction of chemical weapons/toxins into food and beverages; and,
- simple manual processes, including splash attacks.

Indicators of a chemical weapon attack

All chemicals act differently and there are no common indicators for all chemical agents. However, signs of a chemical weapon attack can include:

- a suspicious package emitting a vapour or odour;
- a cloud, mist, fine powder, dust, liquid or fog with no identifiable or suspected source;
- an unexplainable odour (smells may range from fruity to flowery to sharp or rotten eggs);
- abandoned, out-of-place aerosol or manual spray device (e.g., fire extinguisher, garden sprayer);
- unexplained dead or dying animals in the area; and,
- two or more people with the same symptoms.

Health effects

In some cases there may be no immediate and obvious indicators of a chemical weapon attack on a person. However, some chemical agents can produce obvious visual signs of exposure in individuals or groups of persons, including:

- eye irritation, visual changes, vomiting and diarrhoea;
- coughing, breathing difficulties and respiratory irregularities;
- muscle weakness, paralysis and seizures;
- skin redness, irritation and burns; and/or,
- collapse, loss of consciousness, or death.

Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery (PPRR)

Not all crowded places will share the same risk profile or have similar vulnerabilities, so the principle of proportionality should be applied to mitigation planning. This means that protective security measures and planning need to be proportionate to the level of assessed risk. These should protect the public and, where possible, preserve the public's use and enjoyment of these places. When measuring proportionality, it should be recognised that mitigation activities related to terrorism may also provide broader crime prevention and public safety benefits, including against other terrorism threats.

Australia's *National Counter-Terrorism Plan* recognises the need to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover (PPRR) from terrorist acts. The Plan can be found on www.nationalsecurity.gov.au. The PPRR concept does not represent a consecutive set of activities and many elements of PPRR will often occur concurrently.

Event organisers and owners and operators of crowded places are strongly encouraged to ensure their own prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery arrangements align with those of emergency service agencies and that they use them to inform their planning and security measures.

Prevention

Not all risks or emergencies can be prevented. Therefore, the concept of prevention should encompass activities that may reduce the vulnerability of a site, and the severity or impact of an incident.

A building's resilience can be enhanced through policies and procedures as well as through the design of the building itself. These actions may include protecting areas that may be more likely impacted such as public foyers or delivery and mail rooms, through to addressing vulnerabilities in Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems that could be used to disperse chemical agents.

Building design

- Secure air intakes and outlets for HVAC systems to be publicly inaccessible, including those within the building.
- Placing air intakes as high as possible to be publicly inaccessible.
- Reduce ability for objects to be thrown onto intakes (e.g., angled or louvered vents).
- Consider zoning HVAC systems so more vulnerable zones can be isolated (e.g., mail rooms, public foyers).

Procedural controls

- Ensure any toxic industrial chemicals stored on site are appropriately secured.
- Restrict access to HVAC, building plant, and water supply to authorised persons only.

Further Advice

For further advice on implementing suitable controls to mitigate these threats, see *SA HB 188:2021 Base-building physical security handbook — Terrorism and extreme violence.*

Preparedness

Preparedness incorporates emergency planning, resourcing, capability development and testing of preparedness arrangements. Some key activities include identifying and assessing suspicious behaviour or activity, having an assessment process for threats, conducting white level inspections, as well as regularly reviewing and testing policies and procedures.

Security culture

Security culture is a set of values shared by everyone in an organisation that determines how people think about and approach security. Improving security culture helps staff be more security vigilant and consider security in their day-to-day business.

Building a strong security culture is central to developing resilience to terrorism and other types of criminal activity.

Elements of building an effective security culture may include:

- Ensuring that security is a permanent feature of executive decision making and agendas;
- Requiring senior management to demonstrate personal commitment to and compliance with security values and standards;
- Providing staff with clear, succinct and jargon-free guidance about security standards and procedures;
- Promoting good security practice to both staff and visitors by making use of internal communication systems, posters, message boards and newsletters; and,
- Encouraging and rewarding staff for identifying and reporting security vulnerabilities and incidents.

An obvious and professional security culture not only allows for better detection of threats but is a visible and effect deterrent to would be attackers.

Review and testing of security plans, policies, and procedures

Developing, implementing, and regularly testing a comprehensive security plan is a matter of good business and a corporate responsibility. Well-considered, regularly reviewed, and tested security plans, policies and procedures reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and the consequences of such an attack.

When conducting a review of security, emergency and evacuation plans, owners and operators of crowded places may consider:

- Training security and staff to be aware of indicators of a chemical attack, and their role and responsibilities in the building security response plans.
- Training security and staff in reporting procedures for suspicious items or activity.
- Requirements for suitably trained first aid officers with appropriate equipment and supplies.
- How HVAC systems feature in the building security response plans.
- Pre-planning evacuation routes, including identifying alternative routes to minimise people's exposure to contaminated areas.
- How evacuation routes will be communicated to people onsite during an incident.

- Planning and exercising the security response to assist delivering a timely and proportionate response.
- Where possible, engaging local police and emergency services to ensure responses align.
- Contingency plans for a heightened threat environment which may include increasing baggage screening, security patrols, or minimising public access.

Disrupting hostile reconnaissance

People at your site—whether security, staff, patrons, or visitors—are best placed to detect suspicious behaviour. However, they will be more likely to report the behaviour if it's convenient and they are confident about how to do it.

The most effective method of detecting and disrupting suspicious activity is ensuring staff, security, and visitors:

- Know what to report and where to report
- Know it is easy to report information
- Know that reports will be taken seriously

Employees should have an awareness of behaviour or activity that is atypical or unusual for the environment and be able to report such incidents.

Indicators of hostile reconnaissance should be reported immediately to the appropriate person, which may be your manager or security personnel.

In life threatening situations, everyone should phone **000**.

Suspicious or unusual behaviour that is not time critical, should be reported to Crime Stoppers on **1800 333 000** or the National Security Hotline on **1800 123 400**.

Further Advice

Further advice on identifying and responding to suspicious behaviour can be found in the *ANZCTC Disrupting Hostile Reconnaissance Guidelines for Crowded Places* (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au).

Good housekeeping

To reduce the possibility of an unattended item causing disruption at a crowded place, owners and operators should include some basic security activities as part of their day-to-day business. These could include:

- Keeping external, public, and shared areas clear and tidy (e.g., entrances, exits, reception, evacuation routes, bathrooms, etc);
- Ensuring that lost or stolen items are reported immediately; and,

- Maintaining accurate records of assets, plant, and equipment.

White level inspections

A white level inspection involves inspecting an area for anything unusual, suspicious, or that can't be accounted for. Staff members who know and work within an area are best placed to do this.

Create a plan that assigns staff members certain areas, including communal areas such as public concourses, foyers, cloakrooms, stairwells, and corridors. Having a plan will assist in ensuring the white level inspection is conducted in a safe, thorough, and timely manner. Pay particular attention to evacuation routes and assembly areas. Consider a checking mechanism to ensure white level inspections are completed when designated.

White level inspections are distinct from searches by specialist search teams involving police, security personnel or both under the command of a designated search controller. Specialist search teams can provide a higher level of reassurance and response but can be slow and are generally more disruptive to venue operations.

When to undertake a white level inspection

White level inspections may be undertaken:

- Each day upon arrival at work;
- On a random basis; and/or,
- At the request of management (including in response to a received threat).

When initiating a white level inspection, proportionality should be a key consideration. Generally speaking, all threats should be deemed credible until proven otherwise.

Types of white level inspection

White level inspections can be undertaken in several ways depending on the circumstances. There are two main methods for conducting a white level inspection:

- **Occupant**: Staff or occupants are best equipped to inspect areas because they are familiar with their surroundings. This type of inspection is relatively fast and efficient but may require additional training.
- **Supervisory**: A supervisory inspection can be done discreetly, without alerting other staff members to the threat. Supervisors inspect their own areas of responsibility and report back to a chief warden or duty manager. Alternatively, a supervisory inspection can involve designated wardens to oversee and plan the inspection.

Response

Response incorporates those activities to contain, control or minimise the impacts of a security incident, including:

- Responding to communicated threats
- Assessing unattended and suspicious items
- Responding to a chemical weapon attack.

In a crowded place the potential or actual use of a chemical weapon may create a level of panic and chaos that is difficult to control. The response plan should aim to minimise exposure to people from the chemical weapon. Owners and operators of crowded places should do what they can to save and protect life through:

- Evacuating those at risk;
- Containing the incident or threat; and,
- Supporting emergency response and investigation activities.

Actions to be considered in the management of the initial response to a chemical attack incident are outlined in **Appendix B**.

Communicated threats

If a threat is communicated, it may be necessary to inspect the venue or facility. Venue occupants or staff can conduct a white level inspection, provided they are sufficiently trained in what to do if they discover a suspicious item (see 'White level inspections' and 'Assessing unattended and suspicious items' in this Guideline).

A supervisory inspection may also involve partial or full evacuation, however, before initiating such action it is important to consider:

Is the threat non-specific?

If details are scarce or non-specific and there is nothing (other than the threat itself) to suggest that the venue is at risk, a cursory inspection may be adequate.

Possible action: Discreet supervisory inspection

Do you recognise the caller?

If the threat is communicated by a known individual (e.g., a disgruntled ex-employee), it may suggest a hoax and the danger to staff and occupants may be negligible.

Possible action: Occupant inspection

Has specific detail been provided?

If the threat contains specific information about a location for a device or threat, depending on the nature of the location (e.g., a school), a controlled response may be appropriate.

Possible action: Supervisory inspection

Is the threat credible?

If circumstances or consultation with law enforcement deems the threat credible, and the consequence potentially catastrophic, a supervisory search involving police and security personnel may be an appropriate alternative to a white level inspection.

Possible action: Support law enforcement search

Communicated threats should be reported to the police. It is a criminal offence for anyone to threaten to kill or cause bodily harm to any person or damage, destroy, or burn property.

Assessing unattended and suspicious items

A potential chemical weapon attack may be identified through an unattended item identified as suspicious.

However, not all unattended items are suspicious. In most cases, unattended items have simply been forgotten or discarded.

To distinguish harmless items from those that should arouse suspicion, consider the HOT principle. That is, anything that is Hidden, Obviously suspicious or not Typical to its environment could be deemed a security risk.

H

Hidden

Is the item intentionally hidden?

O

Obviously suspicious

Does the item have characteristics of chemical weapon device or hazardous material, such as:

- Suspicious labelling or modifications (e.g. nozzles or vents);
- Leakage of liquids or gases;
- Unusual smells or bulges; and/or
- Off-gassing smoke or particles

T

Not Typical

Is the item out of place for the location?

Has anyone nearby left the item or saw who did?

If the item is suspicious, or suspected of already releasing a chemical agent:

- Do not touch, tilt or tamper;
- Clear the immediate area;
- Do not use mobile phones or radios within a 25 metre radius;
- Record all relevant information (physical characteristics, shape, dimensions, construction and the exact position of the item or vehicle);
- Call Triple Zero '000';
- Inform your security control room or supervisor; and,
- Commence evacuation plans.

If the item is not suspicious:

- Identify the owner—ask people nearby or review CCTV footage;
- Review CCTV to confirm that the abandonment of the item was not a reconnaissance exercise by a potential offender. If suspicious activity is observed, report it to police; and
- If an owner cannot be identified, remove the item (if possible) and follow lost property or abandoned vehicle procedures.

Responding to a chemical weapons attack

If an item has been determined suspicious or suspected of already releasing a chemical agent, the security response plan objectives should be to aim to:

- Evacuating those at risk;
- Containing the incident or threat; and,
- Supporting emergency response and investigation activities.

Evacuating those at risk

Planning and initiating evacuation should be the responsibility of the incident/security manager and, if possible, made in consultation with police and other emergency services.

The evacuation plan should give consideration to:

- Notifying key staff of the incident through prearranged messages/codes and methods.
- Appointing an evacuation manager and ensure they have situational awareness.
- Assessing and providing guidance on safe evacuation routes and assembly points.
  - Consider wind direction and move upwind and uphill, if possible.
- Identifying and establishing a safe medical triage/first aid location.
- Identifying and establishing an appropriate emergency decontamination location, considering access to water for decontamination.

Total or partial evacuation

Depending on the particular size and nature of the crowded place, the plan may include considerations for total evacuation or partial evacuation, for example, if the suspicious item is small and thought to be confined to one location. The decision to initiate a total or partial evacuation may be determined by:

- Potential for cross-contamination.
- Potential for exposing uncontaminated persons through contaminated area.
- Limiting the spread of the chemical agent across the crowded place.
- Ability to isolate and contain the contaminated area.
- Potential to cause panic.

Potential business impacts from total evacuation

Containing the incident or threat

The security plan should aim to contain the incident to minimise exposure to other people from the chemical agent.

- Where possible, seal the building to create a temporary barrier between people and the contaminated air outside—this can include closing doors, closing windows, turning off fans and air conditioning systems.
- Restrict physical access to the site or general vicinity, without inhibiting the evacuation of people or access by emergency services.

Supporting emergency response and investigation activities

Responsibility for implementing and coordinating initial response activities with a crowded place will, in most instances, be assumed by the venue/facility management or security staff until emergency responders are able to take over that responsibility.

Establishing early, effective, and continuous lines of communication from the incident site to the responding police or emergency service agency will be critical in order to accurately inform them of the situation. Knowing or understanding the expectations of first responders will help to transition control of the incident more effectively.

Each jurisdiction has systems and inter-agency arrangements that provide the basis for emergency management and critical incident response. These are tailored to meet the jurisdiction's specific needs, capacities, and capabilities. Commonalities across Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions include:

- Operational response strategies, including incident and emergency management models; and
- Agreed command, control, and coordination arrangements.

Information on arrangements in each state and territory can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/states-territories.

In the event of a chemical weapon attack, the initial priorities for responding police or fire service may include:

- Establishing an incident command post and staging areas for responding agencies.
- Determining safe inner and outer cordons.
- Gathering immediate information on what has occurred and what is being done or considered by the venue management.
- Initiating or providing advice on full or partial evacuations.
- Initiating or providing advice on decontamination procedures.
- Arranging for specialist support to search and assess the scene.
- Rendering safe any unexploded or suspect items.
- Medical triage and treatment.
- Crime scene and evidence recovery activities.

The best way to support the emergency response and investigation activities is to:

- Nominate a suitable emergency services liaison officer to meet/brief the police.
- Identify and communicate safe access routes/form up points for emergency services.
- Maintain incident and decision-making logs.
- Ensure access to site plans and CCTV footage (where possible).
- Clearly identify when incident management has transitioned to the police.
- Provide ongoing support to the emergency response action and investigation activities as requested.

Recovery

To ensure a smooth transition from response to recovery, gradually devolve and integrate response arrangements. This includes media and information management, impact assessment, rehabilitation of the built environment and restoring community and staff confidence. While many recovery-related matters will be similar for most emergency events, significant or traumatic events such as terrorist acts involving chemical weapons may add extra complexity to normal recovery procedures. Key recovery considerations following a chemical weapon incident may include:

- Public information and community confidence.
- Crime scene and investigation.
- Business continuity challenges.
- Ongoing welfare and support.

Public information and community confidence

Handling the media

Local, national, and international media will be searching for information to report and people to interview. Many news crews will arrive at the scene. Plans for handling the media should include a designated spokesperson, coordinating statements with the police, a means for providing continuous updates, and prepared responses to likely questions.

Media or public information activities must support operational policies and actions. To achieve this, develop public messaging in coordination with senior operational personnel and experienced media managers. This is particularly important in situations where an offender has been taken into custody or charged with offences relating to the incident, as information released may interfere with pending legal proceedings.

Provide information regularly to keep the public informed and only restrict it in the interests of safety or operational security. Clearly separate information relating to consequence management, such as aiding victims, from the actual incident or security issue. As a general rule:

- An organisation must only release information for which it has responsibility; and
- A log of all public information activities and decisions should be maintained.

Medical treatment

Many people will require medical treatment for physical injuries as well as mental distress. Some people may have incurred a physical injury that has been masked by adrenaline during the attack, and injuries caused by chemical exposure may not be immediately apparent. Working with the ambulance service, ensure that all personnel and members of the public are checked, recorded, and given medical treatment where needed.

Support for families and friends

Families and friends of those present will be seeking information and many may arrive at the scene of the attack. Plan to establish mechanisms through which information can be issued such as a dedicated telephone number, website, or social media feed. Consider setting aside an area where people may be reunited with family and friends.

Arranging vigils

Consider designating a place where people may leave tokens of remembrance. Organising a vigil provides an opportunity to allow people to begin to grieve and to offer support to those in need.

Crime scene and investigation

Police will conduct some form of major investigation for all chemical weapon incidents. This could involve criminal and forensic investigations in relation to potential criminal offences, as well as coronial investigations on behalf of the coroner. These investigative processes will be extremely thorough and may be protracted, particularly where the incident has occurred over a broad geographical area or involves forensic challenges. During the investigation phase the police may seek assistance from management at the location to help identify potential sources of evidence or witnesses. This could include CCTV footage and radio, telephone, or decision-making logs. Recovery or business continuity plans should identify a suitable emergency services liaison officer that can work with the police to help facilitate these types of requests.

After the scene investigation has been completed the clean-up and restoration of the effected land and infrastructure can begin. The emergency response agencies will undertake measures to protect and preserve life, property, and the environment by containing and rendering safe any substance that poses a risk to the community.
Depending on state/territory arrangements the owner of the effected land or premises where a hazardous material has been contained and rendered safe may be responsible for the disposal of the contained substance safely and in accordance with applicable local legislation. The cost and time associated with the clean-up and restoration phase will be dependent on the contaminant and the extent of the contamination.

Business continuity challenges

Since the attacked site and surrounding area will be designated as a crime scene, they will be inaccessible. Business continuity plans should be implemented and include moving functions to an alternate location and covering the duties of personnel at the affected site.

The ability of owners and operators of crowded places to return to business as usual following an attack depends on how effectively they can devise and implement their business continuity arrangements.

Through their contact with investigating police, the nominated liaison officer will generally be in a position to obtain information about the likely duration of the scene examination, allowing the venue to start implementing their business continuity arrangements. While the actual process may not change significantly, the amount of time it takes often will.

Ongoing welfare and support

Providing for the needs of people who are separated from their possessions

People may have abandoned personal possessions when evacuating. These may include warm clothing, waterproof jackets and umbrellas, wallets, purses, car keys, house keys and mobile phones. It will not be possible to retrieve these whilst the police investigate. Plans should include providing for the needs of personnel and members of the public.

Medical and compassionate leave

Surviving employees may not be ready to return to work for an extended period. Consider how such leave may be managed as medical or compassionate leave. Think about offering financial support to employees, arranging cover for their duties, and offering remote working.

Grief and trauma counselling

The psychological impact of such a violent event should not be underestimated. Everyone reacts differently. Consider facilitating grief and trauma counselling for all personnel, irrespective of whether they were present during the attack.

Anniversaries and memorial services

Acknowledging anniversaries of the attack with memorial services allows those affected by the attack to recover from the experience and allows former colleagues to reconnect. Anniversaries can bring buried emotions to the surface, particularly since there may be significant media coverage. Prepare to offer assistance to individuals who require it.

Useful links

Australian National Security Website: www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

ASIO Outreach: www.asio.gov.au/outreach

Australian Disaster Resilience Handbook Collection: https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/collections/handbook-collection/

Contacts

National contact information

In the event of an emergency (police, ambulance, fire) 000

Contact the National Security Hotline if you have:

- seen or heard something suspicious
- information on possible foreign interference.

Make a report to the National Security Hotline by:

Phone: 1800 123 400

Online form: Report suspicious behaviour

SMS: 0498 562 549

Address: National Security Hotline Department of Home Affairs PO Box 25 Belconnen ACT 2616

Crime Stoppers **1800 333 000**

Australian Federal Police: www.afp.gov.au/contact-us

AFP Hotline (after hours contact) 1800 813 784

Urgent police assistance at major Australian airports 131 237 (131 AFP)

State and Territory Information

Details for police in each state and territory can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/states-territories.

Appendix A: Telephoned threat checklist

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A THREAT

1. Remain calm and talk to the caller
2. Note the caller's number if displayed on your phone
3. If the threat had been sent via email or social media, see appropriate section below
4. If you are able to, record the call
5. Write down the exact wording of the threat:

When Where What How Who Why Time

ASK THESE QUESTIONS AND RECORD ANSWERS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE:

1. Where exactly is the bomb right now?	
2. When is it going to explode?	
3. What does it look like?	
4. What does the bomb contain?	
5. How will it be detonated?	
6. Did you place the bomb? If not you, who did?	
7. What is your name?	
8. What is your address?	
9. What is your telephone number?	
10. Do you represent a group or are you acting alone?	
11. Why have you placed the	
Record time call completed:	

INFORM BUILDING SECURITY OR COORDINATING MANAGER	
Name and phone number of person informed:	
DIAL 000 AND INFORM POLICE	
Time Informed:	

The next section should be completed once the caller has hung up and police / building security / coordinating manager have all been informed.

Date and time of call:	
Duration of call:	
The telephone number that received the call:	

About the caller

Male	Age?	Nationality?
Female		

Threat language

Well-spoken	Irrational	Taped	Foul	Incoherent

Caller's voice

Calm	Crying	Clearing Throat	Angry	Nasal	Slurred	Excited
Stutter	Disguised	Slow	Lisp	Accent*	Rapid	Deep
Familiar	Laughter	Hoarse	Other (*please specify):*			
			*What accent?			
If the voice sounded familiar, who did it sound like?						

Background sounds

Street noises	House noises	Animal noises	Factory Machinery	Office Machinery	Clear	Voice
Static	PA System	Booth	Music	Motor	Crockery	
Other (*please specify):*						

Remarks	
Additional Notes	

Signature: Print Name: Date:

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT SENT VIA EMAIL OR SOCIAL MEDIA

1. Do not reply to, forward or delete the message
2. If sent via email, note the address
3. If sent via social media, what application has been used and what is the username/ID?
4. Dial 000 and follow police guidance
5. Preserve all web log files for your organisation to help the police investigation (as a guide, 7 days prior to the threat message and 48 hours after

SAVE AND PRINT—HAND COPY TO POLICE AND SECURITY OR COORDINATING MANAGER

Appendix B: Chemical weapon attack—response priorities for management

In the event of a chemical weapon attack the primary response objectives are to save and protect life. The actions for achieving this may include:

Facilitating the evacuation of those at risk

- Notify key staff of the incident through prearranged messages/codes and methods.
- Appoint an evacuation manager and ensure they have situational awareness.
- Assess and provide guidance on safe evacuation routes and assembly points. Consider wind direction and move upwind and uphill, if possible.
- Identify and establish a safe medical triage/first aid location.
- Identify and establish an appropriate emergency decontamination location, considering access to water for decontamination.

Containing the incident or threat

- Where possible, seal the building to create a temporary barrier between people and the contaminated air outside—this can include closing doors, closing windows, turning off fans and air conditioning systems.
- Restrict physical access to the site or general vicinity, without inhibiting the evacuation of people or access by emergency services.

Supporting emergency response and investigation activities

- Nominate a suitable emergency services liaison officer to meet/brief the police.
- Identify and communicate safe access routes/form up points for emergency services.
- Maintain incident and decision-making logs.
- Ensure access to site plans and CCTV footage (where possible).
- Clearly identify when incident management has transitioned to the police.
- Provide ongoing support to the emergency response action and investigation activities as requested.

It is important to regularly practise these and any additional initial response activities so that key managers and staff clearly understand the priority actions and are able to perform these actions in a high stress and dynamic environment

Appendix C: Chemical weapon attack—advice for front line staff

Attacks involving chemical weapons may be unlikely, but it is important to be prepared to respond to such an incident. The advice below will help you plan a response.

Front line staff (security officers, ticketing staff, designated first aiders, reception staff, etc) at the immediate site of a chemical weapon attack, your top priority is to direct staff and occupants to get out of the area. By evacuating the area, you minimise exposure to the chemical agent.

At first opportunity call Triple Zero (000).

If you are in a building

- Direct staff and occupants to uncontaminated air quickly—avoiding obvious plume or vapour cloud or the contaminated area.

Once you are out of the building

- Where possible, seal the building to create a temporary barrier between people and the contaminated air outside—this can include closing doors, closing windows, turning off fans and air conditioning systems.
- Consider wind direction and move upwind and uphill if possible.
- Direct staff and occupants to continue moving away from the contaminated area and look for wardens or emergency responders who will direct you to a safe location.
- Direct staff and occupants to limit their use of phones and other communications devices as much as possible (communications systems may become overloaded).
- Where possible, separate persons who have had known exposure with the chemical agent.

Caring for the injured and exposed

- First aid you provide may save lives.
- Ensure appropriately trained first aid staff are available and follow appropriate procedures to minimise further contamination (e.g., PPE, decontamination of patient).
- For those persons exposed to the chemical agent:
  - Remove outer clothing if contaminated and place in a sealed plastic bag;
  - Wash with soap and water, flush skin with lots of water, and flush eyes with water if they are irritated;
  - Put on clean clothes if possible; and,
  - Seek medical attention if they have been exposed to the chemical, even if there are no immediate symptoms.
- Working with the first responders, ensure that all staff and occupants are checked, recorded, and given medical treatment and formal decontamination where needed.