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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) GUIDELINES
FOR CROWDED PLACES

Table of Contents

Introduction

Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism states that all owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including the threat of terrorism.

Crowded places are a preferred terrorist target because of the high volume and concentration of people making them attractive to attack. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for protecting the location.

Globally, violent extremists have previously shown a willingness and capability to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and these could be used to target crowded places such as public transport, sporting arenas, entertainment precincts, and shopping malls.

It is the responsibility of both government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of terrorism.

Purpose

The *Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines for Crowded Places* are intended to help owners or operators of crowded places to be more aware of the threat posed by IEDs. They also provide guidance on considerations during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities.

Considerations for owners and operators are presented across the areas of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (PPRR).

What is the threat?

Globally, explosives remain a favoured terrorist weapon. These weapons allow terrorists the potential to inflict large numbers of casualties, destroy property, cause fear and disruption, and attract media attention. Terrorist groups and their supporters continue to demonstrate interest in conducting explosive-based attacks against their perceived enemies.

Homemade explosives (HMEs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are generally within the financial and technical capabilities of most terrorists. Such items can be manufactured from readily available materials and various violent extremist HME and IED instructional guides exist online.

Recent counter-terrorism arrests and prosecutions in Australia demonstrate the ongoing threat of terrorism onshore. Some Australian counter-terrorism arrests include charges related to plots involving IEDs and explosives.

National Terrorism Threat Level

The National Terrorism Threat Advisory System informs Australians about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia to help guide national preparation and planning. When the threat level is raised, additional precautions are required. State and territory police can provide information on how the National Terrorism Threat Advisory System relates to the local security context.

Further Threat Advice

Updated threat advice and the current National Terrorism Threat Level is publicly available on the **National Security website** (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au).

State and territory police can also provide information on how the National Terrorism Threat Level relates to the local security context. (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places/state-territory-police-contacts)

The ASIO Outreach secure website also hosts reporting drawn from ASIO intelligence holdings, and owners and operators of crowded places can apply for access at the **ASIO Outreach website** (www.asio.gov.au/outreach)

Owners and operators should consider this advice in the context of their own crowded place. Completing the **Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool** (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/protect-your-business/crowded-places) may also assist in better understanding the factors that make your site attractive as a target, and to ensure responses are proportionate to the threat context.

Characteristics of IED incidents

IEDs are physically diverse and can take various forms ranging from small pipe bomb devices to large vehicle-borne devices capable of causing significant damage and loss of life. They may be transported by vehicle, carried, placed, or thrown by a person, delivered in a package, or concealed in various ways . They may be triggered by various methods, including radio control, timer, electronic sensors or pressure plates, trip wires, or a hand-held switch.

The choice of IED is likely to be determined by the type of attack being planned and the capability of the assailant(s):

- Larger vehicles and trucks allow for the movement and detonation of large amounts of explosives with significantly greater destructive impacts. However, larger devices can be more complex to construct and emplace.
- Small quantities of explosives, used in pipe bombs and PBIEDs, have less destructive impacts, but are easier to transport and conceal.

Within Australia, access to commercial or military explosives is strictly regulated with mandatory security requirements during production, transport, and storage. Acquiring explosives through criminal or other means is possible, but risks alerting authorities.

In contrast, some IED precursor chemicals have many legitimate uses, and can be acquired without arousing suspicion, with some being available for purchase at retail level. Recipes and technical instructions for manufacturing IEDs are accessible online.

Australian governments, in consultation with industry, have developed the *National Code of Practice for Chemicals of Security Concern* to improve security awareness of precursor chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of an IED or a toxic device. For a copy of the Code and more information on chemicals of security concern, including the 15 identified as being the most high-risk precursors to HMEs, visit www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/chemical-security-subsite/Files/code-of-practice-chemical-security.pdf

Immediate health effects

Explosions create a high-pressure blast wave that causes damage to surrounding structures and injuries to people. Secondary effects from the blast can cause further injuries to people (such as fragmentation, incendiary, and thermal injuries), as well as damage to the surrounding environment. The type of injuries and the number of people hurt will vary depending on:

- the surrounding physical environment;
- the amount and quality of the explosive;
- the amount and type of shrapnel incorporated in an IED;
- the distance and shielding between victims and the blast (see 'maximising stand-off'); and,
- the presence of fires and/or structural failure following the explosion.

Injuries common to explosions include disruption to sensory functions, overpressure damage to internal organs, blunt and penetrating trauma, burns, and respiratory issues.

Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery (PPRR)

Not all crowded places will share the same risk profile or have similar vulnerabilities, so the principle of proportionality should be applied to mitigation planning. This means that protective security measures and planning need to be proportionate to the level of assessed risk. These should protect the public and, where possible, preserve the public's use and enjoyment of these places.

When measuring proportionality, it should be recognised that mitigation activities related to terrorism may also provide broader crime prevention and public safety benefits, including other terrorism threats.

Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Plan recognises the need to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover (PPRR) from terrorist acts. The plan can be found on www.nationalsecurity.gov.au. The PPRR concept does not represent a consecutive set of activities and many elements of PPRR will often occur concurrently. Event organisers and owners and operators of crowded places are strongly encouraged to ensure their own prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery arrangements align with those of emergency service agencies and that they use them to inform their planning and security measures.

Prevention

Not all risks or emergencies can be prevented, therefore the concept of prevention should encompass activities that may reduce the vulnerability of a site, and the severity or impact of an incident.

The resilience of a crowded place to IED threats can be enhanced through policies and procedures (e.g., search and screening) as well as through the design of the area or building itself (e.g., prevention of progressive collapse, glass protection, creating stand-off and using the built and natural environment).

An attacker using an IED at a crowded place will aim to maximise casualties. There are procedural and physical measures that reduce the attractiveness of a site or event to being targeted, by making it more difficult to plan or execute an attack.

Procedural controls

Screening people and their belongings

Screening people and their belongings or implementing baggage restrictions (e.g., no bags permitted, small bags only, cloakrooms, etc) reduces the likelihood of an IED or other prohibited items being brought into a venue or event. Implementation of security screening should consider:

- notifying persons on screening requirements and prohibited items (i.e., Conditions of Entry);
- authority to undertake screening;
- required flow rate of people requiring screening;
- staff training requirements; and,
- footprint required for screening area.

Maximising stand-off

Stand-off distance between an IED and crowded areas is the most important factor in determining the potential damage caused by the IED. Every metre of stand-off counts in mitigating the effects of a blast.

Maximising appropriate stand-off distances can present significant challenges for people who own and operate crowded places, particularly when unhindered public access to large open spaces is a common feature of such places. Where possible, it is preferable to block vehicle access to crowded places altogether. However, consideration should be given to routine and emergency service requirements, as well as surrounding traffic and transport imperatives.

Strategically placed mitigation devices such as planter boxes, seats, or bollards on the pavement at entrances to crowded places can provide extra protection from unauthorised vehicle intrusion as well as increasing stand-off distance. For further on guidance on vehicle mitigation see the *Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places*.

Building design

Building design—including the architectural layout, structural design, and building materials—can improve the resilience to blast.

Incorporating security principles into the design of a building can improve useability of the space and improve security outcomes and be less costly than retrofitting measures later.

Seek specialist advice

Changes to structural elements of a building and building design to improve blast resilience is complex and if done incorrectly can be costly and ineffective. These measures should also be proportionate to your threat, so it is important to understand and define the type of explosives and charge size you are protecting against. Where appropriate, seek advice from a qualified and experienced structural and/or blast engineer.

Crime prevention through environmental design

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a multi-disciplinary approach to deterring crime through the design of the environment. Affecting the environment where an offender is intending to act can influence their decision making and, in certain designed environments, has been demonstrated to deter and even eradicate that behaviour. CPTED principles can broadly be applied to IED deterrence by making the environment either less attractive or more resilient to an IED attack.

For example, removing or redesigning areas where an IED could be concealed, particularly where these are in proximity to crowded or enclosed public areas (e.g., rubbish bins or dense garden beds).

Layout

Considering security principles in the configuration or design of crowded places can be a cost-effective solution to mitigating explosive threats. In addition to the CPTED principles previously mentioned, maximising stand-off, excluding vehicle or public access to vulnerable or critical areas, or separating vehicle and pedestrian access points all reduce the opportunity for explosive threats.

Preventing progressive collapse

Preventing progressive collapse is an important part of minimising the structural effects of a blast. A building undergoes progressive collapse when a primary structural element fails, resulting in the failure of adjoining structural elements, which in turn causes further structural failure. Due to the diverse range of facilities and sites characterising crowded places, owners and operators must consider the possibility and consequence of progressive collapse on a case-by-case basis. Existing structures might already be designed to mitigate progressive collapse, it depends on the age of the structure. The first step is structural analysis by a qualified and experienced engineer to see if the structure will withstand the expected threats. Existing structures with structural vulnerabilities can have mitigations retrofitted, such as steel fibre reinforced concrete, hardening columns and shielding load bearing walls.

Building envelope

Facades, interior walls, and windows can all have design features incorporated or retrofitted to increase the survivability from explosive effects. If appropriate, conduct blast engineering analysis to identify areas of concern, and identify appropriate treatments.

Glass, masonry, stone, precast concrete, and architectural metals exhibit distinctive failure modes and mechanical properties when subjected to air blast pressures. For example, glass tends to break into small pieces following a blast event, which can cause lacerations and puncture wounds. Brick, on the other hand, tends to break off from a structure in larger pieces following a blast event, which can cause blunt trauma injuries.

Interior walls may become potentially harmful projectiles following a blast. Fragmentation can cause blunt trauma injuries and create debris that hampers access by first responders or blocks escape routes.

The vulnerability of windows and glazed facades depend not just on the type of glazing used, but also other elements such as the seals and frame of the system. Although no commercially available glazing can fully mitigate the effects of a close-range blast event, certain glazing systems may substantially reduce blast impact at greater distances.

Glass selection should be based on your assessment of site-specific requirements, the specific product's blast test standards and advice from a blast engineer/s.

Preparedness

Preparedness incorporates emergency planning, resourcing, capability development and testing of preparedness arrangements. Some key activities including regularly reviewing the national and local threat environment and how it impacts your business, promoting a strong security culture, regular review and testing policies and procedures, having plans and procedures to identify and assess suspicious behaviours or activity, and conducting white level inspections.

Security culture

Security culture is a set of values shared by everyone in an organisation that determines how people think about and approach security. Improving security culture helps staff be more security vigilant and consider security in their day-to-day business.

Building a strong security culture is central to developing resilience to terrorism and other types of criminal activity.

Elements of building an effective security culture can include:

- Ensuring that security is a permanent feature of executive decision making and agendas;
- Requiring senior management to demonstrate personal commitment to and compliance with security values and standards;
- Providing staff with clear, succinct, and jargon-free guidance about security standards and procedures;
- Promoting good security practice to both staff and visitors by making use of internal communication systems, posters, message boards and newsletters; and,
- Encouraging and rewarding staff for identifying and reporting security vulnerabilities and incidents.

An obvious and professional security culture not only allows for better detection of threats but is a visible and effect deterrent to would be attackers.

Review and testing of security plans, policies, and procedures

Developing, implementing, and regularly testing a comprehensive security plan is a matter of good business and a corporate responsibility. Well-considered, regularly reviewed, and tested security plans, policies and procedures reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and the consequences of such an attack.

When conducting a review of security, emergency and evacuation plans, owners and operators of crowded places may consider:

- Training security and staff to be aware of indicators of an IED attack, and their role and responsibilities in the building security response plans.
- Training security and staff in reporting procedures for suspicious items or activity.
- Requirements for suitably trained first aid officers with appropriate equipment and supplies.
- Pre-planning evacuation routes, including procedures for clearing and securing assembly areas.
- How evacuation routes will be communicated to people onsite during an incident.
- Planning and exercising the security response to assist delivering a timely and proportionate response.
- Where possible, engaging local police and emergency services to ensure responses align.
- Contingency plans for a heightened threat environment which may include increasing baggage screening and security patrols or minimising public access.

Disrupting hostile reconnaissance

People at your site—whether security, staff, patrons, or visitors—are best placed to detect suspicious behaviour. However, they will be more likely to report the behaviour if it's convenient and they are confident about how to do it.

The most effective method of detecting and disrupting suspicious activity is ensuring staff, security, and visitors:

- Know what to report and where to report
- Know it is easy to report information
- Know that reports will be taken seriously

Indicators of hostile reconnaissance should be reported immediately to the appropriate person, which may be your manager or security personnel.

In life threatening situations, everyone should phone **000**.

Suspicious or unusual behaviour that is not time critical, should be reported to Crime Stoppers on **1800 333 000** or the National Security Hotline on **1800 1234 00**.

Further Advice

Further advice on identifying and responding to suspicious behaviour can be found in the *ANZCTC Disrupting Hostile Reconnaissance Guidelines for Crowded Places* (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au).

Good housekeeping

To reduce the possibility of an unattended item causing disruption at a crowded place, owners and operators should include some basic security activities as part of their day-to-day business. These could include:

- Keeping external, public, and shared areas clear and tidy (e.g., entrances, exits, reception, evacuation routes, bathrooms, etc);
- Ensuring that lost or stolen items are reported immediately; and,
- Maintaining accurate records of assets, plant, and equipment.

White level inspections

A white level inspection involves inspecting an area for anything unusual, suspicious, or that can't be accounted for. Staff members who know and work within an area are best placed to do this.

Create a plan that assigns staff members certain areas, including communal areas such as public concourses, foyers, cloakrooms, stairwells, and corridors. Having a plan will assist in ensuring the white level inspection is conducted in a safe, thorough, and timely manner. Pay particular attention to evacuation routes and assembly areas. Consider a checking mechanism to ensure white level inspections are completed when designated.

White level inspections are distinct from searches by specialist search teams involving police, security personnel or both under the command of a designated search controller. Specialist search teams can provide a higher level of reassurance and response but can be slow and are generally more disruptive to venue operations.

When to undertake a white level inspection

White level inspections may be undertaken:

- Each day upon arrival at work;
- On a random basis; and/or,
- At the request of management (including in response to a received threat).

When initiating a white level inspection, proportionality should be a key consideration. Generally speaking, all threats should be deemed credible until proven otherwise.

Types of white level inspection

White level inspections can be undertaken in several ways depending on the circumstances. There are two main methods for conducting a white level inspection:

- **Occupant**: Staff or occupants are best equipped to inspect areas because they are familiar with their surroundings. This type of inspection is relatively fast and efficient but may require additional training.
- **Supervisory**: A supervisory inspection can be done discreetly, without alerting other staff members to the threat. Supervisors inspect their own areas of responsibility and report back to a chief warden or duty manager. Alternatively, a supervisory inspection can involve designated wardens to oversee and plan the inspection.

Response

Response incorporates those activities to contain, control or minimise the impacts of a security incident, including:

- Responding to communicated threats
- Assessing unattended and suspicious items
- Responding to an IED attack.

In a crowded place the potential or actual use of an IED may create a level of panic and chaos that is difficult to control. The response plan should aim to minimise risk to people from the explosive device. Owners and operators of crowded places should do what they can to save and protect life through:

- Evacuating those at risk;
- Containing the incident or threat; and,
- Supporting emergency response and investigation activities.

Actions to be considered in the management of the initial response to a chemical attack incident are outlined in **Appendix C: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack— response priorities for management**.

Communicated threats

If a threat is communicated, it may be necessary to inspect the venue or facility. Venue occupants or staff can conduct a white level inspection, provided they are sufficiently trained in what to do if they discover a suspicious item (see 'White level inspections' and 'Assessing unattended and suspicious items' in this Guideline).

A supervisory inspection may also involve partial or full evacuation, however, before initiating such action it is important to consider:

Is the threat non-specific?
If details are scarce or non-specific and there is nothing (other than the threat itself) to suggest that the venue is at risk, a cursory inspection may be adequate. **Possible action: Discreet supervisory inspection**

Do you recognise the caller?
If the threat is communicated by a known individual (e.g., a disgruntled ex-employee), it may suggest a hoax and the danger to staff and occupants may be negligible. **Possible action: Occupant inspection**

Has specific detail been provided?
If the threat contains specific information about a location for a device or threat, depending on the nature of the location (e.g., a school), a controlled response may be appropriate. **Possible action: Supervisory inspection**

Is the threat credible?
If circumstances or consultation with law enforcement deems the threat credible, and the consequence potentially catastrophic, a supervisory search involving police and security personnel may be an appropriate alternative to a white level inspection. **Possible action: Support law enforcement search**

Communicated threats should be reported to the police. It is a criminal offence for anyone to threaten to kill or cause bodily harm to any person or damage, destroy, or burn property.

Assessing unattended and suspicious vehicles

Unattended or suspicious vehicles warrant particular attention due to their potential to cause large numbers of casualties and significant damage to buildings and infrastructure. As with suspicious items, a vehicle could be left in a location to test response procedures and assess the viability of a VBIED attack. Depending on the chosen vehicle and environment, a VBIED may appear less suspicious than a placed IED.

In assessing suspicious or unattended vehicles, the principles outlined below for identifying suspicious or unattended items also apply. There are, however, indicators unique to VBIEDs that should be considered, including:

- Unusual items inside a vehicle (gas cylinders, petrol cans, electrical wires, large bags or boxes, and extra batteries);
- Presence of the vehicle in an area where it should not be, perhaps parked illegally;
- Indications of a triggering device (a switch, radio transmitter, timer, wires passing from the front seat to the rear of the vehicle that would be visible near the driver, under the seat or within reach);
- Recent alterations or repairs including painting or bodywork and removal of interior panels;
- Evidence that an interior door panel has been removed or tampered with;
- Signs that the vehicle's suspension is under abnormal load;
- Presence of powder or prills (small rounded granular material) left when explosive material was loaded into the vehicle; and,

- Additional fuel tanks (may be used to secrete explosives or to provide additional gasoline to fuel the explosives).

Assessing unattended and suspicious items

A potential IED attack may be identified through an unattended item identified as suspicious. However, not all unattended items are suspicious. In most cases, unattended items have simply been forgotten or discarded.

To distinguish harmless items from those that should arouse suspicion, consider the HOT principle. That is, anything that is Hidden, Obviously suspicious or not Typical to its environment could be deemed a security risk.

H	**Hidden** Is the item intentionally hidden?
O	**Obviously suspicious** Does the item have characteristics of an explosive device or hazardous material, such as: • Suspicious labelling; • Leakage of fuel oil; • Unusual smells, bulges or protruding wires; • Power sourcem, such as batteries; • LED lights; and/or • Pieces of metal or glass (shrapnel).
T	**Not Typical** Is the item out of place for the location? Has anyone nearby left the item or saw who did?

If the item is suspicious:

- Do not touch, tilt or tamper;
- Do not use mobile phones or radios within a 25 metre radius;
- Call Triple Zero '000' and advise security;
- Cordon off immediate area and evacuate at least 100 metres from the item (if a vehicle, evacuate at least 500 metres);
- Ensure no personnel are within line of sight of the suspicious item;
- Record all relevant information (physical characteristics, shape, dimensions, construction and the exact position of the item or vehicle);
- Respond in accordance with the directions of emergency services; and
- Gather any evidence of the placement of the item or vehicle, including CCTV showing activities of any person associated with the item or vehicle.

If the item is not suspicious:

- Identify the owner—ask people nearby or review CCTV footage;
- Review CCTV to confirm that the abandonment of the item or vehicle was not a reconnaissance exercise by a potential offender. If suspicious activity is observed, report it to police; and
- If an owner cannot be identified, remove the item or vehicle (if possible), and follow lost property or abandoned vehicle procedures.

Responding to an IED attack

If an item has been determined suspicious or an IED attack has occurred, the security response plan objectives should be to:

- Evacuate those at risk;
- Contain the incident or threat; and,
- Support emergency response and investigation activities.

Evacuating those at risk

Planning and initiating evacuation should be the responsibility of the incident/security manager and, if possible, made in consultation with police and other emergency services.

The evacuation plan should consider:

- Notifying key staff of the incident through prearranged messages/codes and methods.
- For evacuations of communicated threats, requesting removal of personal belongings to reduce the number of suspicious items;
- If an explosion has already occurred, evacuating as quickly as possible without retrieving personal belongings;
- Appointing an evacuation manager and ensure they have situational awareness;
- Assessing and providing guidance on safe evacuation routes and assembly points, including consideration of secondary devices at assembly points and procedures to ensure these are kept clear; and
- Identifying and establishing a safe medical triage/first aid location.

Total or partial evacuation

Depending on the size and nature of the crowded place, the plan may include considerations for total evacuation or partial evacuation, for example, if the suspicious item is small and thought to be confined to one location.

The decision to initiate a total or partial evacuation may be determined by several factors including the nature of the threat (e.g., credible communicated threat or a suspicious item), the potential to cause panic, or potential business impacts from total evacuation.

Containing the incident or threat

The security plan should aim to contain the incident to minimise exposure to other people from the threat.

- Identify and establish a perimeter to prevent people from going near the suspect device/entering the area of the explosion unnecessarily.
- Restrict physical access to the site or general vicinity, without inhibiting the evacuation of people or access by emergency services.

Supporting emergency response and investigation activities

Responsibility for implementing and coordinating initial response activities with a crowded place will, in most instances, be assumed by the venue/facility management or security staff until emergency responders are able to take over that responsibility.

Establishing early, effective, and continuous lines of communication from the incident site to the responding police or emergency service agency will be critical to accurately inform them of the situation. Knowing or understanding the expectations of first responders will help to transition control of the incident more effectively.

Each jurisdiction has systems and inter-agency arrangements that provide the basis for emergency management and critical incident response. These are tailored to meet the jurisdiction's specific needs, capacities, and capabilities. Commonalities across Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions include:

- Operational response strategies, including incident and emergency management models; and
- Agreed command, control, and coordination arrangements.

Information on arrangements in each state and territory can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/states-territories

In the event of an IED incident, the initial priorities for responding police or fire service may include:

- Establishing an incident command post and staging areas for responding agencies;
- Determining safe inner and outer cordons;
- Gathering immediate information on what has occurred and what is being done or considered by the venue management;
- Initiating or providing advice on full or partial evacuations;
- Arranging for specialist support to search and assess the scene;
- Rendering safe any unexploded or suspect items;
- Fire suppression;
- Medical triage and treatment; and
- Crime scene and evidence recovery activities.

The best way to support the emergency response and investigation activities is to:

- Nominate a suitable emergency services liaison officer to meet/brief the police;
- Identify and communicate safe access routes/form up points for emergency services;
- Maintain incident and decision-making logs;
- Ensure access to site plans and CCTV footage (where possible);
- Clearly identify when incident management has transitioned to the police; and
- Provide ongoing support to the emergency response action and investigation activities as requested.

Recovery

To ensure a smooth transition from response to recovery, gradually devolve and integrate response arrangements. This includes media and information management, impact assessment, rehabilitation of the built environment and restoring community and staff confidence. While many recovery-related matters will be similar for most emergency events, significant or traumatic events such as terrorist acts or IED incidents may add extra complexity to normal recovery procedures.

Key recovery considerations following an IED incident may include:

- Public information and community confidence;
- Crime scene and investigation;
- Business continuity challenges; and,
- Ongoing welfare and support.

In the immediate aftermath of an IED explosion, demands will be placed on your organisation by personnel, members of the public, emergency services and the media. Your organisation may need to continue to meet customers' needs without access to the site that has been attacked and with many staff dead, injured or otherwise unable to work.

Immediate aftermath—What to expect

Police will designate the site of the explosion and surrounding area as a crime scene, establishing cordons to restrict access to police officers and staff. This means that the area will not be accessible to personnel or members of the public. Police may want to take statements from personnel and members of the public. The ambulance service will seek to treat people's injuries.

Public information and community confidence

Handling the media

Local, national, and international media will be searching for information to report and people to interview. Many news crews will arrive at the scene. Plans for handling the media should include a designated spokesperson, coordinating statements with the police, a means for providing continuous updates, and prepared responses to likely questions.

Media or public information activities must support operational policies and actions. To achieve this, develop public messaging in coordination with senior operational personnel and experienced media managers. This is particularly important in situations where an offender has been taken into custody or charged with offences relating to the incident, as information released may interfere with pending legal proceedings.

Provide information regularly to keep the public informed and only restrict it in the interests of safety or operational security. Clearly separate information relating to consequence management, such as aiding victims, from the actual incident or security issue. As a general rule:

- An organisation must only release information for which it has responsibility; and
- A log of all public information activities and decisions should be maintained.

Medical treatment

Many people will require medical treatment for physical injuries as well as mental distress. Some people may have incurred a physical injury that has been masked by adrenaline during the attack, and injuries caused by blast effects may not be immediately apparent.

Working with the ambulance service, ensure that all personnel and members of the public are checked, recorded, and given medical treatment where needed.

Support for families and friends

Families and friends of those present will be seeking information and many may arrive at the scene of the attack. Plan to establish mechanisms through which information can be issued such as a dedicated telephone number, website, or social media feed. Consider setting aside an area where people may be reunited with family and friends.

Arranging vigils

Consider designating a place where people may leave tokens of remembrance. Organising a vigil provides an opportunity to allow people to begin to grieve and to offer support to those in need.

Crime scene and investigation

Police will conduct some form of major investigation for all IED explosions. This could involve criminal and forensic investigations in relation to potential criminal offences, as well as coronial investigations on behalf of the coroner. These investigative processes will be extremely thorough and may be protracted, particularly where the incident has occurred over a broad geographical area or involves forensic challenges. During the investigation phase the police may seek assistance from management at the location to help identify potential sources of evidence or witnesses. This could include CCTV footage and radio, telephone, or decision-making logs. Recovery or business continuity plans should identify a suitable emergency services liaison officer that can work with the police to help facilitate these types of requests.

Reoccupation after an explosion

It is possible that the building fabric may be weakened. There may be a need to have the site inspected by structural engineers and critical service providers such as electricity, water, gas, and communications may also need to assess the site before normal operations can resume.

The facility will need to be cleaned, repaired, and refurbished. If several buildings in the area are affected, local resources may be in high demand.

Business continuity challenges

Since the attacked site and surrounding area will be designated as a crime scene, they will be inaccessible. Business continuity plans should be implemented and include moving functions to an alternate location and covering the duties of personnel at the affected site.

The ability of owners and operators of crowded places to return to business as usual following an explosion, or other disaster, depends on how effectively they can devise and implement their business continuity arrangements.

Through their contact with investigating police, the nominated liaison officer will be in a position to obtain information about the likely duration of the scene examination, allowing the venue to start implementing their business continuity arrangements. While the actual process may not change significantly, the amount of time it takes often will.

Ongoing welfare and support

Providing for the needs of people who are separated from their possessions

People may have abandoned personal possessions when evacuating. These may include warm clothing, waterproof jackets and umbrellas, wallets, purses, car keys, house keys and mobile phones. It will not be possible to retrieve these whilst the police investigate. Plans should include providing for the needs of personnel and members of the public.

Medical and compassionate leave

Surviving employees may not be ready to return to work for an extended period. Consider how such leave may be managed as medical or compassionate leave. Think about offering financial support to employees, arranging cover for their duties, and offering remote working.

Grief and trauma counselling

The psychological impact of such a violent event should not be underestimated. Everyone reacts differently. Consider facilitating grief and trauma counselling for all personnel, irrespective of whether they were present during the attack.

Anniversaries and memorial services

Acknowledging anniversaries of the attack with memorial services allows those affected by the attack to recover from the experience and allows former colleagues to reconnect. Anniversaries can bring buried emotions to the surface, particularly since there may be significant media coverage. Prepare to aid individuals who require it.

Useful links

Australian National Security Website: www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

ASIO Outreach: www.asio.gov.au/outreach

Australian Disaster Resilience Handbook Collection: https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/collections/handbook-collection/

Contacts

National contact information

In the event of an emergency (police, ambulance, fire) 000

To report possible signs of terrorism National Security Hotline 1800 123 400 for TTY users: 1800 234 889

Email: hotline@nationalsecurity.gov.au Crime Stoppers 1800 333 000

Australian Federal Police: www.afp.gov.au/contact-us

AFP Hotline (after hours contact) 1800 813 784

Urgent police assistance at major Australian airports 131 237 (131 AFP)

State and Territory Information

Details for police in each state and territory can be found at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/states-territories.

Appendix A: Glossary of terms

Home Made Explosives (HMEs): A combination of commercially available ingredients combined to create an explosive substance (or a combination of military and/or commercial explosives that result in a new, non-standard explosive mixture). Non-standard explosive mixtures/compounds that have been made or synthesised from readily available ingredients.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED): Any combination of items that are not designed to be used in conjunction with each other and, when placed together, constitutes a mechanism that has the capability of exploding and causing personal injuries and/or property damage. A device made or placed in an improvised way that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and is designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract.

Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED): An improvised explosive device IED worn, such as a vest, belt, and back-pack, in which the person houses the IED and/or serves as the delivery or concealment means for explosives with an initiating device. carried or housed by a person, either willingly or unwillingly.

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED): An improvised explosive device IED delivered by a vehicle and/or that serves as the or concealed in a vehicle concealment means for explosives with an initiating device.

Appendix B: Telephoned bomb threat checklist

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A THREAT

1. Remain calm and talk to the caller

2. Note the caller's number if displayed on your phone

3. If the threat had been sent via email or social media, see appropriate section below

4. If you are able to, record the call

5. Write down the exact wording of the threat:

When Where What How Who Why Time

ASK THESE QUESTIONS AND RECORD ANSWERS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE:

Question	
1. Where exactly is the bomb right now?	
2. When is it going to explode?	
3. What does it look like?	
4. What does the bomb contain?	
5. How will it be detonated?	
6. Did you place the bomb? If not you, who did?	
7. What is your name?	
8. What is your address?	
9. What is your telephone number?	
10. Do you represent a group or are you acting alone?	
11. Why have you placed the bomb?	
Record time call completed:	

INFORM BUILDING SECURITY OR COORDINATING MANAGER	
Name and phone number of person informed:	
DIAL 000 AND INFORM POLICE	
Time Informed:	

The next section should be completed once the caller has hung up and police / building security / coordinating manager have all been informed.

Date and time of call:	
Duration of call:	
The telephone number that received the call:	

About the caller

Male ☐	Age?	Nationality?
Female ☐		

Threat language

Well-spoken	Irrational	Taped	Foul	Incoherent
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Caller's voice

Calm	Crying	Clearing Throat	Angry	Nasal	Slurred	Excited
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Stutter	Disguised	Slow	Lisp	Accent*	Rapid	Deep
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Familiar	Laughter	Hoarse	Other (*please specify*):			
☐	☐	☐	*What accent?			
If the voice sounded familiar, who did it sound like?						

Background sounds

Street noises	House noises	Animal noises	Factory Machinery	Office Machinery	Clear	Voice
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Static	PA System	Booth	Music	Motor	Crockery	
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
Other (*please specify*):						

Remarks	
Additional Notes	

Signature: ………………....…………… Print Name: ……...............………………………… Date: ……......…….

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT SENT VIA EMAIL OR SOCIAL MEDIA

1. Do not reply to, forward or delete the message
2. If sent via email, note the address
3. If sent via social media, what application has been used and what is the username/ID?
4. Dial 000 and follow police guidance
5. Preserve all web log files for your organisation to help the police investigation (as a guide, 7 days prior to the threat message and 48 hours after

SAVE AND PRINT—HAND COPY TO POLICE AND SECURITY OR COORDINATING MANAGER

Appendix C: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack—response priorities for management

In the event of an IED incident the primary response objectives are to save and protect life. The actions for achieving this may include:

Facilitating the evacuation of those at risk

- Notify key staff of the incident through prearranged messages/codes and methods.
- Appoint an evacuation manager and ensure they have situational awareness.
- Provide guidance on safe routes for those that are self-evacuating.
- Assess the suitability and potential safety of normal evacuation routes.
- Evaluate the safety of standing evacuation muster points and change if necessary.

Containing the incident or threat

- Identify and establish a perimeter to prevent people from going near the suspect device/entering the area of the explosion unnecessarily
- Restrict physical access to the site or general vicinity, without inhibiting the evacuation of people or access by emergency services.

Supporting emergency response and investigation activities

- Nominate a suitable emergency services liaison officer to meet/brief the police
- Identify and communicate safe access routes/form up points for emergency services.
- Maintain incident and decision-making logs.
- Ensure access to site plans and CCTV footage (where possible).
- Consider using CCTV and other remote methods where possible.
- Clearly identify when incident management has transitioned to the police.
- Provide ongoing support to the emergency response action as requested.

It is important to regularly practise these and any additional initial response activities so that key managers and staff clearly understand the priority actions and are able to perform these actions in a high stress and dynamic environment.

Appendix D: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack—advice for front line staff

Attacks involving IEDs may be unlikely, but it is important to be prepared to respond to such an incident. The advice below will help you plan a response.

Front line staff (security officers, ticketing staff, designated first aiders, reception staff, etc) at the immediate site of an IED attack, your top priority is to direct staff and occupants to get out of the area. This increases their safety in case a secondary device is present in the area and minimises their exposure to dust, smoke, and any hazardous substances that may have been released as a result of the blast. This allows emergency responders to find and assist the most critically injured victims.

At first opportunity call Triple Zero (000).

If you are in a building

- Direct staff and occupants to get under a sturdy table or desk if objects are falling around you.
- Direct staff and occupants to exit as quickly as possible, without stopping to retrieve personal possessions or make phone calls.
- Help others to leave the area if possible.
- Direct staff and occupants to use stairs instead of elevators.
- Be aware of weakened floors and stairways and watch for falling debris as you exit the building.

Once you are out of the building

- Direct staff and occupants to move away from windows, glass doors or other potentially hazardous areas.
- Use caution to avoid debris that could be hot, sharp, or cause puncture wounds.
- Direct staff and occupants to continue moving away from the blast site and look for emergency officials who will direct you to a safe location.
- Be aware that secondary explosions may occur at or near the original blast site, especially as rescue personnel arrive.
- Direct staff and occupants to limit their use of phones and other communications devices as much as possible (communications systems may become overloaded).

Caring for the injured

- First aid you provide may save lives.
- The most likely help you may need to provide is to control bleeding. Apply direct pressure to the bleeding site.
- Working with the ambulance service, ensure that all staff and occupants are checked, recorded, and given medical treatment where needed.
- Nearby hospitals may be overwhelmed with casualties. If you need to transport people who are not severely injured, go to a hospital that is further from the explosion site.