

Council of Australian Governments



Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Strengthening Our Resilience

2015

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ISBN 978-1-925237-72-6 (Hardcopy)

ISBN 978-1-925237-70-2 (PDF)

ISBN 978-1-925237-71-9 (DOC)

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FOREWORD

We join together to release Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Australians are facing the most significant ongoing threat from terrorism in our nation's history. Reflecting this, in 2014 the National Terrorism Public Alert Level was, for the first time, raised to High: a terrorist attack is likely at any time.

We are opposed to terrorism and violent extremism in all its manifestations, regardless of its ideological or political inspiration. Violent extremism has no place in Australia.


This Strategy focusses on the major threat that we, and other nations, are currently facing. That is, the threat from violent extremism perpetrated or inspired by terrorist groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida (AQ) and others that claim to act in the name of Islam.

This Strategy sets out the comprehensive counter-terrorism arrangements our nation has in place to meet the terrorist threat. From community engagement to diplomacy, from law enforcement to intelligence, our agencies at all levels of government are doing everything they can to prevent and, should the need arise, respond effectively to terrorist attacks.

The resilience and cohesion of the Australian community is our best defence against violent extremism and our greatest asset when responding to and recovering from a major terrorist attack. The community spirit shown during and following the Martin Place siege was testament to this strength and resilience.

One of the things that makes Australia great is our diversity. We are determined to promote respect for the diverse religious, racial and cultural backgrounds which underpin our cohesive community.

The bottom line of this Strategy, then, is simple. We are determined to protect human life, foster the strength and unity of our community, and uphold the values we hold most dear.



The Hon Tony Abbott MP
Chair
Council of Australian Governments

Significant terrorism related events affecting Australians and Australia's CT arrangements: 1977-2015

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	
Terrorism Related Events	1977 Kidnapping and wounding of the Indian Defence Attaché and his wife, Canberra. 1977 Bombing of Yugoslav Airlines Office, Melbourne. 1978 Bombing outside Hilton Hotel, Sydney.	1980 Assassination of Turkish Consul-General and his bodyguard, Sydney. 1982 Bombing of Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club, Sydney. 1986 Bomb explosion at Turkish Consulate-General, Melbourne. 1988 Firebombing of US Defence Attaché's car, Canberra. 1989 Firebombing of multiple Chinese restaurants, Perth.	1991 Firebombing of Rooty Hill Islamic Centre, Sydney. 1991 Firebombing of Jewish Kindergarten, Melbourne. 1992 Unsuccessful arson attack on US Consulate, Brisbane. 1992 Attack on Iranian Embassy, Canberra. 1995 Firebombing of French Consulate, Perth. 1998 Attempted firebombing of vehicle at Indonesian Consulate, Perth.	2001 US September 11 attacks, 10 Australians killed. 2002 Bali night club bombings, 88 Australians killed. 2003-2004 Disruption of terrorist planning associated with LeT, Sydney. 2004 Australian Embassy bombed, Jakarta. 2005 Bali restaurant bombings, 4 Australians killed. 2005 London underground bombing, 1 Australian killed. 2005 Operation Pendennis arrests of 10 individuals in Sydney and Melbourne. 2005, 2008, 2011 3 Australians held hostage separately in Iraq, Somalia and the Philippines. 2008 Mumbai attacks, 2 Australians killed. 2009 Jakarta Hotel bombings, 3 Australians killed. 2009 Operation Neath disruption of a terrorist plot at Holsworthy Barracks Sydney	2013, 2014, 2015 3 Australians conduct separate suicide bombings in Syria and Iraq. 2013 Kenya Westgate Mall attack, 1 Australian killed. 2014 Significant operations to disrupt separate terrorism networks and attack planning in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. 2014 Stabbing of 2 police officers, Melbourne. 2014 Martin Place siege, 2 Australian victims killed. 2015 Australian-Colombian dual national killed in an attack in Tunisia. 2015 Significant operations to disrupt separate terrorist attacks in Sydney and Melbourne.	Table key: ■ Terrorism pre 9/11 ■ The 'new wave' of terrorism
Changes to Australia's CT Arrangements	1977 Establishment of the Office of National Assessments. 1979 Establishment of the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence. 1979 Establishment of the Australian Federal Police. 1979 Expansion of ASIO's investigative powers.		1990 Establishment of the Defence Intelligence Organisation. 1995 Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction legislation passed. 1994 Prohibition of chemical weapons legislation passed.	2002 National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) established. 2002 Joint AFP-state/territory police Counter-Terrorism teams established in each jurisdiction. 2004 Passport cancellation legislation passed. 2005-06 States, Territories and Commonwealth enact preventative detention legislation. 2009 Establishment of the National Crisis Coordination Centre.	2011 Establishment of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. 2012 NZ invited to join the NCTC. Establishment of the ANZCTC. 2014 Establishment of the National Disruption Group. 2014 Foreign fighters legislation passed. 2014 National Terrorist Public Alert Level raised to High. 2015 Minister Assisting the PM on CT and CT Coordinator positions established.	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September 2014, for the first time, Australia's National Terrorism Public Alert Level was raised to High. This reflected the judgement of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that a terrorist attack was likely. The heightened threat level is likely to endure.

Australian governments are proactively dealing with the threat. We are working with our international partners and with the Australian community to lower the risk of a terrorist attack and strengthen our ability to respond to, and recover from, any attack.

The purpose of releasing this Strategy is to provide information to the community on the threat Australia faces and what we are doing to counter it. Importantly, it highlights the community's role in preventing, preparing for, responding to and recovering from a terrorist attack.

This Strategy sets out the framework for Australia's counter-terrorism arrangements. It situates the current terrorism threat within the global context and articulates how we are countering it. It sits above and is complemented by the *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*; an important resource that outlines governance and jurisdictional arrangements and operational responsibilities for preventing, preparing, responding to and recovering from domestic terrorist attacks.

Our Strategy is based on the following principles:

- Protecting lives is the absolute priority.
- Governments and the community must face the challenge of terrorism together.
- Terrorist acts are crimes to be dealt with through the criminal justice system.

Terrorism and Australia

Globally, ISIL, AQ and associated groups represent the most significant terrorist threat.

These groups are motivated by a selective, violent and extreme interpretation of Islam. Such an interpretation is alien to the overwhelming majority of Muslims.

Though ISIL is the most threatening manifestation of this terrorist threat, AQ and some associated groups retain the intent and capability to mount major attacks.

ISIL, in particular, exerts a direct influence in Australia through its aggressive promotion of violent extremism. This group's violent ideology, persuasive propaganda, and its grooming of young people online is directly responsible for the radicalisation to violent extremism of a significant number of individuals in our community. As a direct flow-on result, there is now a higher risk of attacks by individuals or by small groups than ever before.

Violent extremist influences in Australia will be exacerbated by foreign fighters seeking to return from conflict zones in the Middle East. Some of these foreign fighters will seek to return with the skills, experience and a predisposition to violent action that will make them a significant risk to the community.

Terrorism based on other ideological, religious, or political beliefs – such as right wing or left

wing extremists – is also of concern, though it does not represent the same magnitude of threat as that posed by violent extremists claiming to act in the name of Islam.

Resilience of the Australian community

The Australian community's resilience is important to everything we do to counter terrorism. Building and maintaining our resilience allows us to push back against terrorists' attempts to intimidate us and undermine social cohesion.

Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy is based on partnerships between all levels of government, communities and the private sector. It is focussed on prevention as a first line of defence against terrorism. Our actions are informed by thorough analysis and assessments of violent extremism here and abroad.

This Strategy involves five core elements.

1. Challenging violent extremist ideologies

Australia's task to constrain the terrorist threat is fundamentally about limiting the spread and influence of violent extremist ideas.

Governments are working with communities to counter violent extremist propaganda with carefully targeted messages. Our messages show people there are ways they can help improve the situation in Syria or Iraq, and ways they can find a sense of meaning and belonging in Australia, without resorting to violence.

Importantly, the information we provide shows the horror of living, killing and dying in the conflict zones, including exposing the horrific toll on local, overwhelmingly Muslim, populations.

We also seek to promote the values and ideas which underpin our society, ideas such as equality, respect, individual freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.

The exact messages conveying these themes are best developed and delivered by communities for their own members, though governments can help to facilitate them.

2. Stopping people from becoming terrorists

The most effective defence against terrorism is to prevent people from becoming terrorists in the first place.

To do this we work closely with the community: families, friends and community members are often in the best position to identify individuals who are at risk of radicalisation and help steer them away from violent extremism.

Our aim is to prevent extremists from exploiting vulnerable Australians and robbing them of their futures.

3. Shaping the global environment

Our efforts to counter terrorism in Australia are complemented by coordinated international action to make the global environment less conducive to terrorism. Australia works with international partners, including through the United Nations, to challenge terrorism.

We also engage with a wide number of partner countries to build capacity and capability, undertake joint operations, and exchange information to assist partner governments in detecting, monitoring and responding to terrorism.

Australia may also contribute to international military efforts to destroy or degrade major terrorist capabilities. Over the last decade, elements of the Australian Defence Force

(ADF) have been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq for this purpose.

4. Disrupting terrorist activity within Australia

Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to disrupt terrorist activity. They have a good history of disrupting numerous terrorist plots. Low-capability and limited-preparation attacks such as knife attacks present a challenge to police and intelligence agencies because they involve little or no lead time, making them difficult to detect. Given the absolute focus on saving lives, agencies will prioritise early disruption of a planned attack over waiting to gather further evidence for a successful prosecution.

Early disruption is also used to stop activities that support or facilitate terrorism, but which may fall short of specific attack planning. There are a range of methods that can be used to send a message to individuals that their activities have attracted the attention of authorities in an attempt to dissuade them from further action.

5. Effective response and recovery

If an attack does occur, we have robust arrangements in place to respond to any act of terrorism, from low-preparation to coordinated multi-jurisdiction mass-casualty attacks.

States and Territories lead the response to any attacks within their jurisdictions. They can request assistance from other States, Territories or the Commonwealth as required. States and Territories may also ask for the ADF to provide specialist skills or equipment to assist in response and recovery. State and Territory police and the Australian Federal

Police (AFP) are highly trained and well-equipped to respond to a terrorist attack. Our police are skilled in investigation, negotiation, tactical response, defusing explosives, crisis management and hostage recovery, enabling effective responses to terrorist attacks across all jurisdictions. Our emergency response and health services are also well-prepared to respond to any terrorist incident.

Australian governments work closely with critical infrastructure and key service providers, including electricity, gas, water and transport utilities, to reduce the impact of any terrorist attack on such facilities and services.

In the event of a terrorist attack, we will work calmly and efficiently to bring the perpetrators to justice and to ensure that we can all return to our everyday activities with confidence. A range of government agencies and community organisations are prepared to assist the community in an effective recovery.

Governance and accountability

Countering terrorism is a responsibility shared by all Australian governments, the community and the private sector.

The dynamic nature of the terrorist threat, and the rapid growth of home-grown and lone actor elements, demands rigorous monitoring and assessment to ensure our arrangements remain properly targeted and implemented. To this end, Australia's national counter-terrorism coordinating body, the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), meets regularly to monitor and assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism arrangements. The ANZCTC reports to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) annually.

TERRORISM AND AUSTRALIA

The most significant terrorist threat to Australian interests is from ISIL, AQ and individuals and networks inspired by the same broad ideology. This extremist ideology has been the philosophical foundation for many terrorist groups. ISIL, AQ and Boko Haram are current prominent examples.

The threat of terrorism based on other ideological, political or religious beliefs, while not of the same magnitude as that posed by ISIL and AQ, is also of concern.

The global environment

Fifteen years of concerted pressure in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere has seen the stature and capability of AQ diminished. However, AQ and others have taken advantage of instability in the Middle East – particularly in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya – to build capacity, spread their ideology, and organise and launch attacks.

ISIL's emergence in the Syria-Iraq conflict zone is the most striking example of this phenomenon. Indeed, ISIL represents a new 'business model' for extremist groups. With its income from extortion, oil and contraband sales, as well as funding from wealthy sponsors, ISIL is now among the best-resourced of terrorist groups. Because ISIL actively seeks new recruits from around the world (not just Syria and Iraq), its numbers are growing and it is now the biggest terrorist group. The unilateral declaration of a global caliphate has also boosted the flood of foreign fighters joining ISIL's ranks from approximately 100 different countries, including Australia. ISIL is, therefore, also the most 'internationalised' of the terrorist groups to have emerged in the

Middle East. Its large contingent of foreign fighters not only adds to its capabilities in Syria and Iraq, but also plays a role in radicalising and influencing others globally.

Elsewhere in the world, notably in parts of Africa, violent extremist groups, often inspired by ISIL or AQ, are exploiting instability and operating in new areas.

Many of these groups are under little or no counter-terrorism pressure. Most will prioritise local fights. Al Shabaab, for example, prioritises its war against the Governments of Somalia and Kenya and African intervention forces. Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb prioritises its clashes with Malian and other regional troops. But some of these groups will also attempt attacks on Western interests in their areas of operation.

The threat to Australia

Recent developments have demonstrated the close relationships and shared ideologies between violent extremists in Australia and terrorist groups overseas.

ISIL, AQ and associated groups are exerting an influence in Australia through propaganda flowing into our communities. This is increasing the risk of home-grown violent extremism, particularly by encouraging lone actor attacks.

Lone actor terrorist attacks

‘Lone actor’ terrorist attacks can be characterised in many ways, including ‘home-grown’, ‘self-initiated’ or ‘low-threshold’. They involve an individual or individuals operating with little or no direct contact with established terrorist groups.

This does not mean that lone actors operate in perfect isolation. They may be inspired by extremist ideology and terrorist groups’ public calls for small-scale, but high-impact, attacks. Because these attacks may only involve minimal planning, preparation or resourcing they are harder for agencies to detect and disrupt.

Terrorist groups seek to use lone actor attacks to promote their ideologies and generate fear.

This type of attack was illustrated by the murder of British soldier Fusilier Lee Rigby by two individuals born and radicalised in the United Kingdom. The pair initially attacked Fusilier Rigby with a car, before stabbing him to death.

It is also possible that individuals who are not part of, or inspired by, a proscribed terrorist group but who are fixated on a particular issue will employ lone actor-type methods in Australia, requiring counter-terrorism responses from agencies and the community.

The case of Anders Breivik who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011, underscores this possibility. Breivik was motivated by a far-right extremist worldview based on distorted and complex ideologies.

Larger scale attacks

There have been a number of mass casualty terror plots in Australia. Plans for mass casualty attacks in New South Wales and Victoria, uncovered by Operation Pendennis (2005) and Operation Neath (2009) were successfully disrupted through multi-state and multi-agency efforts.

While increasingly the focus is on the growing number of individuals and groups prepared to commit low-preparation attacks, large scale attacks against high profile targets within Australia remain a possibility.

The Martin Place siege

On the morning of 15 December 2014, Man Haron Monis walked into the Lindt Café in Martin Place, in the heart of Sydney’s commercial district. Shortly thereafter, he produced a gun and locked customers and staff inside as hostages. After a standoff lasting around 17 hours, the siege ended in gunfire. Two hostages and Monis died. Several other hostages sustained injuries.

Monis had a long history of provocative, attention-seeking behaviour. He was the subject of many law enforcement and security investigations and assessments over the period of his residence in Australia. However, neither of these investigations, nor the continuous assessment of information related to Monis in the intervening periods, provided any indication he had the intention to commit an act such as the Martin Place siege.

Foreign fighters

Among the foreign recruits joining the conflicts in the Middle East are an unprecedented number of Australians. Far more Australian foreign fighters are associated with ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra (a branch of AQ operating in Syria and Lebanon) than were associated with AQ and the Taliban from 1990 to 2010.

Not all who are motivated to support terrorist organisations will join the actual fighting.

Of the Australians who would otherwise have been motivated to travel and join ISIL or other groups, there are significant numbers who have been unable to leave Australia (generally because their passports have been cancelled). At least some of these individuals may contemplate terrorist activity here.

Many individuals who do join ISIL or other groups are committed to their ideology and may not wish to return to Australia. Many others will be killed in the fighting or die of other causes. However, there will still be some who seek to return. Based on previous experience these returnees represent a real risk.

Some will support terrorism: for example, by actively recruiting others to terrorism. Some may plan to commit terrorist attacks themselves.

Where possible, those who return will be prosecuted and imprisoned. Where this is not possible, security and intelligence agencies will have to monitor and manage these returnees.

Significantly, many of the earlier generation of AQ- and Taliban-affiliated foreign fighter returnees did not become involved in terrorist plots until more than five years after their return. This, combined with the extreme violence which characterises groups such as ISIL, suggests that the threat arising from returnees from the Syria-Iraq conflict zones will be with us for many years.

A number of individuals, including Australians, are also travelling to conflict zones in the Middle East to take up arms against ISIL rather than to fight alongside them. Fighting against ISIL is not an acceptable way for an individual to seek to improve the situation in Syria or Iraq either.

Australians returning from conflict zones

	Afghanistan and Pakistan ¹ 1990 – 2010 (20 years)	Syria and Iraq 2011 – mid-2015 (4 years and counting)
Australians travelling to conflict zones	Approximately 30	Over 120 to date
Returned to Australia	25	Over 30 to date
Subsequently involved in activities of security concern	19	<i>None to date</i>
Convicted of terrorism-related offences (some years after return)	8	<i>None to date</i>

¹ Note that Australians (suspected foreign fighters) have also been involved in conflicts in Somalia, Chechnya and elsewhere.

Terrorism in our region

Many Southeast Asian countries have built significant counter-terrorism capabilities over the last decade.

Indonesia, in particular, has proven very effective in degrading and reducing the capabilities of violent extremist organisations. In recent years it has emerged as a regional counter-terrorism leader.

The conflicts in Syria and Iraq have also attracted extremists from across Southeast Asia. Many will seek to return to plan attacks against local and Western targets and attempt to extend the reach of ISIL's self-declared caliphate.

These fighters will spread knowledge, skills and resources, and strengthen international terrorist connections. These were the two key elements in the 2002 to 2009 anti-Western bombing campaigns in Bali and Jakarta.

As returning foreign fighters bolster the ranks of extremists in the region, terrorists involved in earlier attacks, particularly in the period of 2000 to 2010, have served their sentences and are being released from Southeast Asian prisons. Many of these individuals will retain their violent extremist views and may therefore bolster regional terrorist capabilities.

Given the large number of Australians who travel to Southeast Asia for tourism or business, the possibility of another mass casualty attack involving Australians cannot be ruled out.

Other potential threats

Violence in the Middle East may spark communal tensions in Australia. Social cohesion could also be undermined by violent expressions of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism or other racially- and culturally-motivated ideologies.

The increased threat from groups such as ISIL and AQ and sympathisers within Australia has triggered some hate propaganda and attacks by nationalist and white supremacist extremist movements and individuals. This is exacerbating local intercommunal tensions and risks reinforcing terrorist recruitment propaganda by fueling perceptions of Muslim persecution.

Over time, the terrorism threat picture for Australia will change. Groups on the political far right, for instance, have posed a terrorist threat in the past and may resurface. However, there is no evidence that such groups pose a significant threat to Australia in the short to medium term.

RESILIENCE OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY

Terrorists aim to create fear and intimidation. Even a failed attack may spread fear.

We must remain resilient. Simply continuing to go about our daily activities in the face of terrorist threats will send a clear message about our resolve.

(Physical resilience, which relates to critical infrastructure and essential services, is addressed in *Chapter 5: Effective Recovery and Response*.)

Social cohesion

Peaceful expression of diverse political, religious and ideological views is an important and highly valued feature of Australian life. An objective of terrorism is to undermine our values and social cohesion. We must not let this happen.

The Martin Place siege deeply affected Australians. In the aftermath of the siege, a minority of individuals sought to incite hatred against Muslims. In response to this, many Australians took to social media to demonstrate that Australians are united in the face of terrorism.



The sea of flowers alongside messages of sympathy and support in Martin Place demonstrated that Australians were united in our stance against violent extremism.

Public communications

Australians need access to accurate and timely information about the extent and nature of a terrorist threat. Effective public communication about terrorism, especially during and following a terrorist attack, is critical to avoid speculation, misinformation and panic.

Australian governments work with media outlets and community organisations to ensure the public is appropriately informed about terrorist incidents.

Australians have access to official information about terrorism in foreign countries through the government website Smart Traveller (www.smarttraveller.gov.au). This enables resilience and vigilance in times of emergency.


AUSTRALIA'S COUNTER- TERRORISM STRATEGY

Our counter-terrorism efforts are focussed on prevention and are informed by diligent analysis and assessment of violent extremism here and abroad. Our emphasis is on reducing the lure of violent extremist ideologies in Australia, stopping Australians from choosing violence to express their views, and disrupting terrorist activity.

Despite our best efforts, there can be no guarantees that a terrorist attack will not occur. Therefore, we are continuing to develop our capabilities and resources to effectively respond to, and recover from attacks.

Australia's national Counter-Terrorism Strategy is built on:

- Challenging violent extremist ideologies
- Stopping people from becoming terrorists
- Shaping the global environment
- Disrupting terrorist activity within Australia
- Effective response and recovery



1. CHALLENGING VIOLENT EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES

Constraining the terrorist threat is fundamentally about limiting the spread and influence of violent extremist ideas.

Violent extremist ideology promoted by groups like ISIL and AQ is currently the key driver of terrorist activity across the globe. While these groups claim to act in the name of Islam, the vast majority of Muslims reject their ideologies. Indeed it is Muslims who have suffered the most at the hands of terrorist groups.

Governments across Australia are helping communities and local organisations to share their own messages countering violent extremist ideologies. Messages from within communities, particularly those from family and friends, are more likely to influence the thinking and behaviour of those attracted to violent extremist ideologies than messages delivered from outside.

For example, islamate.org.au connects trusted Islamic scholars with young people across geographic boundaries so they can provide advice and guidance. Similarly the emagazine, *The Point Magazine* features the views of young people and community and religious leaders on a wide range of issues relating to the negative impact of violent extremism on the community.

ISIL has been particularly successful in producing messages that resonate with some individuals across the globe. Their declaration of a caliphate in June 2014 is an example of such messaging.

To limit the effectiveness of violent extremists' propaganda, their false claims must be exposed. For example, in contrast to their propaganda, the reality of joining ISIL or similar groups is that individuals will be subjected to brutality and cruelty and may well be killed.

Countering violent extremist ideologies that contradict our core values is the responsibility of governments and communities. We must remain vigilant of all ideologies that promote the use of unlawful violence to achieve its goals.

What do we mean by 'violent extremism' and 'radicalisation' in this Strategy?

Violent extremism: a willingness to use unlawful violence, or support the use of violence by others, to promote a political, ideological or religious goal. Violent extremism includes terrorism, other forms of politically motivated violence and some forms of communal violence (e.g. racially motivated violence).

Radicalisation: the process by which individuals come to accept violent extremism as a legitimate means of pursuing their political, ideological or religious goals. The radicalisation process is unique to each individual. However, it often includes a combination of exposure to violent extremist propaganda and adverse social and economic factors.

The role of the internet

The online environment is easily accessible but difficult to monitor – terrorists take advantage of this. The internet enables terrorists to spread propaganda, connect with each other, groom and recruit people, and plan and execute terrorist attacks.

Some terrorist propaganda, such as AQ's *Inspire* or ISIL's *Dabiq*, and more recently, the choreographed videos made by these groups, is well-produced and seeks to portray a sense of legitimacy. Its aim is to persuade individuals to reject their own societies, and to promote fighting for and supporting terrorist organisations.

The proliferation of detailed and graphic videos of terrorist activities online (such as beheadings or terrorist training) gives impressionable individuals exposure to images not too dissimilar to what they would experience if they actually travelled to Syria or Iraq. These graphic images and messages may play a role in radicalising individuals. They may also incite fear and outrage in the general public.

The internet can also be used to counter terrorist propaganda and to connect at-risk individuals with the people and services that help prevent them being influenced by violent extremist propaganda.

If you see violent extremist material online you should report it by calling the National Security Hotline or by going to:
reportextremism.livingsafetogether.gov.au

NATIONAL SECURITY HOTLINE
1800 1234 00
Trained operators take every call seriously. You can remain anonymous.

Role of the community and private sector

It is not just the family and friends of vulnerable individuals who can provide guidance and support to resist violent extremist messages. Community leaders, community groups, teachers and many others play a constructive role in exposing the


falsehoods and propaganda that are part of the appeal of violent extremist ideologies. They can also encourage individuals to seek help from government agencies and engage with support services.

Agencies and providers of online services have a key role in limiting the availability of terrorist propaganda. Similarly, social media platforms play an important role in identifying and acting on online extremist content. For example, companies such as Facebook and Twitter are actively monitoring, reporting and in some cases closing down violent extremist sites.

Media and news organisations can play a positive role by reporting on propaganda without giving it undue attention or glamorising it. They can also help defuse possible community tensions and promote social cohesion.

Australian governments have committed funds to enhance the work of communities, the private sector and international partners to undermine the online propaganda of violent extremists. This work will also include research to better understand the impact of violent extremist propaganda on Australians and strategies to empower community and civil society voices that combat terrorist ideology.

Domestic Diversion and Disruption



Prevention is the focus of Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Preventing violent extremist ideologies from influencing Australians is a first line of defence against terrorism. When this fails, Australian government agencies use all tools at their disposal to divert people from radicalising to violent extremism and disrupt terrorist activity. These tools range from community support services to arrest and prosecution. The next three chapters provide further detail.

2. STOPPING PEOPLE FROM BECOMING TERRORISTS

The most effective defence against terrorism is to prevent people from becoming terrorists in the first place.

There is no one process or pathway to radicalisation to violent extremism. The exact combination of causes and drivers are unique to each individual. The common element in the process, however, is exposure to a violent extremist ideology (see *Chapter 1: Challenging Violent Extremist Ideologies* for more information).

Family, friends and communities are the frontline in stopping people from becoming terrorists. Australian governments support local communities in this endeavour by providing training and resources.

Efforts to prevent radicalisation focus on addressing what makes people vulnerable to violent extremist influences and terrorist recruitment. The tools used include individually-tailored programmes that support the diversion of individuals at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism and programmes to deradicalise and rehabilitate individuals.

In addition to challenging violent extremist ideologies, Australian governments and communities are also working together to improve social cohesion, identify and divert at-risk individuals, and deradicalise those already influenced by violent extremism. Like other forms of crime prevention, the aim of these activities is to help people get their lives back on track. The focus is not on individuals who hold unconventional beliefs; rather, it is on those who are radicalised, or at-risk of radicalisation, to violent extremism.

What are we doing to stop radicalisation to violent extremism?

To prevent individuals becoming or remaining radicalised, Australian governments are working with communities to:

- Address the drivers of radicalisation: building the resilience of communities to violent extremism.
- Assist at-risk individuals: supporting the diversion of individuals at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism when possible.
- Rehabilitate violent extremists when possible.

Addressing drivers of radicalisation

The common element in radicalisation is exposure to violent extremist ideology. Our approach to challenging this ideology is covered in *Chapter: 1 Challenging Violent Extremist Ideologies*. Other drivers, such as social isolation, a longing for a sense of purpose or belonging, long-term unemployment, criminality, or perceived political grievances, may also contribute. Individuals within a cohesive community – one that values respect, individual freedoms, democracy and the rule of law – may be more resilient to violent extremist ideology.

Australian governments and communities can work to reduce the impact of these drivers of radicalisation by improving social cohesion and participation. This can be done through education, helping people find jobs, preventing crime, promoting workplace diversity, and supporting families and community organisations.

Tensions within or between communities can also be a critical driver of radicalisation towards violent extremism. These will often drive feelings of isolation and political grievances that can contribute to radicalisation.

Assisting at-risk individuals

Government agencies across Australia work with and support local efforts to stop individuals from radicalising. This can range from providing targeted financial grants, resources, advice and training for community organisations, to more structured interventions and government-coordinated programmes.

The first step in assisting any individual is to identify that they may be at risk of radicalising. Each circumstance is unique, but in some cases the next step may be to develop and implement a tailored plan to divert the individual away from a path to violent extremism.

Governments and communities also work together to help rehabilitate individuals who have been radicalised to violent extremism, including convicted terrorists.

Australian government agencies, family and friends and community groups, will work together to make the plan work. There are a range of community based and government supported services and programmes to help counteract the drivers of radicalisation. These include mentoring and coaching, counselling, education and employment support, and outreach and leadership programmes.

Radicalisation to violent extremism is undoubtedly distressing for family members, friends and communities. Some people are concerned that seeking advice or assistance from government agencies could be viewed as betraying their loved ones.

While at some level these feelings are understandable, it is nonetheless in everyone's interests to identify and help at-risk individuals as early as possible. This will help to ensure harm does not come to them or others. The sooner this can be done, the quicker they can return to being productive members of the community.

What are the signs an individual may be at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism?

Individuals in the early stages of the process of radicalisation to violent extremism will start to change what they think and may begin to behave differently.

- They are likely to start following an increasingly strict and literal understanding of a given belief. This may see them vilifying or discriminating against others or openly rejecting Australian laws and customs.
- They will probably visit extremist or terrorist groups' websites and share this information with others.
- Some people withdraw from family, end friendships or start spending more time with smaller, tight-knit groups of people who share their extreme beliefs.



For information and advice on radicalisation to violent extremism, visit www.livingsafetogether.gov.au

When early intervention isn't enough within Australia

Despite our best efforts, early intervention will not stop all individuals from radicalising. If security and law enforcement agencies become aware that an individual has become a threat to themselves or others, that person will be investigated and monitored as appropriate. See *Chapter 4: Disrupting Terrorist Activity* for more information.

3. SHAPING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Terrorism is a global issue – the threat to Australia is directly related to terrorism abroad. This is evidenced by the spread of ISIL’s propaganda into Australia’s suburbs and communities, and the flow of fighters to and from conflict zones in the Middle East. Our counter-terrorism activities must therefore be global in outlook. We will have the greatest impact when we work with partners in coordinated global action against terrorism.

Australia implements sanctions against terrorist groups and contributes to developing best practices and strengthening international frameworks for responding to terrorism. We do this by working with partner countries through multilateral bodies including the United Nations and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum.

We also work with civil society to counter international violent extremism.

Working with partner countries

Australia has strong, long-standing relationships with traditional security partners, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. Our intelligence and information-sharing arrangements, legal cooperation, and defence partnerships with these key countries help us counter terrorism at home and abroad.

Australia also works with other partner countries to share information, build capacity and capability and engage in operations to degrade and disrupt and prosecute terrorists and their activities. We cooperate on counter-terrorism with a number of countries, in particular across Southeast Asia, and

increasingly with partners in the Middle East and Europe.

In some cases, Australia has also contributed to international military efforts to remove or limit the strategic space available to terrorist groups. Our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of such efforts.

Information sharing

Australia shares intelligence with partner countries to identify and disrupt terrorist networks. Information regarding persons and organisations of concern, such as their international travel and financial transactions, help Australia and its partners build a more complete picture of terrorism financing, terrorist movements and networks.

Australia works with international partners to stop the illegal flow of funds to terrorists through front organisations, registered financial institutions or not-for-profits. Terrorist groups also use a range of financing methods. These includes taxing goods and wages; controlling resources such as oil, gas, crops and minerals; kidnapping for ransom; theft and selling stolen antiquities.

Capacity and capability building

Australia works closely with regional partners to develop counter-terrorism capacity and capability. Commonwealth agencies provide training, advice and resources to:

- Strengthen counter-terrorism laws.
- Develop the skills of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt terrorist networks.
- Facilitate the use of advanced technology to identify, investigate, monitor and counter terrorism.
- Build response and recovery capability to terrorist attacks.

Australia also receives training from partner countries. This allows us to draw on the expertise of foreign governments.

Australian law enforcement agencies and the ADF also provide training to their counterparts in the Middle East, including in Iraq.

The Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation

The Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) was established by the Commonwealth Government of Australia and the Indonesian Government to build capacity in the region in response to the 2002 Bali bombings. It is jointly operated by the Indonesian National Police and the AFP.

JCLEC provides law enforcement training on issues such as countering violent extremism, investigating terrorism financing, and using social media in counter-terrorism prosecutions. It has provided training to approximately 17,000 Indonesian and regional law and justice officials.



There are many safe and legal ways Australians can contribute to humanitarian relief efforts in overseas conflicts. Information on appeals can be found at the Australian Council for International Development website: <http://www.acfid.asn.au/>.

These appeals help the millions of people displaced by conflicts such as in Syria and Iraq by providing food, water and shelter.

Australia and Iraq: The Building Partner Capacity mission

In April 2015, the Australian Government announced that the ADF, in close partnership with the New Zealand Defence Force, would provide training to the Iraqi Army to build their capacity to regain territory from ISIL and re-establish control over their country's security.

The mission underlines Australia's commitment to supporting stability in Iraq and the Middle East and helping to stop the spread of violent extremism to our own region.

4. DISRUPTING TERRORIST ACTIVITY WITHIN AUSTRALIA

We are doing everything possible to prevent individuals from radicalising towards violent extremism. However, no matter how effective our programmes are in this regard, some people will still plan to commit an act of terrorism. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to disrupt terrorists and have been successful in disrupting numerous terrorist plots to date.

Protecting lives is our absolute priority. To save lives, agencies will prioritise early disruption of a planned attack over the gathering of evidence for a successful prosecution. This is why those arrested can often be released without charges shortly thereafter: police will always place public safety ahead of securing a successful prosecution.

We can choose to disrupt activities of concern in a number of other ways. An option might be to send a message to individuals that their activities have attracted the attention of authorities, and that they are being monitored, in an attempt to dissuade them from further action. This may be done through suspending payment of welfare claims where appropriate, preventing international travel due to non-payment of tax, passport or visa cancellations.

When more specific information is available, agencies may also use other measures such as

preventative detention and control orders to disrupt individuals.

Close operational cooperation across the Commonwealth, States and Territories, including through Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams (JCTTs) in each jurisdiction, has proven effective in detecting and disrupting acts of terrorism in Australia. Through COAG, States and Territories are also working together to strengthen identity management and protect identity use, and to improve the tracking of firearms and further restrict the movement and use of illegal firearms. This work will complement other activities to counter terrorism.

The lone actor challenge

Lone actors operating on the periphery or independently of known extremist networks are difficult for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect. The low capability required for attacks – a kitchen knife, for example – means there may be little time between violent extremists forming intent and then committing an act of terrorism.

Developing disruption plans

Intelligence and law enforcement agencies gather and assess the information needed to plan disruption activities. They identify individuals and networks radicalising, planning attacks, supporting terrorist groups overseas or seeking to participate in foreign conflicts. Agencies then assess the threats these individuals or groups pose to Australia's security and may refer the case to the National Disruption Group – a multi-agency law enforcement body – so that a plan to disrupt terrorist activities can be developed.



Working together – Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams

JCTTs were first established in 2002 to better coordinate Commonwealth, State and Territory counter-terrorism investigations. They exist in each Australian jurisdiction and comprise relevant State and Territory law enforcement agencies, the AFP and ASIO. Some JCTTs also include other law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

JCTTs are flexible and adaptive multi-agency teams drawing on the expertise and special capabilities of their members. While each JCTT may differ in its structure and membership, they provide a nationally consistent vehicle for investigating and disrupting terrorist activities in Australia.

As the threat environment has evolved, JCTTs have focussed on early disruption to prevent terrorist acts. Operations in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane in 2014-15 demonstrated the speed with which JCTTs can mobilise and disrupt an attack.

Australia's counter-terrorism legislation

Australia has a strong legislative framework for countering terrorism.

Australia's national security legislation is largely a preventative regime that enables intelligence and law enforcement agencies to intervene at an early stage before a terrorist act occurs. In addition to engaging in a terrorist act, it is an offence to advocate, prepare, plan or train for a terrorist act. It is also an offence to be a member of, or associate with, a terrorist organisation. Where police do not have sufficient evidence to charge a person for one of these offences, they have special powers to prevent terrorist activities.

Control orders are issued by a court to impose restrictions on individuals who are suspected of terrorist involvement. A control order can be imposed whether or not the person has been charged or convicted of a criminal offence. Restrictions enforced under a control order could include orders to not contact or associate with certain individuals, or to not use certain technology such as the internet. The use of these powers must be supported by substantial evidence.

Preventative detention orders enable police to detain individuals where there is a threat of an imminent terrorist attack or immediately after a terrorist attack has occurred. The maximum time a person can be preventatively detained is 14 days.

The legislative framework contains thresholds and safeguards to ensure the powers available to law enforcement agencies are proportionate, and only used where appropriate and where there is a fundamental risk to public safety. As the terrorist threat evolves and new challenges emerge, we will continue to review our laws and update them as needed to keep Australians as safe as possible.

Disrupting the movement of terrorists and support for terrorism

Disruption activities also involve identifying and stopping people departing Australia to fight overseas, restricting the movement offshore of potential Australian foreign fighters (including to transit countries), and stopping terrorists, violent extremist propaganda and weapons from entering Australia.

Agencies may stop these people from travelling by cancelling passports, undertaking biometric identity checking processes at the border or imposing strict visa controls.

Preventing potential foreign fighters from travelling stops them from directly contributing to terrorist organisations and networks. It may also stop them from dying in conflicts overseas. However, preventing their travel may lead to frustration, alienation and anger, and may drive further radicalisation that could culminate in domestic terrorist attacks. Should activities of concern arise, agencies are ready to take appropriate action, and we are working with the community to provide clear messaging on why we prevent travel.



Managing returned foreign fighters

The number of Australians looking to fight with or support terrorist organisations overseas is growing. While some will die or choose to stay overseas permanently, some may seek to return home.

Not all of these foreign fighters would intend to engage in terrorist activity. Even so, their terrorist connections, skills and experience, combined with a predisposition to violent action still hold the potential to create security issues in the long-term.

Some foreign fighters may seek to return home with the intent to conduct terrorist attacks in Australia or to radicalise elements of the Australian community. Agencies will take action to mitigate the significant security risk these individuals pose.

Each individual seeking to return to Australia would be managed on a case-by-case basis. This may involve the use of several disruption approaches.

Options include prosecutions for terrorism offences overseas or personal restrictions (including permanent or temporary exclusion from Australia of non-citizens, control orders, cancellation of passports). Others may choose to cooperate with government and community initiatives and participate in countering violent extremism programmes and other preventative programmes.

5. EFFECTIVE RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

In the event of a terrorist incident, Australia is well-positioned to respond immediately to a wide range of terrorist incidents (including multi-jurisdiction, mass-casualty attacks). Our agencies are well-placed to coordinate recovery efforts to assist the Australian community to return to everyday activities.

Responding to a terrorist incident

States and Territories are responsible for responding to domestic terrorist attacks within their own jurisdiction. State and Territory police lead on-the-ground responses to terrorism and investigate terrorist incidents in close cooperation with Commonwealth law enforcement and intelligence agencies.



State, Territory and Federal Police are highly trained and well-equipped to respond to a terrorist attack in Australia. Our police are skilled in negotiation, tactical response, defusing explosives, crisis management and hostage recovery.

To create a nationwide network capable of responding to terrorist attacks anywhere in Australia, the Commonwealth, States and Territories invest in similar technology and equipment.



State and Territory emergency services and hospitals are also well-prepared to respond to a terrorist attack.

Australian governments work closely with critical infrastructure and key service providers, including electricity, gas, water and transport sectors to prevent and reduce the impact of any potential terrorist attack. This includes setting and enforcing standards for counter-terrorism measures and monitoring compliance, putting systems in place to stop terrorists from accessing critical infrastructure and working with the private sector to improve their ability to keep essential services operating even in the event of a major terrorist attack.

A State or Territory may ask for assistance from other States and Territories or the Commonwealth to respond to a terrorist attack. States and Territories may also ask for assistance from the ADF, which maintains unique counter-terrorism capabilities.

The Commonwealth has responsibility for responding to offshore maritime and aviation related terrorist attacks.

Government agencies across all Australian jurisdictions conduct regular reviews and participate in counter-terrorism exercises to test and improve counter-terrorism capability and arrangements. These exercises also ensure that States, Territories and the Commonwealth are able to work together seamlessly to respond to larger or more complex terrorism incidents.

Exercise IRON MOON

In 2013, Exercise IRON MOON was conducted to improve Australia's ability to respond to a maritime terrorist incident. Several hundred personnel from the ADF and Australian intelligence and security agencies participated in a mock scenario in which Australian offshore interests were attacked. Exercise IRON MOON demonstrated that Australia's multi-agency maritime response and recovery skills were effective and well-coordinated. It reinforced the importance of testing Australia's operational and strategic counter-terrorism arrangements. Western Australia Police participated in a support role.



The Police Command Post at Exercise Hermes Castle

Exercise HERMES CASTLE was a major national counter-terrorism exercise designed to test and evaluate the multi-agency response to an incident on an ADF base. Held on 7 May 2015, the exercise was led by NSW Police with support from ADF, the AFP, and a number of State and other Commonwealth partners.

Multiple jurisdiction operation: G20

On 15-16 November 2014, Brisbane hosted the G20 Leaders' Summit. It was the most significant gathering of world leaders in Australia's history, with over 25 global leaders, 4,000 delegates and 2,500 media in attendance.

Ensuring the security and safety of all attendees was paramount. This was a large and complex operation, which required extensive coordination and cooperation between Queensland Government agencies, Commonwealth Government agencies and the private sector. Working with their State, Territory, Federal and New Zealand counterparts, Queensland Police played a central role in frontline operations and assisting with coordination across jurisdictions.

Security measures at the Summit included venue security at the Summit's location, law enforcement for crowd control, close personal protection of delegations, transport and customs security to ensure travelling parties were safe, and intelligence coordination to monitor potential terrorist threats.

In addition to accrediting over 15,000 individuals, the operation involved coordinating over 6,000 police officers, creating 12 restricted areas around the Summit's venue, and passing the *G20 (Safety and Security) Bill 2013* to temporarily provide law enforcement officers with special powers to close roads, remove vehicles from restricted areas and prohibit certain items.

These were all important elements that contributed to a safe and successful Summit.



Response to overseas attacks

When an international terrorist incident affects Australian citizens or interests, the Commonwealth Government is responsible for coordinating Australia's response. Consular assistance will be provided to victims and their families.

If asked by the government of an affected country, Australian governments may also assist in responding to an overseas terrorist attack, such as by providing medical, police, intelligence or forensic assistance.

Recovering from a terrorist attack

Recovery is the process of restoring normality after a terrorist attack. This includes the restoration of physical, psycho-social and economic wellbeing and the reconstruction of physical infrastructure.

In the event of a terrorist attack, Australian governments will work to ensure that everyone can confidently return to their everyday activities. A timely and efficient recovery will undermine the success of a terrorist attack and help improve community resilience.

State and Territory governments have primary responsibility for recovery efforts within their jurisdiction. Recovery activities may include supplying food, water and shelter, reconstructing damaged areas, and providing ongoing health and counselling services.

State and Territory governments may also request the assistance of other States, Territories or the Commonwealth Government in recovering from a terrorist incident.

Commonwealth assistance may include the provision of financial assistance or ADF support.

Australia's response to the 2002 Bali bombings

The 12 October 2002 terrorist attack in Bali remains the largest single act of terrorism to have directly affected Australians. 202 people were killed, including 88 Australians.

Australian governments worked in partnership with Indonesia to respond. The Commonwealth Government provided emergency evacuations for critically injured Australians and undertook a joint criminal investigation with Indonesia.

Australian State and Territory governments provided a number of important resources such as victim identification experts and played a pivotal role in the repatriation of deceased Australians.



Public health, infrastructure and the economy

Ensuring the physical and psycho-social wellbeing of individuals affected by a terrorist act is paramount. National approaches to public health emergencies are coordinated by the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, which is chaired by the Commonwealth Government Chief Medical Officer and includes Chief Health Officers from States, Territories and New Zealand.

Critical infrastructure is essential for our community to function normally. Australian governments will work closely with businesses and industry to ensure critical infrastructure is restored as quickly as possible following a terrorist attack.

Acts of terrorism may impact the financial wellbeing of individuals, businesses and the broader economy. Financial support is available to individuals, businesses or State and Territory governments. This plays an important role in supporting our economy in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.



NATIONAL CRITICAL CARE AND TRAUMA RESPONSE CENTRE

The 2002 Bali bombings resulted in a large number of serious trauma and burns victims. Many of the victims were flown to Darwin and, being too badly injured to be moved to other capital cities, remained there for treatment. Following this experience, and recognising the lack of adequate facilities in the region, the National Critical Care and Trauma Response Centre was established in Darwin.

The Centre is now a key element of our emergency medical response to incidents of national and international significance, including terrorist incidents. The value of the Centre has been proven on many occasions including following the 2005 Bali bombings when many more burns and blast victims were airlifted to Darwin and treated at the Centre. The Centre maintains its equipment and its core medical response team in Darwin, working closely with the Northern Territory Police and Emergency Services to train, exercise and respond to a range of incidents.



GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Countering terrorism is a shared responsibility between all Australian governments, communities, and the private sector. The *Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements* sets out how governments work together.

All Australian jurisdictions have comprehensive counter-terrorism governance arrangements. The ANZCTC is the national coordinating body for counter-terrorism which reports to COAG. The ANZCTC is co-chaired by a State or Territory representative and the Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, who is the primary contact between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories on counter-terrorism issues.

This Strategy provides an overarching strategic framework for Australia's national counter-terrorism arrangements. It situates the current terrorism threat to Australia within the global context and articulates how we are countering it at home and abroad. It is complemented by the *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*; an important resource that outlines governance and jurisdictional arrangements and operational responsibilities for preventing, preparing, responding to and recovering from domestic terrorist attacks.

Evaluations

The ANZCTC produces an annual report for COAG. From 2016 this will include an evaluation of the Strategy against the changing terrorist threat. The ANZCTC also assesses Australia's counter-terrorism capabilities against the present threat environment. It ensures decisions regarding resources, training and capabilities are coordinated at the national level and that any gaps are addressed.

State, Territory and Commonwealth agencies report through established channels to their respective governments on the continuing effectiveness of counter-terrorism arrangements. For example, the Australian Counter Terrorism Centre evaluates the performance of Commonwealth Government agencies against the Commonwealth's counter-terrorism priorities and reports to the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

There are also a number of independent oversight bodies which assess and report on elements of our counter-terrorism arrangements.

Resourcing

Through our various reporting mechanisms, internal reviews and external checks and balances, all Australian governments will ensure that resources are directed to areas where they will have the greatest impact on countering terrorism.

Australia's response to the changing terrorism threat

Australia's counter-terrorism arrangements are constantly evolving. Australian government agencies use lessons learned from terrorist incidents here and overseas and analysis of emerging terrorist tactics to enhance their ability to prevent and respond to terrorism.

Incidents like the 2002 Bali bombings; attacks in London, Madrid and Mumbai; and foiled attacks planned in Australia led to a number of initiatives improving our capacity to detect, prevent and respond to threats. For example, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (now ANZCTC) was established in response to the events of 11 September 2001 and the 2002 Bali bombings, and the *Foreign Fighters Act* was passed in 2014 in response to the growing numbers of Australians attempting to fight with ISIL overseas.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Australian Crime Commission
ACTC	Australian Counter-Terrorism Centre
ADF	Australian Defence Force
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ANZCTC	Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee
AQ	al-Qa'ida
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
CT	counter-terrorism
CT Coordinator	Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
IGIS	Inspector General of Intelligence and Security
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JCTT	Joint Counter-Terrorism Team
JCLEC	The Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
NCCTRC	National Critical Care and Trauma Response Centre
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Committee
NSC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
ONA	Office of National Assessments
PM	Prime Minister

PHOTO REFERENCES

Front Cover	Australian flag waving	iStock
	Martin Place flowers	iStock
	Police officers in tactical gear	NSW Police
	Police officers playing cards with children	ACT Police
Page 5	Sydney pays respect to victims after 16 hour siege	Getty Images
Page 13	JCLEC logo	AFP
Page 14	Police officer and suspect	NSW Police
Page 14	Legislation definition	iStock
Page 14	Gavel	iStock
Page 16	Smartgate at airport	ACBPS
Page 17	Emergency service personnel in front of ambulance	NSW Police
Page 17	Crime scene in Melbourne	Getty Images
Page 18	Exercise Hermes Castle	NSW Police
Page 19	G20 Leader's Summit photograph	G20 Australia
Page 20	Police talking to a civilian	AFP
Page 20	ADF personnel carrying a stretcher	Defence
Page 21	Medical personnel and ambulance	NCCTRC